Athanaius: did he teach Sabellianism (i.e. modalism) ???

I have recently encountered the proposition that Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 296-373) was not a Trinitarian, but rather, that he was a Sabellian (i.e. modalist).

The first instance of connecting Athanasius with Sabellianism that I came across occurred back on 11-26-2023 via my reading of a post published by Andries van Niekerk on his blog From Daniel to Revelation under the title, 'The Sabellians of the Fourth Century'. Andries wrote:

Note that the West also vindicated Athanasius. His theology was similar to the Sabellians...

And:

Another article provides further evidence of the Sabellian leaning of the theologies of Alexander and Athanasius. For example, “Studer’s account here follows the increasingly prominent scholarly position that Athanasius’ theology offers a strongly unitarian Trinitarian theology whose account of personal differentiation is underdeveloped.” (LA, 238) The question is, why did the West vindicate these two Sabellians?

The 'Another article' mentioned (and linked to) by Andries was published under the title, 'Was Athanasius a Sabellian?' From that post we read:

There is no real difference between the theology of Alexander and Athanasius and the main Sabellians of their time; Eustathius and Marcellus. As ‘one hypostasis’ theologians, Alexander and Athanasius were part of a minority in this church. And since both Sabellius’ theology and the term homoousios were already formally rejected as heretical by the church during the preceding century, they followed an already discredited theology.

The Western Council of Serdica in 343, where Athanasius played a dominant part, is devastating evidence. It explicitly describes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as one hypostasis and Athanasius approved and supported this creed. People struggle with this conclusion is that it shows that Athanasius, who is regarded as the hero of the Arian Controversy, was a Sabellian; not a Trinitarian.

Before moving on to my second recent encounter with the notion that Athanasius was a Sabellian, I would like to mention I have been following Andries blog for over two years now. It began shortly after Andries posted a few comments back in late November 2021 in an old thread here at AF [LINK]. (Interestingly enough, earlier this week during some online research I discovered that Andries had also published the material from the two above mentioned threads at the Christianity Stack Exchange [LINK].)

With this background information in place, I suspect that folks reading this post will be as surprised as I was that in a mere seven days after reading Andries’ posts on Athanasius and Sabellianism, I began receiving emails from a knowlegable member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints who has embraced the proposition that Athanasius was a modalist/Sabellian. (My December 10, 2023 AF post  was inspired by our email exchanges.)

Prior to all this, I was involved in an email exchange—beginning on August 30th—with an advocate of neo-modalism who had questions concerning my AF post, James White's (mis)use of Melito of Sardis as an early witness to the incarnation of God (the Son) [December 5, 2011 - LINK].

There is one more connection that warrants mentioning: the LDS gent mentioned above is a friend with Errol Amey. Errol has a keen interest in patristics, and has contributed a number of informative comments in a few threads here at AF. And so, we have four gents mentioned above, that have at least three interests in common—patristics, theology, and challenging/respectful dialogue—who are in one way or another linked to this current post.

It is now time to delve into why I maintain Athanasius was not a Sabellian/modalist. One of Andries’ arguments—which initially seems quite strong and compelling—is that,"Athanasius opposed the concept of 'three hypostases'" and taught the "Father and Son are only one Hypostasis". (LINK)

Though Athanasius wrote in at least two extant documents that the Father and Son are 'one hypostasis', he also acknowleged that they are 'three hypostases'. Note the following:

And how do the impious men venture to speak folly, as they ought not, being men and unable to find out how to describe even what is on the earth? But why do I say 'what is on the earth?' Let them tell us their own nature, if they can discover how to investigate their own nature? Rash they are indeed, and self-willed, not trembling to form opinions of things which angels desire to look into (i Pet. i. 12), who are so far above them, both in nature and in rank. For what is nearer [God] than the Cherubim or the Seraphim? And yet they, not even seeing Him, nor standing on their feet, nor even with bare, but as it were with veiled faces, offer their praises, with untiring lips doing nought else but glorify the divine and ineffable nature with the Trisagion. And nowhere has any one of the divinely speaking prophets, men specially selected for such vision, reported to us that in the first utterance of the word Holy the voice is raised aloud, while in the second it is lower, but in the third, quite low,—and that consequently the first utterance denotes lordship, the second subordination, and the third marks a yet lower degree. But away with the folly of these haters of God and senseless men. For the Triad [Τριὰς], praised, reverenced, and adored, is one and indivisible and without degrees (ἀσχηματιστός). It is united without confusion, just as the Monad also is distinguished without separation. For the fact of those venerable living creatures (Isa. vi. ; Rev. iv. 8) offering their praises three times, saying 'Holy, Holy, Holy,' proves that the Three Subsistences [τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις] are perfect, just as in saying 'Lord,' they declare the One Essence. They then that depreciate the Only-begotten Son of God blaspheme God, defaming His perfection and accusing Him of imperfection, and render themselves liable to the severest chastisement. For he that blasphemes any one of the Subsistences [τῶν ὑποστάσεων] shall have remission neither in this world nor in that which is to come. But God is able to open the eyes of their heart to contemplate the Sun of Righteousness, in order that coming to know Him whom they formerly set at nought, they may with unswerving piety of mind together with us glorify Him, because to Him belongs the kingdom, even to the Father Son and Holy Spirit, now and for ever. Amen. [Athanasius, In Illud ‘Omnia’, Mihi Tradita – On Luke x. 22 (Matt. Xi. 27) - NPNF 4.90]

And:

And prohibit even the reading or publication of the paper, much talked of by some, as having been drawn up concerning the Faith at the synod of Sardica. For the synod made no definition of the kind. For whereas some demanded, on the ground that the Nicene synod was defective, the drafting of a creed, and in their haste even attempted it, the holy synod assembled in Sardica was indignant, and decreed that no statement of faith should be drafted, but that they should be content with the Faith confessed by the fathers at Nicaea, inasmuch as it lacked nothing but was full of piety, and that it was undesirable for a second creed to be promulged, lest that drafted at Nicaea should be deemed imperfect, and a pretext be given to those who were often wishing to draft and define a creed. So that if a man propound the above or any other paper, stop them, and persuade them rather to keep the peace. For in such men we perceive no motive save only contentiousness. For as to those whom some were blaming for speaking of three Subsistences [τρεῖς λέγοντας ὑποστάσεις], on the ground that the phrase is unscriptural and therefore suspicious, we thought it right indeed to require nothing beyond the confession of Nicaea, but on account of the contention we made enquiry of them, whether they meant, like the Arian madmen, subsistences [τριοουσίους] foreign and strange, and alien in essence [οὐσίας] from one another, and that each Subsistence [ὑπόστασιν] was divided apart by itself, as is the case with creatures in general and in particular with those begotten of men, or like different substances, such as gold, silver, or brass ;—or whether, like other heretics, they meant three Beginnings and three Gods, by speaking of three Subsistences [τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις λέγωσι].

They assured us in reply that they neither meant this nor had ever held it. But upon our asking them 'what then do you mean by it, or why do you use such expressions?' they replied. Because they believed in a Holy Trinity [ἁγίαν Τριάδα], not a trinity [Τριάδα] in name only, but existing and subsisting in truth, 'both a Father truly existing and subsisting, and a Son truly substantial and subsisting, and a Holy Spirit subsisting and really existing do we acknowledge,' and that neither had they said there were three Gods or three beginnings, nor would they at all tolerate such as said or held so, but that they acknowledged a Holy Trinity [ἁγίαν μὲν Τριάδα] but One Godhead [μίαν δὲ θεότητα], and one Beginning, and that the Son is coessential [ὁμοούσιον] with the Father, as the fathers said; while the Holy Spirit is not a creature, nor external, but proper to and inseparable from the Essence [τῆς οὐσίας] of the Father and the Son. (Athanasius, Tomus ad Antiochenos - Tome to the People of Antioch, Paragraph 5 - NPNF 4.484)

Having accepted then these men's interpretation and defence of their language, we made enquiry of those blamed by them for speaking of One Subsistence, whether they use the expression in the sense of Sabellius, to the negation of the Son and the Holy Spirit, or as though the Son were non-substantial, or the Holy Spirit impersonal. But they in their turn assured us that they neither meant this nor had ever held it, but 'we use the word Subsistence thinking it the same thing to say Subsistence or Essence [ὑπόστασιν μὲν λέγομεν ἡγούμενοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι εἰπεῖν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν];' 'But we hold that there is One, because the Son is of the Essence of the Father [ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας], and because of the identity of nature [τὴν ταυτότητα τῆς φύσεως]. For we believe that there is one Godhead [μίαν γὰρ θεότητα], and that it has one nature [φύσιν],  and not that there is one nature of the Father, from which that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit are distinct.' Well, thereupon they who had been blamed for saying there were three Subsistences [τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις] agreed with the others, while those who had spoken of One Essence, also confessed the doctrine of the former as interpreted by them. And by both sides Arius was anathematised as an adversary of Christ, and Sabellius, and Paul of Samosata, as impious men, and Valentinus and Basilides as aliens from the truth, and Manichasus as an inventor of mischief. And all, by God's grace, and after the above explanations, agree together that the faith confessed by the fathers at Nicaea is better than the said phrases, and that for the future they would prefer to be content to use its language. (Athanasius, Tomus ad Antiochenos - Tome to the People of Antioch, Paragraph 6 - NPNF 4.484, 485)

Clearly, Athanasius used the term 'hypostasis/hypostases' in two, distinct senses. In one sense, he equated 'hypostasis' with 'ousia' and 'theotēs', and in a second sense, with the personal distinctions of the three members of the Trinity. He also made it quite clear that he separated himself from those folk who embraced a Sabellian sense of the term. With these facts in place, I must conclude that Athanasius did not embrace Sabellianism.

Grace and peace,

David

Monarchianism and Origen's Early Trinitarian Theology – a dissertation by Stephen Edward Waers (Part 3)

Part 3 of this series examines chapters 4 and 5 of Waers dissertation. Chapter 4 delves into, “[t]he interplay between the monarchian controversy and the development of Origen’s thought” (p. 216). Waers has made a, “conscious decision to read Origen with his contemporaries rather than with his heirs in the Nicene debates” (p. 216), and his analysis focuses, “almost exclusively on ComJn 1-2, books which Origen composed during the height of the monarchian controversy” (p. 216). Waers offers the following reasons for his emphasis on Orgien’s ComJn 1-2:

The fact that these books are extant in a mostly complete Greek text, untouched by the editorial hand of Rufinus, makes them particularly valuable for reconstructing Origen’s thought. Further motivating my choice to use these two books is the fact that I accept an early dating for their composition, beginning around 217 C. E. This dating means that these two books were composed in the middle of the monarchian controversy, with Contra Noetum (ca. 200-210) and Adversus Praxean (ca. 213) antedating them and the Refutatio (ca. 225-235) and De Trinitate (ca. 240-250) postdating them. This dating of the text, coupled with Origen’s probable contact with monarchianism during his trip to Rome, suggests that the anti-monarchian polemical context is important for interpreting works he composed while still in Alexandria. (p. 217)

Pages 219-228 provide important historical context for Origen’s ComJn, which includes the fact that Origen composed ComJn, “at the request of his patron Ambrose”* (p.225).

Pages 228-241 concerns “Monarchianism and Book 1 of the Commentary on John.” Waers in this section points out that Origen clearly has certain aspects of modalistic monarchianism in mind, placing an emphasis on the real existence of the Logos, who is God’s Son; and that this Logos/Son is distinct from the Father—both of these aspects being denied by the modalistic monarchians. I particularly found the following of interest:

In both ComJn and De Prin., Origen interprets ἀρχή in John 1:1 as a reference to the ἀρχή in Proverbs 8:22ff, where Wisdom is said to have been with God before creation. By means of Pr. 8:22, which itself echoes the opening words of Genesis in the LXX, Origen explicitly links Wisdom with demiurgic functions, even claiming that Wisdom contains within herself all of the forms of what would be created. In De Prin., he asks if any pious person could consider the Father to have ever existed without Wisdom by his side. Later in book one of ComJn, Origen stresses that the Wisdom of God “is above all creation” (τὴν ὑπἐρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφίαν τοῦ θεοῦ). Thus, not only has Origen argued that Wisdom is not something insubstantial, he has also argued that Wisdom has been alongside of, and distinct from, the Father from the beginning, that the Father has never been without Wisdom. (Page 238)

Chapter 5 begins on page 242, and is my personal favorite. The title—Origen the subordinationist; subordination as a means of distinguishing the Father and the Son—sets the tone for the entire chapter. Note the following:

In this chapter, I demonstrate that the intentional subordination of the Son was a common strategy that anti-monarchian writers used to distinguish the Father and Son during the first half of the third century. By situating their terms for distinction within a subordinationist framework, they were able to clarify how the Father and Son were not “one and the same.” The term subordination is often used by scholars with the negative evaluative judgment that whatever is deemed subordinationist was a failure to live up to the standards of Nicaea. I reject this usage as anachronistic when discussing third-century texts and authors and argue, to the contrary, that the subordinationist schemata employed by the authors considered in this chapter were intentionally used to distinguish the Father and Son. Although subordinationism comes to be viewed as heretical in the post-Nicene period, it was an accepted anti-monarchian strategy among some prominent early third-century authors. (Pages 243, 244)

Now, given the fact that scholars use the term “subordination" in more that one sense—e.g. economic, functional, heirarchical, ontological, positional, relational—Waers, in pages 16-25, cogently delves into the issue of subordination. After relating how a number of other scholars have used the term with reference to the Church Fathers of the 2^nd and 3^rd centuries, Waers writes:

In order to avoid over-generalizing, I work with a definition of subordinationism created from examples in the three main texts I consider in the final chapter: Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, Novatian’s De Trinitate, and Origen’s ComJn. As I observe when reading these three texts, the subordination of the Son to the Father is not a uniform phenomenon in the early third century. Thus, perhaps my definition will add nuance to the ways we speak of subordination. In the texts I survey, subordination often occurs when the authors speak of the relationship between a cause/source and its effect (in our case, the Father and Son). When authors are dealing with a cause and effect, the effect either lacks something present in the cause or possesses it less fully. (Pages 21, 22)

He then provides the following definition:

The Son is less than the Father and distinguished from him because he has an origin. For both Tertullian and Novatian, the reception or derivation of something from a source necessarily implies that the recipient is less than the source. Novatian is explicit about this and states multiple times that the Son is less than (minor) the Father. This is what I mean by subordination. (Page 23)

Before he examines Origen’s subordinistic/anti-monarchian passages (pages 263-299), he takes a look at what Tertullian and Novatian had to say on this issue (pages 245–263).

Towards the end of his section on Origen, Waers boldly states:

His participation in the divinity of the Father necessarily entails him receiving or drawing it from the Father into himself. Only one is αὐτόθεος, and it is not the Son. (Page 291)

He then presents a number of passages from Origen wherein he subordinates the Son to the Father, and then writes:

Because divinity is received by the Son from a source outside of himself, argues Origen, he would cease to be God if he stopped being with the only true God, who is the Father. (Pages 293)

He ends chapter 5 with the following:

Origen, like Tertullian and Novatian, argued that the derivative or received nature of the Son’s divinity distinguished him from the Father, who alone properly and fully possessed divinity. With regard to divinity, the Son was downstream from the Father, the source from whom he drew it into himself. (Page 299)

Chapter 5 is followed by the Conclusion (pages 300-304). I shall let interested folk read it for themselves…

Grace and peace,

David

*Concerning this Ambrose, Eusebuis wrote:

ABOUT this time Ambrose, who held the heresy of Valtentinus, was convinced by Origen’s presentation of the truth, and, as if his mind were illumined by light, he accepted the ordodox doctrine of the Church. (HE, VI.18 – NPNF, Series 2, 2.264.)

From Jerome we read:

AMBROSE, at first a following of Marcion, and then converted by Origen, became a deacon of the the church and attained great fame through his profession of faith in the Lord. (On Illustrious Men, LVI – FC, volume 100.83.)

And:

…Ambrose, who, as we have said, was converted from the Marcionite heresy to the true faith, exhorted Origen to write commentaries on the Scriptures, providing him with more than seven secretaries, paying their expenses, and an equal number of copyists, and, more important than this, demanding work from him daily with incredible importunity. For this reason, in one of his letters. Origen calls him ἐργόδιώτην, a task master. (Ibid. 100.88.)

Monarchianism and Origen's Early Trinitarian Theology – a dissertation by Stephen Edward Waers (Part 2)

Part 2 of this series on monarachianism will focus on the following question:

Was monarchianism the majority view in the second and early/middle third century?

The ‘roots’ of the above question that has become somewhat popular amongst some 20^th and 21^st century scholars is uncovered by Waers in the early pages of his dissertation; note the following:

Harnack produced a number of accounts of monarchianism that shaped discourse for much of the twentieth century. Harnack’s division of monarchianism into two main streams, modalistic and dynamistic, has become a scholarly commonplace. Harnack’s account is colored by his overarching assumption that the speculative theology of the learned Logos theologians was at odds with the simple faith of the uneducated masses. He proposed that it was this opposition between the learned theologians and the simple laity that gave rise to the monarchian controversy and that monarchianism was an attempt to protect the pure faith against the intrusion of speculation which derived from Hellenistic philosophy. (Page 7)

Waers in his section on Tertullian, provides a quote that is utilized by Harnack and other folk who maintain that monarchiaism was the majority position in the early/middle 3rd century:

This monarchian interpretation of the oneness of God was particularly appealing for those whom Tertullian calls simple folks. For Tertullian, claims about the oneness of God must be balanced by assertions about the plurality of God in the economy, a balance that Tertullian’s simplices seem unable to achieve. Tertullian states, “Simple people… not understanding that while they must believe in one only <God> yet they must believe in him along with his economy, shy at the economy.” (Page 139)*

Now, to extrapolate from the above that the “simple faith" of the simplices mentioned by Tertullian was the same as the actual faith of the monarchians of the second and early/middle third century is dubious, and unproven. Later on, Waers exposes some of the weaknesses of such a view:

Despite its notable influence in the early-third-century church, it is difficult to sustain claims that monarchianism was the majority position in the church, or something like an early-third-century orthodoxy. Reinhard Hübner is the most recent proponent of this theory, and he suggests that monarchianism was the overwhelming majority position in Christianity until the middle of the third century. Hübner’s theory is built upon a number of suppositions, the most problematic of which requires a revisionist reading of virtually all second-century theology and a revisionist chronology of some major figures. (Page 203)

And:

All of the extant accounts of monarchianism that I have studied thus far have shown that the explicit identification of the Father and Son was at the core of monarchian theology. The absence of such strong statements about the Father and Son being identical in second-century texts is an insurmountable obstacle for Hübner’s theory. Were Noetus as influential as Hübner contends, one would surely find this central aspect of his teaching mirrored in those writers who allegedly relied on him. It is more probable that Noetus’ antithetical statements about God were drawing on traditional ways of speaking about God in Asia Minor. He added to this traditional phraseology the monarchian postulate, that the Father and the Son are one and the same.

Once Hübner’s assertions in favor of an early date for Noetus have been problematized, his theories about monarchianism as the overwhelming majority position until the mid-third century lose their firm basis. There is evidence that monarchianism gained a strong following in Rome at the beginning of the third century. However, there is scarcely enough information to determine the extent to which monarchianism was adopted in other regions. (Pages 205, 206)

Should have part 3 up later this week, the Lord willing…

Grace and peace,

David 

*Full context of Tertullian quote HERE.

Monarchianism and Origen's Early Trinitarian Theology – a dissertation by Stephen Edward Waers (Part 1)

A couple of weeks ago (04-22-21), I received an email that brought to my attention the following scholarly article:

The Christology of Callistus

Shortly after reading Haine’s essay, I discovered the following germane dissertation by Stephen Edward Waers:

Monarchianism and Origen's Early Trinitarianism

This dissertation precipitated a renewed interest and investigation into the cause and rise of the theological movement that Waers has termed “monarchianism”. [Personally, I prefer ‘modalistic monarchianism’; other folk have used ‘patripassianism’, ‘Sabellianism’ and ‘modalism’ when referencing the movement.]

To make sure that his readers fully understand what he believes constitutes one as a monarchian, Waers provides the following working definition:

…the monarchians had two core commitments: (1) God is one alone; (2) Jesus is God. These two core commitments led them to conclude that the Father and the Son are “one and the same” (ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ). This is the heart of the theological position I am calling monarchianism. (Page 13)

The above definition is given towards the end of the section, “Major Scholarship on Monarchianism” (pages 6-14). Though brief, this section is a solid overview that begins with, Hermann Hagemann’s, Die römische Kirche und ihr Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den drei ersten Jahrhunderten (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864), and is immedieately followed by Dr. Adolf Harnack’s substantive contributions. It also includes Heine’s above refenced, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–91, and ends with  Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” in Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993), 124–39; idem, “Wer war Sabellius?,” Studia patristica 40 (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 359-65. 

Chapter 1, “Models of the Father/Son Relationship in the Second Century” (pages 26-94), examines a number of texts produced by the Church Fathers of the second century. From the opening of the chapter we read:

Scholars frequently refer to figures from the second century as “modalists” or “monarchians” without first defining what either of those terms means. For example, Campbell Bonner called Melito of Sardis’ theology “naïve modalism.” More recently, Reinhard Hübner has argued that Ignatius of Antioch was a monarchian. As I noted in the introduction and develop in the later chapters on the monarchian controversy, I prefer a restrictive and specific definition of monarchianism. Using my definition, monarchianism is restricted to those who explicitly claim that the Father and the Son are “one and the same” in an effort to maintain that there is only one God. (Page 26)

Though I certainly understand Waers’ motive for “a restrictive and specfic defintion of monarchianism”, I believe that other criteria than an explicit "statement that the Father and Son are ‘one and the same'", can be used to determine if ones theology is monarchian. As such, Reinhard Hübner's claim "that Ignatius of Antioch was a monarchian" needs to be taken seriously. Interestingly enough, John Henry Newman in his An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine states that, “St. Ignatius may be considered Patripassian” (University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, p. 17). As for Campbell Bonner’s assertion that Meltio of Sardis’ theology was “naïve modalism”, I believe he was accurate. [See my post, James White's (mis)use of Melito of Sardis, for support of this assessment.]

Yet, even with the above observations in mind, Waers survey of the second century writers remains quite valuable. He divides the second century writings he exmamines into three categories. First, the authors that made a ‘soft distinction’ between the Father and the Son—i.e. the distinction made is primarly via the use of names and titles. Second, a “hard distinction”—i.e. those who provide an explicit explanation on how the Father and Son are essentially distinct. And third, those writers whose reflections lie in between the soft and hard distinctions. The following are the authors and writings, that are surveyed and categorized by Waers:

Soft Distinction -

1 Clement (Pages 35, 36)

2 Clement (Pages 36, 37)

Ignatius (Pages 38-41)

Polycarp (Pages 41, 42)

Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, and Shepherd of Hermas (Pages 42-45)

Epistle to Diognetus (Pages 46, 47)

Melito (Pages 48-52)

The Ambiguous Middle -

Theophilus of Antioch (Pages 52-57)

Irenaeus (Pages 58-61)

Clement of Alexandria (Pages 61-73)

Athenagoras (Pages 73-78)

Hard Distinction -

Justin Martyr (Pages 79-91)

Given my recent threads on Justin Martyr, I was particularly interested in reading Waers’ analysis of Justin’s theology on the relationship between the Father and Son. The following is from the middle of that section:

Justin unabashedly asserts that there is another God alongside the Creator God whom his dialogue partners acknowledge. Trypho and his coreligionists were pleased that Justin had clearly stated that there was no God above the Creator of all, but they remained unconvinced by Justin’s argument that there was another God alongside the Creator. This exchange between Justin and Trypho signals one of the chief points of disagreement that frequently recurs as the dialogue progresses. Justin again and again claims that the Son is another God alongside the Father. Other second-century authors spoke of Christ as God, but they did not clarify that he was another God. Justin carries on the tradition of maintaining the Son’s divinity, but he couples it with an equally strong affirmation that the Son is a God distinct from, and even different than, the Father. (Pages 85, 86)

Waers reiterates the above in his conclusion of the section; note the following:

Of all of the writings surveyed in this chapter, Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho stands out because of its strong concern to show that the Father and Son are distinct, even different. He argues that the Son is another God and that he is distinct from the Father in number. Justin’s descriptions of the difference between the Father and the Son offer a sharp contrast to the other second-century theologies that did not take care to distinguish them so strongly. Even more, while Justin uses an abundance of scripture from the Old Testament to support his positions, he does not shy away from using Greek philosophical concepts in a way that we do not see in the Apostolic Fathers. (Page 93)

In chapters 2 and 3, Waers provides, “a detailed analysis of the main texts of the period that bear witness to monarchian theology” (p. 96). He correctly points out that, “we do not possess any texts from the monarchians themselves”; as such, “[w]e are thus left with the difficult task of reconstructing monarchian theology using only the fragmentary evidence we can extract from hostile witnesses.” The following is his introduction to the texts he utilizes:

Although it is the latest of the texts I survey, I begin with an overview of passages relevant to monarchianism in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History. He has little to say about monarchianism itself, but his work does elucidate the state of the church in Rome at the time when monarchianism made its appearance. Next, I discuss Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum, which I take to be the earliest of the sources attesting to monarchiansim. Then, I examine Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, which I consider to be dependent on Contra Noetum. These two sources are the earliest attestation to monarchianism, and they show that there was a stable core to monarchian theology. At the same time, there was also variation and development within monarchian theology, early signs of which can be seen in Adversus Praxean. In chapter three, I undertake a similar analysis of the Refutatio omnium haeresium and Novatian’s De Trinitate, which give us later portraits of monarchianism. (Page 96)

I shall end part 1 of my look into Waers dissertation with the following selection:

The most foundational tenet of monarchian theology, and the one that remains stable across all witnesses, is the strong affirmation that there is only one God. At the beginning of the third century, such claims were common. Both the monarchians and their opponents claimed to believe in only one God. The distinctive thing about the monarchian commitment to belief in only one God was that it interpreted the oneness of God in a manner that rejected the position held by their opponents, namely, that Jesus and the father were distinct realities and both God. The monarchians supported their understanding of the oneness of God with references to classic biblical affirmations of monotheism, like Isaiah 44:6.

The second core component of monarchian theology was the unwavering confession that Jesus was divine. The acceptance of the divinity of Jesus demarcated them from the psilanthropists, who also sought to preserve the oneness of God by denying that Jesus was God. Because the monarchians had an interpretation of monotheism that did not allow for two distinct realities to be God, they argued that the Father and Son were one and the same. In their monotheistic reasoning, if the Father was God, and the Son was God, then they were necessarily the same. Any argument affirming that both were distinct and divine was tantamount to ditheism in the eyes of the monarchians. Using this same logic, the monarchians focused on biblical theophanies and argued that one and the same God was both invisible and visible. This approach was a stark rejection of the way someone like Justin interpreted the Old Testament theophanies. (Pages 213, 214)

Should have part 2 up soon. Until then, I hope folk who have taken the time to read part 1 will also read the entire dissertation.

Grace and peace,

David

Augustine's Trinity: modalistic, semi-modalistic, or pro-Nicene Trinitarianism ???

Back on July 10, 2018 I became engaged in a discussion with Andrew Davis at his blog Contra Modalism. Andrew had published a thread under the title, 'Do You Believe in the Son of God ?' (link), which caught my eye. From the opening post we read:

[Quotes from Andrew will be in GREEN; my combox comments from Andrew's blog will be in BLUE; excerpts from Augustine and scholars in RED]

To believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, then, is manifestly required for salvation. The confession that Jesus is “the Christ, the Son of the living God” is central to the true Christian faith (Matt 16:16).

Yet tragically, many professing Christians deny the Son of God. They do this by embracing Augustinian trinitarianism.

Surely such a statement must seem shocking to many. But consider this- if one believes that the Lord Jesus Christ is the Supreme God, the one God, the Almighty, rather than His Son, then a person does not truly believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God.

Towards the end of the post, Andrew boldly states that, "Augustinian trinitarianism, then, or semi-modalism, as I prefer to call it, is not simply some innocuous error."

In the combox, I asked Andrew for some further clarification as to what he meant by "Augustinian trinitarianism" and "semi-modalism". He replied with:

I’m using “Augustinian Trinitarianism” here to refer to his beliefs as expressed in his books on the Trinity, and in his debate with Maximinus, a Homoian, that God, the one God, is by definition the Trinity. Its this identification of God with the Trinity instead of identifying God as the Father in particular that logically leads to a denial that Christ is the Son of God. Whatever monarchy and causality of the Son by the Father there is in this view, since it is within God, the Trinity, it ultimately doesn’t change this. The problem as I see it is not a lack of affirmation of the monarchy of the Father, but the identification of the one God with the Trinity rather than the Father. (July 10, 2018 at 9:35 pm)

And:

Semi-modalism says that the one God is one individual who is ontologically three persons of Father, Son, and Spirit. From there there is considerably more variety depending on who you talk to, ranging from a breakdown of the relationship between those persons are one defined by ontologically causality of the Son and Spirit from the Father, to a mere economic choice among those three persons to effectively role-play as Father, Son, and Spirit. (July 15, 2018 at 4:37 am)

Augustine believed that, "the one God is one individual"?  That assessment did not, and does not, seem to be an accurate understanding of what Augustine actually taught. The rest of this post will build upon my following combox response to Andrew:

My understanding of Augustine is that though he terms the Trinity (the Three) “one God”, he does not say that the Trinity (the Three) is “one individual”. Augustine states, “‘the Three are One’, because of one substance”; and, “hath one and the same nature”—not “one individual”.

IMO unus Deus (one God) with reference to the Trinity in Augustine’s mature thought has Deus being used in a qualitative sense. This understanding makes sense of the “God from God’ phraseology—found throughout Augustine’s writings, and, of course, in the Nicene Creed.

I then provided the following quote from an esteemed scholar of Augustine:

One constant strand of argument throughout the book has been that the Father’s monarchia, his status as principium and fons, is central to Augustine’s Trinitarian theology. The discussions of these central chapters of the book should, however, have also made clear that many things come under the umbrella of asserting the importance of the Father’s status as principium. For Augustine, the Father’s status as principium is eternally exercised through his giving the fullness of divinity to the Son and Spirit such that the unity of God will be eternally found in the mysterious unity of the homoousion. (Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, p. 248.)

I am in total agreement with the above reflections from Ayres. In a previous AF thread—Augustine - on the causality of the Son from the Father and the monarchy of God the Father—I provided a number of examples which support Ayres' belief that, "the Father’s monarchia, his status as principium and fons, is central to Augustine’s Trinitarian theology". With this central teaching of Augustine in mind, I am unable to make sense out of Andrew's conclusion that Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity, "logically leads to a denial that Christ is the Son of God."

Now, Andrew is certainly not the only person to charge Augustine with embracing some degree of modalism. I first came across this notion while reading Harnack's, History of Dogma. Note the following:

We can see that Augustine only gets beyond Modalism by the mere assertion that he does not wish to be a modalist, and the aid of ingenious distinctions between different ideas. (History of Dogma, 1958 Eng. ed., 4.131.)

IMO, Harnack should have read Augustine much more closely, for Augustine definitively goes well beyond, "the mere assertion that he does not wish to be a modalist". Time and time again Augustine makes it clear that the Trinity (i.e. the Three) is composed of three distinct persons, and that the Father is the beginning/source of the Son and the Holy Spirit. As mentioned above, I have already provided a number of examples which are germane to Augustine's anti-modalistic understanding of the Trinity. The following selections will add further support that Augustine did not espouse some degree and/or form of modalism:

summe unus est Pater Veritatis, Pater suae Sapientiae (De Vera Religione, 43.81 - Sant'Agostino website)

The Father of Truth is uniquely the highest/supreme One, the Father of His Wisdom (On True Religion, 43.81 - translation mine.)

112. One God alone I worship, the sole principle of all things [unum omnium Principium], and his Wisdom who makes every wise soul wise, and his Gift [munus] whereby all the blessed are blessed. I am certainly sure that every angel that loves this God loves me too. Whoever abides in him and can hear human prayers, hears me in him. Whoever has God as his chief good, helps me in him, and cannot grudge my sharing in him. Let those who adore or flatter the parts of the world tell me this. What good friend will the man lack who worships the one God whom all the good love, in knowing whom they rejoice, and by having recourse to whom as their first principle they derive their goodness? Every angel that loves his own aberrations and will not be subject to the truth, but desires to find joy in his own advantage, has fallen away from the common good of all and from true beatitude. To such all evil men are given to be subdued and oppressed. But no good man is given over into his power except to be tried and proved. None can doubt that such an angel is not to be worshipped, for our misery is his joy, and our return to God is his loss.

113. Let our religion bind us to the one omnipotent God, because no creature comes between our minds and him whom we know to be the Father and the Truth, i.e., the inward light whereby we know him. In him and with him we venerate the Truth, who is in all respects like him, and who is the form of all things that have been made by the One, and that endeavour after unity. To spiritual minds it is clear that all things were made by this form which alone achieves what all things seek after. But all things would not have been made by the Father through the Son, nor would they be preserved within their bounds in safety, unless God were supremely good. (Of True Religion, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, 55.112, 113, p. 282 - translation by John H. S. Burleigh.) 

16. ON THE SON OF GOD

God [the Father] is the cause of all that exists. But because he is the cause of all things, he is also the cause of his own Wisdom, and God is never without his Wisdom. Therefore, the cause of his own eternal Wisdom is eternal as well, nor is he prior in time to his Wisdom. So then if it is in God's very nature to be the eternal Father, and if there never was a time when he was not the Father, then he has never existed without the Son. (The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 70 - St. Augustine, Eighty-three Different Questions, p. 45.)

All those Catholic expounders of the divine Scriptures, both Old and New, whom I have been able to read, who have written before me concerning the Trinity, Who is God, have purposed to teach, according to the Scriptures, this doctrine, that the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit intimate a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality; and therefore that they are not three Gods, but one God: although the Father hath begotten the Son, and so He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son is begotten by the Father, and so He who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but only the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, Himself also co-equal with the Father and the Son, and pertaining to the unity of the Trinity. Yet not that this Trinity was born of the Virgin Mary, and crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried, and rose again the third day, and ascended into heaven, but only the Son. Nor, again, that this Trinity descended in the form of a dove upon Jesus when He was baptized; nor that, on the day of Pentecost, after the ascension of the Lord, when "there came a sound from heaven, as of a rushing mighty wind,'' the same Trinity "sat upon each of them with cloven tongues like as of fire," but only the Holy Spirit. "Thou art my Son," whether when He was baptized by John, or when the three disciples were with Him in the mount, or when the voice sounded, saying, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again;" but that it was a word of the Father only, spoken to the Son; although the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as they are indivisible, so work indivisibly.  This is also my faith, since it is the Catholic faith. (On the Trinity, Book I.7 - NPNF 3.20 - bold emphasis mine.)

But if the Son is said to be sent by the Father on this account, that the one is the Father, and the other the Son, this does not in any manner hinder us from believing the Son to be equal, and consubstantial, and coeternal with the Father, and yet to have been sent as Son by the Father. Not because the one is greater, the other less; but because the one is Father, the other Son; the one begetter, the other begotten; the one, He from whom He is who is sent; the other, He who is from Him who sends. For the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son. And according to this manner we can now understand that the Son is not only said to have been sent because "the Word was made flesh," but therefore sent that the Word might be made flesh, and that He might perform through His bodily presence those things which were written; that is, that not only is He understood to have been sent as man, which the Word was made but the Word, too, was sent that it might be made man; because He was not sent in respect to any inequality of power, or substance, or anything that in Him was not equal to the Father; but in respect to this, that the Son is from the Father, not the Father from the Son; for the Son is the Word of the Father, which is also called His wisdom. What wonder, therefore, if He is sent, not because He is unequal with the Father, but because He is "a pure emanation (manatio) issuing from the glory of the Almighty God ?" For there, that which issues, and that from which it issues, is of one and the same substance. (On the Trinity, Book IV.27 - NPNF Vol. 3.83 - bold emphasis mine.)

28. Therefore the Word of God is sent by Him, of whom He is the Word; He is sent by Him, from whom He was begotten (genitum); He sends who begot, That is sent which is begotten...What then is born (natum) from eternity is eternal... But the Father is not said to be sent, when from time to time He is apprehended by any one, for He has no one of whom to be, or from whom to proceed; since Wisdom says, "I came out of the mouth of the Most High," and it is said of the Holy Spirit, "He proceedeth from the Father," but the Father is from no one.

29. As, therefore, the Father begat, the Son is begotten; so the Father sent, the Son was sent. But in like manner as He who begat an He who was begotten, so both He who sent and He who was sent, are one, since the Father and the Son are one. So also the Holy Spirit is one with them, since these three are one...That then which the Lord says, "Whom I will send unto you from the Father," shows the Spirit to be both of the Father and of the Son; because, also, when He had said, "Whom the Father will send," He added also, "in my name." Yet He did not say, Whom the Father will send from me, as He said, "Whom I will send unto you from the Father," showing, namely, that the Father is the beginning (principium) of the whole divinity, or if it is better so expressed, deity. He, therefore, who proceeds from the Father and from the Son, is referred back to Him from whom the Son was born (natus). (On the Trinity, IV.28, 29 - NPNF 3.85 - bold emphasis mine.)

And yet it is not to no purpose that in this Trinity the Son and none other is called the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit and none other the Gift of God, and God the Father alone is He from whom the Word is born, and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds...This distinction, then, of the inseparable Trinity is not to be merely accepted in passing, but to be carefully considered; for hence it was that the Word of God was specially called also the Wisdom of God, although both Father and Holy Spirit are wisdom. If, then, any one of the three is to be specially called Love, what more fitting than that it should be the Holy Spirit ? namely, that in that simple and highest nature, substance should not be one thing and love another, but that substance itself should be love, and love itself should be substance, whether in the Father, or in the Son, or in the Holy Spirit; and yet that the Holy Spirit should be specially called Love. (On the Trinity, XV.29 - NPNF 3.216 - bold emphasis mine.)

We can ask whether we should understand the words "In the beginning God made heaven and earth" only in accord with history, or whether they also signify something in figures, and how they conform to the gospel and for what reason this book begins in this way. According to history one asks whether "In the beginning" means in the beginning of time in the principle, in the very Wisdom of God. For the Son of God said that he was the principle. When he was asked, "Who are you?" he said, "The principle; that is why I am speaking to you." For there is a principle without principle, and there is a principal along with another principal. The principle without principle is the Father alone, and thus we believe that all things are from one principle. But the Son is a principle in such a way that he is from the Father. (On the Literal Translation of Genesis, in  Fathers of the Church, vol. 84, p. 148 - bold emphasis mine.)

In this Beginning, O God, hast Thou made heaven and earth, in Thy Word, in Thy Son, in Thy Power, in Thy Wisdom, in Thy Truth, wondrously speaking and wondrously making. Who shall comprehend ? who shall relate it ? What is that which shines through me, and strikes my heart without injury, and I both shudder and burn ? I shudder inasmuch as am unlike it ; and I burn inasmuch as I am like it. It is Wisdom itself that shines through me, clearing my cloudiness, which again overwhelms me, fainting from it, in the darkness and amount of my punishment...I will with confidence cry out from Thy oracle, How wonderful are Thy works, O Lord, in Wisdom hast Thou made them all. And this Wisdom is the Beginning, and in that Beginning hast Thou made heaven and earth.  (Confessions, XI.11 - NPNF 1.166, 167.)

For it is true, O Lord, that Thou hast made heaven and earth ; it is also true, that the Beginning is Thy Wisdom, in Which Thou hast made all things. (Confessions, XI.28 - NPNF 1.183 - bold emphasis mine.)

What is it, then, that He "saith, hath given to the Son to have life in Himself" ? I would say it briefly. He begot the Son. For it is not that He existed without life, and received life, but He is life by being begotten. The Father is life not by being begotten; the Son is life by being begotten. The Father is of no father; the Son is of God the Father. The Father in His being is of none, but in that He is Father, 'tis because of the Son. But the Son also, in that He is Son, 'tis because of the Father: in His being. He is of the Father. 'This He said, therefore: "hath given life to the Son, that He might have it in Himself." Just as if He were to say, "The Father, who is life in Himself, begot the Son, who should be life in Himself." Indeed, He would have this dedit (hath given) to be understood for the same thing as genuit (hath begotten). It is like as if we said to a person, "God has given thee being." To whom ? If to some one already existing, then He gave him not being, because he who could receive existed before it was given him. When, therefore, thou hearest it said, "He gave thee being," thou wast not in being to receive, but thou didst receive, that thou shouldst be by coming into existence. The builder gave to this house that it should be. But what did he give to it? He gave it to be a house. To what did he give ? To this house. Gave it what ? To be a house. How could he give to a house that it should be a house ? For if the house was, to what did he give to be a house, when the house existed already? What, then, does that mean, "gave it to be a house" ? It means, he brought to pass that it should be a house. Well, then, what gave He to the Son? Gave Him to be the Son, begot Him to be life that is, "gave Him to have life in Himself " that He should be the life not needing life, that He may not be understood as having life by participation. (St. Augustin: Homilies on the Gospel of John, Tractate XIX.13, NPNF 7.127 - bold emphasis mine.)

With the above selections in mind—and those from the AF thread linked to above—I am truly baffled by Andrew's deduction concerning "Augustinian trinitarianism" and the Son of God. Here again is Andrew's conclusion:

Its this identification of God with the Trinity instead of identifying God as the Father in particular that logically leads to a denial that Christ is the Son of God. Whatever monarchy and causality of the Son by the Father there is in this view, since it is within God, the Trinity, it ultimately doesn’t change this. The problem as I see it is not a lack of affirmation of the monarchy of the Father, but the identification of the one God with the Trinity rather than the Father.

Though Augustine does in fact term the Trinity "one God", it is not to the exclusion that the Father is in a unique sense "one God", "God alone", "God only", "the Supreme One",  "sole Principle", "Principle without principle", et al. Augustine also repeatedly informs us that it is the Father alone, who is the beginning/source of the Son of God. When all the evidence is brought together—with all due respect to Andrew—I ultimately find no basis for the belief that "Augustinian trinitarianism...logically leads to a denial that Christ is the Son of God."

As for modalism, and/or semi-modalism, I just don't find any trace of it in Augustine's extant corpus; but I do find plenty of anti-modalism. So, why is it some folk maintain that some degree of modalism exists in Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity? I would like to suggest two probable reasons:

1.) The failure to recognize that Augustine uses two different senses for the term God (Deus); one with reference to the Three as being one God (i.e. one divinity/essence/substance) and not three Gods; the second with reference to the Father as being the principium and fons (i.e. monarchia) of everything else that has existence—including the Son and the Holy Spirit.

2.) A misunderstanding of what the term trinity (trinitas) meant in Augustine's time; note the following:

The word "trinitas" is more merely numerical in meaning than the English "trinity," has come almost to demand a capital T. But it means no more than "threeness," or more concretely "threesome" "a three." My inclination will be to avoid the capital T mostly, and sometimes to substitute more numbersome English words. (Edmund Hill, The Works of St. Augustine - A Translation for the 21st Century, Vol. 5, The Trinity, p. 91.)

I shall end here for now; more later, the Lord willing...

Grace and peace,

David