In a recent thread here at AF (LINK), I took issue (yet once again) with
a renewed assertion by Ken Temple that the decrees of the Council of Trent
concerning justification and salvation are essentially
"semi-Pelagian". To support this charge, Ken relies heavily on the
polemics of R.C. Sproul, as expressed in his published works, Faith Alone and
Willing to Believe (see THIS
THREAD for some critical reflections). Ken invokes Sproul's use
Herman Bavinck, who wrote, "although
semi-Pelagianism had been condemned by Rome, it reappeared in a ‘roundabout
way", and adds the following from G. C. Berkouwer (via Sproul):
Between Orange and
Trent lies a long process of development, namely, scholasticism, with its
elaboration of the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, and the Roman
system of penitence...
For a fuller context of the above quotes, I now turn to
Sproul's, Faith Alone—wherein after quoting chapter 5 of Trent's sixth
session—we read:
Here Rome makes it clear that fallen man cannot convert himself
or even move himself to justice in God's sight without the aid of grace. Again
Pelagiansim is repudiated.
This predisposing grace, however, is rejectable. It is
not in itself effectual. Its effectiveness depends on the fallen person's
assent and cooperation. This sounds very much like semi-Pelagianism, which had
been condemned at Orange. Earlier in the fifth session, which treated original
sin, Trent affirmed some aspects of the decrees of Orange.
Rome has repeatedly been accused of
condemning semi-Pelagianism at Orange but embracing it anew at Trent. Herman
Bavinck held that "although semi-Pelagianism had been condemned by Rome, it
reappeared in a 'roundabout way'". G. C. Berkouwer observed:
"Between Orange and Trent lies a
long process of development, namely, scholasticism, with its elaboration of the
doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, and the Roman system of
penitence...Hence the situation became much more complicated for Rome in Trent
than when, in 529, semi-Pelagianism had to be condemned for its "weakening" of
grace...Trent had to ward off the Reformers' attack without derograting from
the decrees of Orange...The gratia praeveniens had to be taught without
relapsing into the sola fide of the Reformers. That is why the Orange
texts are repeated in Trent, especially in the decree on justification."
The
Council of Trent to steer a course on the razor's edge between semi-Pelagianism
and Reformed thought. It is arguable that they cut themselves on that razor. At
issue was the residual power of man's weakened, fallen will. Rome tried to
argue that the will is weaker than semi-Pelagianism allowed, but not as weak as
the Reformer's insisted. Berkouwer concludes: "At Trent there was no
concern with the threat to grace as there was at Orange. But Trent is concerned
with the natural freedom of the will. The latter, it is true, has been weakened
by sin (Orange, Valence, Trent) but not at all extinguished."
...To
avoid the Reformation and Augustinian view of the enslaved will, Rome speaks of
the power of fallen man to assent and cooperate with prevenient grace. That
grace is not effectual without the sinner's response. (Sproul, Faith Alone, pp.
140-141.)
Now, the
above has certainly given Ken the impression Sproul believes that Trent is
semi-Pelagian, and that Sproul believes he has support from Bavinck and
Berkouwer on this issue. But what one will fail to uncover in Sproul's writings
is a clear, definitive description of what semi-Pelagianism actually is. The
nearest I have been able to find is in his book, Willing to Believe,
wherein he seems to identify any system of soteriology that does not embrace
"monergistic regeneration" as a form of semi-Pelagianism (see pp.
20-29, 69-84). As such, he is convinced that the vast majority of modern
Evangelicals embrace semi-Pelagianism,
and that in official Roman Catholic doctrine, we have the, "triumph of
semi-Pelagianism over Augustinianism" (p. 84).
The major
error in Sproul's assessments lies in the fact that he has incorrectly
described/understood what actually constitutes semi-Pelagianism. This fact
comes as shock to me, for a number of the scholars he has quoted (e.g.
Berkouwer, Harnack, Schaff), in his two referenced books above, do define the
distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism—i.e. the rejection of the belief
that preceding/prevenient grace (gratia praeveniens) is necessary for
one to accept the Gospel. Sproul has
substituted this distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism with the notion
that it is the rejection of "monergistic regeneration" that makes
one's theology semi-Pelagian—to do so is either a case of dishonesty or very
shoddy scholarship.
Before
moving on to Sproul's misrepresentation/misunderstanding of Berkouwer, I would
like to provide a few scholarly selections that identify the distinguishing
feature of semi-Pelagianism:
SEMI-PELAGIANISM. The
doctrines on human nature upheld in the 4th and 5th cents. by a group of
theologians who, while not denying the necessity of *Grace for salvation,
maintained that the first steps towards the Christian life were ordinarily
taken by the human will and Grace supervened only later. (The Oxford Dictionary of the
Christian Church, 2nd ed. 1974, 1985 reprint, p. 1258.)
SEMI-PELAGIANISM. Doctrines, upheld during the period from 427 to 529, that rejected the extreme views of Pelagius and of Augustine in regards to the priority of divine grace and human will in the initial work of salvation...
SEMI-PELAGIANISM. Doctrines, upheld during the period from 427 to 529, that rejected the extreme views of Pelagius and of Augustine in regards to the priority of divine grace and human will in the initial work of salvation...
Cassian taught that though a
sickness is inherited through Adam's sin, human free will has not been entirely
obliterated. Divine grace is indispensable for salvation, but does not
necessarily need to precede a free human choice, because, despite the weakness
of human volition, the will takes the initiative toward God. (Evangelical
Dictionary of Theology, 1984, p. 1000.)
In opposition to both systems
[Pelagianism and Augustinianism] he
[John Cassian] taught that the divine image and human freedom were not
annihilated, but only weakened, by the fall; in other words, that man is sick,
but not dead, that he cannot indeed help himself, but that he can desire the
help of a physician, and either accept or refuse it when offered, and that he
must cooperate with the grace of God in his salvation. The question, which of
the two factors has the initiative, he answers, altogether empirically, to this
effect: that sometimes, and indeed usually, the human will, as in the cases of
the Prodigal Son, Zacchaeus, the Penitent Thief, and Cornelius, determines
itself to conversion; sometimes grace anticipates it, and, as with Matthew and
Paul, draws the resisting will—yet, even in this case, without constraint—to
God. Here, therefore, the gratia
praeveniens is manifestly
overlooked.
These are
essentially Semi-Pelagian principles, though capable of various modification
and applications. The church, even the Roman church, has rightly emphasized the
necessity of prevenient grace... (Philip
Schaff, History of the
Christian Church, 1910, 1981 reprint, 3.861, 862.)
The
preeminent Christian doctrinal/historical scholar of the latter-half of the
20th century, Jaroslav Pelikan, 'puts-the-icing-on the-cake' (so to speak). He
begins his section on Semi-Pelagianism with:
The
opposition to Augustine earned this position the title
"Semi-Pelagian" in the sixteenth century, but already in the fifth
century the partisans of Augustine were calling it "the remnants of the
Pelagian heresy [Pelagianae pravitatis reliquiae]." The term is used to
cover a group of theologians from the fifth and sixth centuries, the most
prominent of whom were John Cassian, Vincent of Lérins, and Fautus of Riez. (The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), p.
319.)
After
presenting the doctrines that the adherents of "Pelagianae pravitatis
reliquiae" agreed upon with Augustine and the catholic tradition, Pelikan
then delineates where they departed:
Even
while asserting that without divine assistance none of these virtues could
attain perfection, Augustine's critics still insisted that "it cannot be
doubted that there are by nature some
seeds of goodness in every soul implanted by the kindness of the
Creator." This did not detract from the glory of redemption. If is was
said "that one should not pay attention to what is good by nature because
before the coming of Christ, the Gentiles obviously did not attain to
salvation," the reply was the axiom: "Anyone who denies that nature
is to be proclaimed in its good qualities, simply does not know that the Author
of nature is the same as the Author of grace," and that therefore
"since the Creator is the same as the Restorer, one and the same is
celebrated when we praise either work." Praising the free will of man
meant praising its Creator and did not detract from his grace.
This was
evident from the Bible itself, where "the bounty of God is actually shaped
according to the capacity of man's faith." Sometimes, for example in the
conversion of Paul or of Matthew, divine grace had preceded any desire or good
will on the part of man. But in other instances, for example in the account of
Zacchaeus or of the thief on the cross, the free will of man had taken some
initiative. By the goodness of the Creator there still remained the capacity to
initiate the will for salvation. (Ibid., pp. 323, 324)
He then
moves on to the synod of Orange (529) and its clear, direct condemnation of the
teaching that "there still remained the capacity [in fallen mankind] to
initiate the will for salvation":
...in
response to the argument that there was a diversity of operations by which in
some cases men took the initiative and in others God took the initiative, the
synod condemned as "alien to the true faith" anyone who taught that
"some have come to the grace of baptism by mercy, but others by free
will." Citing the specific biblical examples that had been used in support
of this teaching, Caesarius affirmed that the conversion of Zacchaeus and of
the thief on the cross had also been "not achievements of nature, but
gifts from the generosity of divine grace." The "beginning of
faith" was always due to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. (Ibid., p. 328)
So, the
question for me is: why did Sproul substitute the distinguishing feature of
semi-Pelagianism—the belief that "there still remained the capacity [in
fallen mankind] to initiate the will for salvation"—with the notion that
it is the rejection of "monergistic regeneration" that makes one's
theology semi-Pelagian ? What makes this substitution even more baffling is the
fact Sproul informs his readers that it was the Synod of Orange in 529 which,
"condemned the system of semi-Pelagianism"; and yet, one will look in
vain to find ANY reference to "monergistic regeneration" in the
decrees of that synod.
Time to
move onto Sproul's use of Berkouwer. Does Berkouwer side with Sproul's view
that Trent, and subsequent Catholic theology, had adopted semi-Pelagianism ?
Sproul's surrounding context of the two quotes from Berkouwer in Faith Alone
gives the reader the strong impression that he believed this. However, a
deeper, more extensive reading of Berkouwer reveals that Berkouwer did not
believe Trent, and subsequent Catholic theology, had embraced semi-Pelagianism.
Berkouwer discusses this issue at length in two of his important works that
have been translated into English: The Conflict with Rome (English 1958)
and Studies in Dogmatics - Divine Election (English 1960).
Sproul
quotes Berkouwer three times in his Faith Alone (pp. 140, 141), all
of which are from The Conflict with Rome (pp. 80, 82, 84). Two of
those three quotes are directly related to the topic at hand (the third deals
with Calvin) and are provided in their entirety above. If one limits their
reading of Berkouwer concerning semi-Pelagianism and Catholicism to what Sproul
has provided, a severely flawed impression is difficult to avoid. However, if
one reads Berkouwer's full contributions on this issue as found in The
Conflict with Rome (pp. 76-112) and Studies in Dogmatics - Divine
Election (pp. 28-52) a much different impression emerges. One will find
Berkouwer's clearest assessment on whether or not the Roman Catholic Church teaches semi-Pelagianism
in the following selection:
The
Council of Orange (529) condemned not only Pelagianism but also
semi-Pelagianism, a condemnation to which the Roman Catholic Church still
adheres for the reason that even semi-Pelagianism thinks too depreciatively
of the necessity of God's grace. To be sure, semi-Pelagianism rejected
Pelagianism and did not teach an inviolate ibberum arbitrium, but it
still maintained a belief in free will — although a weakened free will (infirmitas
liberi arbitrii). It taught that man retains his free will, but because it
has been weakened by sin it is in need of God's helping grace, so that a
cooperation between God's grace and man's freedom is necessary. Rome rejects
this doctrine because she does not think the necessity of grace is sufficiently
confessed by it. (Studies
in Dogmatics - Divine Election, p. 30 - bold emphasis mine.)
I don't
think that Berkouwer could be much clearer on what his position concerning
semi-Pelgainism and the RCC is. (Anyone who thinks Berkouwer maintained that the
RCC is semi-Pelagian after reading the above is in dire need of some help.)
Before
ending this somewhat lengthy post, I would like to point out one more
significant difference between Sproul and Berkouwer. Note the following from
Sproul's pen:
A
theologian friend of mine says frequently that in church history there have
been only three basic types of theology. There have been a multitude of
theological schools with subtle nuances, but in the final analysis there are
only three kinds of theology: what we call Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, and
Augustinianism. Virtually every church in Western church history, and Eastern
church history as well, has fallen into one of those three categories. (Saved
from What ?, p. 46.)
It was
after reading the above that I came to understand why Sproul labels Arminian,
Lutheran and Catholic theologies as semi-Pelagianism, for in his worldview,
"there are only three kinds of theology".
But,
Berkouwer does not agree with Sproul on this matter. Berkouwer's view adds a
fourth kind of theology: synergism. In Studies in Dogmatics - Divine
Election, he makes a clear distinction between Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism,
synergism and monergism, and places the Arminian, Lutheran and Catholic
theologies into the synergistic category.
I shall
end here, feeling fairly confident that I established some significant flaws in
a number of Sproul's assessments.
Grace and
peace,
P.S. I think it is prudent that I let my Calvinistic readers know that this thread is not a critique of monergism and/or an endorsement of synergism (in any form).
