Towards the end of July, I received an email from a reader of this blog that precipitated an in depth investigation into the doctrinal axiom/rule termed, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa (the external works of the Trinity are indivisible.)
This axiom/rule had never been a focus of my theological studies, but the very mention of if brought back to mind something Augustine wrote near the beginning of his book, De Trinitate (On the Trinity); note the following:
…the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are indivisible, so work indivisibly. (On the Trintiy, 1.7 – NPNF 3.20; trans. Arthur West Haddan, revised and annotated by W.G. T. Shedd)
…the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit are inseparable, so do they work inseparably. (The Trinity, 1.7 – The Works of Saint Augustine I/5, p. 70; trans. Edmund Hill)
[Latin: Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sicut inseparabiles sunt, ita inseparabiliter operentur]
And:
…the Trinity works indivisibly in everything that God works (On the Trintiy, 1.8 – NPNF 3.21; trans. Arthur West Haddan, revised and annotated by W.G. T. Shedd)
…the Trinity works inseparably in everything that God works The Trinity, 1.8 – The Works of Saint Augustine I/5, p. 70; trans. Edmund Hill)
[Latin: inseparabiliter operari trinitatem in omni re quam deus operatur]
The connection between the above Augustine quotes and the doctrinal axiom/rule termed, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa is obvious. With that said, subsequent online research revealed something to me that I had been unaware of—this axiom/rule was quite influential in the formulation of the Latin/Western understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. During that research one particular book came to my attention, Adonis Vidu’s The Same God Who Works All Things: Inseparable Operations in Trinitarian Theology (Google preview).
I finished reading the book a few days ago. It was not an easy read for me given the fact that my previous knowledge of the doctrinal axiom/rule termed, opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa was limited. I can now say with confidence that this is no longer the case; Vidu’s book—along with the reading of a number of the works referenced therein—has greatly enhanced my knowledge of the axiom/rule.
Now, with that said, though I certainly appreciated Vidu’s in depth contribution, the book is not without flaws, and it is one of those flaws that will constitute the primary focus of this post—Gregory Nazianzen’s teachings on the monarchy of God.
From Vidu’s book we read:
Arguing against the personalistic trend epitomized by Zizioulas, Chrysostom Koutloumousianos demonstrates that neither the Cappadocians, nor John Damascene, Maximus the Confessor, nor any other Eastern Father, sets the person of the Father himself as primordial in relation to the divine essence. There is no monarchy of the Father, but rather a monarchy that is shared by all the persons in virtue of their sharing the one divine essence. (Page 98 – bold emphasis mine.)
Vidu, apparently relying on Koutloumousianos, makes an all too familiar mistake concerning Gregory’s thoughts on the monarchy of God—i.e. that Gregory has only ONE interpretation concerning what the monarchy of God means.
A number of patristic scholars have exposed this mistake, but for now, I shall limit this post to one—John Zizioulas. Note the following lengthy selection:
This brings us to the question of divine monarchia. What meaning did it have for the Fathers and for the Cappadocians, in particular? Did it relate to the Father or to all three persons? Let us try to answer this question with particular reference to the evidence of Gregory Nazianzen, who seems to be trusted more by the critics of the Cappadocians.
Monarchia means one arche. The idea was first employed to indicate that there is only one rule in God, amounting to one will, one power, and so on.[56] Soon, however, the concept had to be employed ontologically, as it applied not only to the Economy but to God in his eternal life. In such a case, it was inevitable for the question to arise as to its precise meaning for the being of God. The Cappadocian Fathers witness to this development by specifying what arche means with reference to God.
Basil clearly understands arche in the ontological sense of the beginning of being. As such, arche is attached exclusively to the Father. He writes: the names Father and Son 'spoken of in themselves indicate nothing but the relation (schesis) between the two'. 'For Father is the one who has given the beginning of being (arche ton einai) to the others... Son is the one who has had the beginning of his being (arche tou einai) by birth from the other'.[57]
Gregory Nazianzen seems to use the term monarchia in the early sense of one rule, will and power. As such, he refers it to all three persons of the Trinity. Yet he is not unaware of the ontological meaning which he expresses with the term monas. This he refers not to all three persons but to the Father. Let us consider carefully the following passage which is crucial for our subject.
There are three opinions (δόξαι) about God, anarchy, polyarchy and monarchy. The first two were played by the children of the Greeks, and let them continue to be so. For anarchy is something without order; and the rule of many is factions, and thus anarchical and thus disorderly. For both these things lead to the same thing, namely disorder; and thus to dissolution, for disorder is the first step to dissolution. But monarchia is that which we hold in honour. It is, however, a monarchia that is not limited to one person, for it is possible for unity if at variance with itself to come into a condition of plurality; but one which is constituted by equality of nature, and agreement of opinion, and identity of motion, and a convergence (or concurrence) of its elements to one[58] ...so that though numerically distinct there is no division of ousia.[59]
So far, monarchia seems to refer to all Persons and not to any one of the Trinity. Yet we should note that Gregory uses monarchia in the sense of one will and concord of mind, that is, in the old moral or functional sense of the term, to which we referred earlier: monarchy is contrasted with anarchy and polyarchy, and the accent falls on order as opposed to disorder, and on common will, and so on. The ontological sense of monarchia comes with the text that immediately follows the one just quoted:
For this reason, the One (μονάς) having moved from the beginning (from all eternity) to a Dyad, stopped (or rested) in Triad. And this is for us the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. The one as the Begetter and the Emitter (προβολεύς), without passion of course and without reference to time, and not in a corporeal manner, of whom the others are one of them the begotten and the other the emission.
In this passage, the subject is transferred to the ontological level; it is now a question not of a moral unity in which disorder and anarchy are excluded but of how the three Persons relate to one another in terms of ontological origination. The crucial point here is the word monas: to what does it refer? Does it refer to something common to the three Persons out of which the Trinity emerged? Or to the person of the Father?
If the monas referred to something other than the Father, that is to ousia or something common to the three persons, we would have to exegete the text in the following way: 'The one ousia (monas) moved to a Dyad and finally stopped at the Triad'. This would mean that from the one ousia came first the two persons together (a dyad) to which a third one was added finally to make the Trinity. Unless we are talking about the Filioque such an interpretation would look absurd. If we wish to have the Trinity simultaneously emerging from the ousia, which is what I suppose those who refer the monas to ousia would prefer, the text would forbid that, for it would have to read as follows: 'The one ousia (monas) moved (not to a dyad first but simultaneously) to a triad'.
The text clearly refers the One (μονὰς) to the Father, for it explains itself immediately by saying: 'the one (moved) as the Begetter (γεννήτωρ) and Emitter (προβολεύς), of whom the others are the one begotten and the other the emission (τῶν δέ, τό μέν γέννημα, τό δέ προβολεύς)'. Furthermore, in continuing his thought, Gregory explains all this by saying that the reason why he would insist on what he just said is that he wants to exclude any understanding of the Trinity as a derivation from an a-personal something, like an overflowing bowl (an explicit reference to Plato), lest the emergence of the Son and the Spirit be conceived of as 'involuntary', his intention being to 'speak of the unbegotten and the begotten and that which proceeds from the Father'.
In conclusion, when Gregory uses monarchia in the moral sense of unity of mind, will, and so on, he refers it to the three persons taken together (how could it be otherwise?). But when he refers to how the Trinity emerged ontologically, he identifies the monas with the Father. (Zizioulas, John D., Communion & Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church, T&T Clark, 2006, pp. 131-134 – Amazon link.)
Notes:
56. Thus in Justin, Dial. 1; Tatian, Or. ad Gr. 14; etc.; see above, n. 20.
57. Basil, C. Eun. 2.22. Note again the language employed by Basil: the Father gives the Son not ousia but einai, 'being'; there is a difference between these two terms: person is being, but does not denote ousia', ousia and being are not identical. See the implications of this above.
58. This is the rather inadequate rendition given of this sentence in A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. VII, p. 301. A translation and commentary more adequate and more interesting for our subject is given by J. Mason, The Five Orations of Gregory of Nazianzus, 1899, p. 75: 'This complete harmony of mind and will in the Godhead is itself based upon the concurrence of the other Blessed Persons with that One of their number from Whom they are derived, viz. the Father'. In this case, the monarchy is ultimately referred to the Father. Exegetically, the meaning depends on how we render the word 'one' (ἓν) and the 'from it' (τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ): do these refer to the One from whom the others derive, i.e., the Father, or to the elements that make up the unity of nature, motion, etc.? The sentence that immediately follows would support the first option. My argument, however, is unaffected in either case, as can immediately be seen.
59. Gregory Naz., Theol. Or. 3.2. [This is the 3rd ‘theological oration’ and has the title ‘On the Son’; it is also numbered as #29 among the 45 extant orations of Gregory N.]
In ending this opening post, I would like to submit that an objective reading of Gregory Naziansen’s writings reveals he submitted TWO interpretations, not ONE, concerning the monarchy of God—the most important being the monarchy of God the Father.
Grace and peace,
David
