Aquinas on John 14:28 and John 5:19

A few days ago, I got involved in a thread started by Dr. Edgar Foster—at his blog Foster's Theological Reflections—under the title: Question of the Day for Trinitarians.

Among other issues, Dr. Foster and I discussed Aquinas's understanding of Jesus statement that, "the Father is greater than I" (John 14:28). I stated, that Aquinas believed that it could be understood to apply to both of Jesus' natures (i.e. divine and human); Edgar (who is quite knowledgeable and no novice when it comes to Aquinas), is of the opinion that Aquinas limited the interpretation to his human nature only. I quoted in our combox discussion the same selection from Aquinas's commentary on the Gospel of John that I provided in my April 1, 2016 thread, Clear elements of Nicene Monarchism..., which I believe supports my take. Here is that selection again:

1971 One could also say, as Hilary does, that even according to the divine nature the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not inferior to the Father, but equal. For the Father is not greater than the Son in power, eternity and greatness, but by the dignity of a grantor or source. For the Father receives nothing from another, but the Son, if I can put it this way, receives his nature from the Father by an eternal generation. So, the Father is greater because he gives; but the Son is not inferior, but equal, because he receives all that the Father has: "God has bestowed on him the name which is above every name" (Phil 2:9). For the one to whom a single act of existence (esse) is given, is not inferior to the giver. [LINK to online source.]

The above did not convince Edgar of my position, so to add strength to my view, I am providing yet another selection from Aquinas's commentary on the Gospel of John, this time from John 5:19:

746 To get the true meaning of Christ’s statement, we should know that in those matters which seem to imply inferiority in the Son, it could be said, as some do, that they apply to Christ according to the nature he assumed; as when he said: “The Father is greater than I” (below 14:28). According to this, they would say that our Lord’s statement, the Son cannot do anything of himself, should be understood of the Son in his assumed nature. However, this does not stand up, because then one would be forced to say that whatever the Son of God did in his assumed nature, the Father had done before him. For example, that the Father had walked upon the water as Christ did: otherwise, he would not have said, but only what he sees the Father doing.

And if we say that whatever Christ did in his flesh, God the Father also did in so far as the Father works in him, as said below (14:10): “The Father, who lives in me, he accomplishes the works,” then Christ would be saying that the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing in him, i.e., in the Son. But this cannot stand either, because Christ’s next statement, For whatever the Father, does, the Son does likewise, could not, in this interpretation, be applied to him, i.e., to Christ. For the Son, in his assumed nature, never created the world, as the Father did. Consequently, what we read here must not be understood as pertaining to Christ’s assumed nature.

747 According to Augustine, however, there is another way of understanding statements which seem to, but do not, imply inferriority in the Son: namely, by referring them to the origin of the Son coming or begotten from the Father. For although the Son is equal to the Father in all things, he receives all these things from the Father in an eternal begetting. But the Father gets these from no one, for he is unbegotten. According to this explanation, the continuity of thought is the following: Why are you offended because I said that God is my Father, and because I made myself equal to the Father? Amen, amen, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of himself. As if to say: I am equal to the Father, but in such a way as to be from him, and not he from me; and whatever I may do, is in me from the Father.

748 According to this interpretation, mention is made of the power of the Son when he says, can, and of his activity when he says, do. Both can be understood here, so that, first of all, the derivation of the Son’s power from the Father is shown, and secondly, the conformity of the Son’s activity to that of the Father.

749 As to the first, Hilary explains it this way: Shortly above our Lord said that he is equal to the Father. Some heretics, basing themselves on certain scriptural texts which assert the unity and equality of the Son to the Father, claim that the Son is unbegotten. For example, the Sabellians, who say that the Son is identical in person with the Father. Therefore, so you do not understand this teaching in this way, he says, the Son cannot do anything of himself, for the Son’s power is identical with his nature. Therefore the Son has his power from the same source as he has his being (esse); but he has his being (esse) from the Father: “I came forth from the Father, and I have come into the world” (Jn 16:28). He also has his nature from the Father, because he is God from God; therefore, it is from him that the Son has his power (posse).

So his statement, the Son cannot do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing, is the same as saying: The Son, just as he does not have his being (esse) except from the Father, so he cannot do anything except from the Father. For in natural things, a thing receives its power to act from the very thing from which it receives its being: for example, fire receives its power to ascend from the very thing from which it receives its form and being. Further, in saying, the Son cannot do anything of himself, no inequality is implied, because this refers to a relation; while equality and inequality refer to quantity. (Bold emphasis in the original.) [LINK]

In my opinion, I think the above comments make it quite clear that Aquinas applies John 14:28 and John 5:19 to both of Jesus' natures. Would be very interested in hearing from others on this issue...

Grace and peace,

David

Clear elements of Nicene Monarchism from an esteemed, 19th century Catholic theologian

Important elements of Nicene Monarchism include the priority of the Father over the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the etiological principle that the Father is the cause/source of both the person and substance of the Son and Holy Spirit. Though post-Augustine Catholic theologians rarely place an emphasis on the above aspects of Trinitarian thought (unlike many Anglican and Eastern Orthodox theologians), I remained convinced that the Catholic tradition has never denied those teachings. For instance, I found vestiges of Nicene Monarchism in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, who taught:

One of the most important 'relational' distinctions between the three persons of the Trinity is that, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead" (P1.Q.39.A5), the "fontal principle of the entire divinity" (fontale principium totius divinitatis - Aquinas, Commentum in Lib. 1 Sententiarum, D.34.Q.2) [See THIS THREAD for more on this issue.]

In his commentary on the Gospel of John (verse 14:28), we read:

1971 One could also say, as Hilary does, that even according to the divine nature the Father is greater than the Son, yet the Son is not inferior to the Father, but equal. For the Father is not greater than the Son in power, eternity and greatness, but by the dignity of a grantor or source. For the Father receives nothing from another, but the Son, if I can put it this way, receives his nature from the Father by an eternal generation. So, the Father is greater because he gives; but the Son is not inferior, but equal, because he receives all that the Father has: "God has bestowed on him the name which is above every name" (Phil 2:9). For the one to whom a single act of existence (esse) is given, is not inferior to the giver. [LINK to online source.]

So, although I had found snippets of Nicene Monarchism in post-Augustine Catholic theologians, it was not until I had recently read the English translation of Matthias Joseph Scheeben's, Die Mysterien des Christentums (The Mysteries of Christianity), that I came across definitive support for Nicene Monarchism within the Catholic tradition. The following germane selections will be from the B. Herder Book Co. 1947 English edition, translated by Cyril Vollert.

From Chapter IV - The Productions of the Second and Third Persons, we read (all bold emphasis mine):

The term "generation" is of course employed, in the first place, to indicate that the production of the Second Person in God is wholly different from creation, the act by which non-divine beings come into existence. Creation is a free act of the divine will, whereby God calls into being things which of themselves were nothing, and communicates to them an existence which is essentially different from His own. But God brings forth His interior Word by communicating to Him His own being, His own substance. The Word proceeds from the Father's innermost substance, which passes over to the Word and places Him in full possession of the very nature that is proper to the Father. (Page 87.)

In God, in whom all that is found scattered in creatures is one, faith reveals to us the production of the Word from the substance of the Father. This Word is an intelligible image of its principle, because it proceeds from the latter's cognition and manifests it. It is likewise a real. substantial, personal image, because the cognition and also the object of the cognition, are expressed and impressed in this Word. The Second Person in the Godhead is produced because the First Person wills to utter and attest Himself, to express and manifest His nature. The Second Person receives the Father's nature in order to exhibit and manifest it in Himself. What then is to prevent us from saying that He is truly generated, nay, that in accord with the words of Holy Scripture, all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is so-called after the generating fatherhood of His principle? (Page 91.)

Then, in a footnote (#4, p. 91 ff.) Scheeben provides a quotation from Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles (IV.11), a work I had read in the 90's, long before my studies into Nicene Monarchism, and quite frankly, failed to recall its importance to Nicene Monarchism. Note the following:

We must note that what is generated is said to be conceived, so long as it remains in the parent. God's Word is begotten of God in such wise that He does not depart from the Father but remains in Him. Therefore God's Word may rightly be said to be conceived of God. This is the reason why the Wisdom of God affirms: 'The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived' (Prov. 8:24). (Page 92.)

A bit later, from the same footnote, we read:

Again, what is brought forth issues from the womb. For a similar reason the generation of God's Word, which is called birth to indicate his perfect distinction from His Father, is called birth from the womb, according to Psalm 109:3" 'From the womb before the day star I begot Thee." However, the distinction of the Word from the speaker does not prevent the Word from existing in the speaker. Hence, just as the Word is said t0 be begotten or brought forth from the womb, to indicate His distinct existence, so to show that this distinction does not exclude the Word form existence in the speaker, revelation assures us that He 'is in the bosom of the Father' (John 1:18).

Finally, we must advert to the fact that carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive principle. The father has an active, the mother a passive part. Hence for procreation of offspring the father has one function, the mother a different one: the father confers nature and species on the progeny, whereas the mother, as passive and receptive principle, conceives and gives birth. Procession is predicated of the Word inasmuch as God understands Himself: but the divine intelligence involves no passive element, but is wholly active, so to speak, since the divine intellect is not in potency but exclusively in act. Therefore in the generation of God's Word there is no maternal function, but only a paternal function. Hence the various functions which pertain to the father and the mother in carnal generation, are attributed by Scripture to the Father in His generation of the Word: the Father is said to give life to the Son (cf. John 5:16), to conceive Him, and to bring Him forth. (Page 93.)

Towards the end of the chapter, Scheeben, provides some insightful commentary on the issue of 'relation' as it pertains to the three persons of the Godhead/Trinity. Scheeben writes:

The communication of the essence from one person to the others involves no separation or partition of the essence. On the contrary, the essence can be transmitted to one of the other persons only if this person enters into relationship with the First Person and is united to Him in oneness of essence.

Furthermore, the first principle is one, the original possessor of the divine nature is one, and the distinction among persons proceeds from this one principle. The distinction issues from the unity, and is in turn stabilized by this same unity. for the Second and Third Persons are distinct from the First Person only because they have their origin from Him and stand in relation to Him by virtue of this origin...(Page 115.)

The Father unites the other two persons with and in Himself as their common root and source; for He is the common principle of both. (Page 116.)

In ending, I would like to say that it is quite reassuring (and refreshing) to discover a 'heavy-weight' Catholic theologian who espouses a number of the propositions concerning the Godhead that I have been defending over the last few years.

Grace and peace,

David

Timothy Kauffman on baptismal regeneration and the early Church Fathers: my critical examination continues

This post has been delayed by almost a month. Rather than bore readers with all that transpired during the last few weeks, I shall proceed right into the main emphasis of this thread—Timothy Kauffman's novel interpretations concerning baptismal regeneration and the early Church Fathers.

Tim (I will be referring to Timothy as Tim throughout the rest of this post, not out disrespect, but due to the fact that in our combox interactions, he refers to himself as such, so I am assuming that this is his preference) has published the final installment (#6) in his ongoing series, "THAT HE MIGHT PURIFY THE WATER" (link).

The following is the second paragraph of Tim's final installment:

Before we proceed with Methodius of Olympus, the last Ante-Niceæan Father cited by Called to Communion, we thought it would be worthwhile to interact very briefly with David Waltz who blogs at Articuli Fidei and has also commented at this site as well. We appreciate Waltz’s interaction and his willingness to engage on this topic.

Before moving on to Tim's reflections, I would like to say that I too appreciate Tim's, "interaction and his willingness to engage on this topic." Though I have grave concerns concerning a number of his novel interpretations of the early Church Fathers concerning baptism (and as you will see, his take on Dr. Ferguson), I sincerely appreciate the fact that he has been very charitable with me in our discussions, even though I have been quite critical at times. (I also appreciate the fact he has adopted a open policy when it comes to comments on his blog, a policy I firmly believe in, and employ here at AF).

Tim continued his post with:

Waltz responded to our posts, analyzed two fathers that we cited, and concluded that we were really “0 for 2″ in our analysis thus far, due in no small part to his reliance on Dr. Everett Ferguson’s Baptism in the Early Church.  Waltz wrote here last week that Ferguson “is one of the (if not THE) foremost authorities on the NT and early [Church Fathers] teachings concerning baptism,” and thought that “perhaps [we] would not so easily dismiss” him.

I must correct Tim here, my conclusions concerning Justin Martyr and Tertullian were NOT, "due in no small part to his reliance on Dr. Everett Ferguson’s Baptism in the Early Church", but rather, "due in no small part" to my own readings of their contributions on baptism. I cited Dr. Ferguson primarily for three reasons: first, because his assessments mirror my own; second, he is a contemporary patristic scholar, who has done extensive work on the topic of baptism in the early Church Fathers; and third, his reflections are representative of pretty much every patristic scholar who has written on the subject.

Tim then wrote:

But we do dismiss Ferguson, and we do so advisedly. There is very much we could write on this, but we will give only a few examples to make our point. Ferguson’s work is helpful as a resource, but it simply cannot be the final say on baptism in the fathers.

I agree with Tim that, "Ferguson’s work is helpful as a resource, but it simply cannot be the final say on baptism in the fathers"; however, I do not dismiss him as easily (so it seems) as Tim does. Tim goes on to offer a few examples of where he differs with Dr. Ferguson (which I hope to address in upcoming posts), but for now, I would like to explore some of Tim's presuppositions;  presuppositions which I believe have caused Tim to grossly misread the Church Fathers when it comes to the doctrine of baptismal regeneration.

One of Tim's presuppositions is: if a Church Father postulates that regeneration/new birth can occur apart from the sacrament of baptism, then that Church Father cannot believe in baptismal regeneration. 

Tim has committed a grave error here: the fact that God can, and does, provide other means than the sacrament of baptism to regenerate some of His children does not negate that one can still consistently believe that the sacrament of baptism is the ordinary means by which God regenerates.

A second presupposition which leads Tim to incorrect assessments of the Church Fathers is: if baptism is referred in figures and/or as a sign and seal, then that Church Father cannot also believe in baptismal regeneration.

Once again, such beliefs do not negate that one can also maintain the sacrament of baptism is the ordinary means by which God regenerates. Augustine, Aquinas, Trent and the Catechism of the Catholic Church (to name but a few germane sources within the Catholic tradition), like Tertullian, all affirm that God has provided other means than the sacrament of baptism for the new birth. They use a number of figures when referencing baptism, calling baptism both a sign and a seal, and they do this while also clearly affirming that the sacrament of baptism in the ordinary means that God regenerates.

There is a third presupposition embraced by Tim, which may be the most detrimental one: his belief that the great apostasy spoken of in the NT occurred in the late 4th century.

Tim adamantly maintains that belief in baptismal regeneration is one of the outcomes of this supposed late 4th century apostasy; as such, Tim cannot allow a reading of any of the Church Fathers who wrote prior to this alleged apostasy which would suggest that they believed in baptismal regeneration, for such a reading would force him to jettison his cherished presupposition.

Armed with such presuppositions, one should not be surprised that Tim has developed interpretations of the Church Fathers concerning baptismal regeneration that are novel, and void of any support from patristic scholars.

Moving on, over the last couple of days, I have been rereading all of Tim's selections from the writings of Tertullian, and his novel interpretations of those passages. I have also reread a number of English translations of Tertullian's On Baptism, On Repentance, Against Marcion, and a few other passages that touch on baptism, consulting the Latin where the translations vary. I have come away from these fresh readings even more convinced than before that Tim has made some grave errors in his interpretations of Tertullian; Tim's novel interpretations just don't hold up when one reads Tertullian's writings in their full context.

Since I have already examined the concepts of 'baptism of blood' and 'baptism of desire/repentance' in two previous threads (first; second)—reiterating that belief in such concepts do not preclude one from also believing that the sacrament of baptism is the ordinary means that God uses to regenerate fallen mankind—I would now like to explore what I believe to be is the most important issue at hand: did Tertullian in his writings affirm that the sacrament of baptism regenerates ???

Even though Tim admitted that, "Tertullian spends 20 chapters defending the merits of baptism, its divine origin, the significance of the water, the power to sanctify, remit sins, grant life and secure eternal salvation", he then goes on to deny that such a defense includes the belief that the sacrament of baptism itself is the ordinary means which brings those graces to fruition. He argues that one should not adopt a "plain" reading of Tertullian here because, "Tertullian says more than this".

I ask: does Tertullian's non-"plain" musings negate his "plain" statements on this matter ??? Tim says yes, but I (and pretty much every patristic scholar I have read) say no. Interestingly enough, Tertullian himself castigates the heretic Marcion for negating the belief that the sacrament of baptism truly accomplishes what it is said to bring about. Note the following:

I see no coherence and consistency; no, not even in the very sacrament of his faith [i.e. baptism] ! For what end does baptism serve, according to him ? If the remission of sins, how will he make it evident that he remits sins, when he affords no evidence that he retains them? Because he would retain them, if he performed the functions of a judge. If deliverance from death, how could he deliver from death, who has not delivered to death ? For he must have delivered the sinner to death, if he had from the beginning condemned sin. If the regeneration of man, how can he regenerate, who has never generated ? For the repetition of an act is impossible to him, by whom nothing anytime has been ever done. If the bestowal of the Holy Ghost, how will he bestow the Spirit, who did not at first impart the life ? For the life is in a sense the supplement of the Spirit. He therefore seals man, who had never been unsealed in respect of him ; washes man, who had never been defiled so far as he was concerned ; and into this sacrament of salvation wholly plunges that flesh which is beyond the pale of salvation ! (Against Marcion, 1.28 - ANF volume 3.293.)

Tertullian clearly establishes that one should embrace a "plain" reading of his views on the sacrament of baptism, contrary to what Tim would have us to believe.

I would now like to address Tim's claim, "that the water of the baptismal font is merely a signification of the actual baptism that takes place in the heart."

Tim wrote:

Notice, for example, that Tertullian was so free in his use of figures that he actually has us drinking from the baptismal font unto eternal life. If taken literally, this is a divergence from the command of Christ, for He did not command that we “take and drink” the water of baptism. But if Tertullian is to be taken figuratively—as well he should—the water of baptism that we are to drink is the Word of God and the truth of Christ’s Passion, which revives us, which is to say, regenerates us. This Tertullian plainly states:

“For this tree in a mystery, it was of yore wherewith Moses sweetened the bitter water; whence the People, which was perishing of thirst in the desert, drank and revived; just as we do, who, drawn out from the calamities of the heathendom in which we were tarrying perishing with thirst (that is, deprived of the divine word), drinking, by the faith which is on Him, the baptismal water of the tree of the passion of Christ, have revived—a faith from which Israel has fallen away, ….” (Tertullian, An answer to the Jews, 13)

Note once again that we have a Church Father referring to Christ’s Passion as the “baptismal water,” or the laver of revivification, as it were. This is important because next we shall see that Tertullian insisted that the literal water of baptism ought not be approached until the spiritual water of baptism is already evident in the believer.

Take notice of what Tim is doing in his above interpretation: he is replacing "the baptismal water of the tree of the passion of Christ" with "Christ's Passion as [is] the 'baptismal water'". The "drinking" is no longer a metaphor for the sacrament of baptism (i.e. "the baptismal water"), but has now become solely faith in "Christ's passion". Tim has erroneously gotten rid of the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism, one of the, "two baptisms He sent out from the wound in His pierced side", mentioned by Tertullian in his On Baptism (chapter 16). The "baptismal water" (i.e. sacrament of baptism) is efficacious THROUGH "the tree of the passion of Christ", for "Christ [is], the 'font of the water of life'." From Christ's Passion comes "the water of life"; "the water of life" is not Christ's Passion itself, but flows out from His Passion, Christ being the "font".

Tim also replaced the evidence of true repentance on the part of the believer, with "the spiritual water of baptism", arguing that Tertullian's admonition to postpone the sacrament of baptism until there is solid evidence of true repentance, supports this replacement. This cleaver attempt is flawed, for if Tertullian thought that the sacrament of baptism was merely a "sign" and/or "seal" of something that had already taken place (in other words, the sacrament of baptism has no efficacious effect/s), why such stern warnings from Tertullian ? Fact is, Tertullian argued for the postponement of sacramental baptism because he believed that the effects produced by the sacrament of baptism (e.g. regeneration, forgiveness of sins, union with Christ, et al.) occurs only once. The effects of sacrament of baptism can be lost through post-baptismal sin—i.e. one who has been regenerated through baptism can become unregenerate through sin. And further, Tertullian believed that some post-baptismal sins are unforgivable (e.g. adultery, apostasy, murder), so he wanted to make sure that anyone who submitted to baptism had truly repented of their sins. In other words, Tertullian was not a Calvinist.

However, Tertullian did have a great deal in common with Thomas Aquinas. Like Aquinas, Tertullian believed that the sacrament of baptism regenerated; like Aquinas, he held that the sacrament of baptism receives it's efficacy from Christ's Passion; like Aquinas, he maintained that one could become unregenerate by post-baptismal sin; like Aquinas, he affirmed two other means than the sacrament of baptism by which one can be born-again—i.e. baptism of blood and baptism of repentance. (See appendix below for Aquinas' reflections.)

I sincerely doubt that Tim will jettison his novel interpretations of Tertullian, for I believe that his presuppositions will continue to prevent him from reading Tertullian in a "plain" sense, the very sense that Tertullian himself has asked his readers to embrace when it comes to the sacrament of baptism.

Shall end with a "plain" quote from Tertullian:

Now there is a standing rule that without baptism no man can obtain salvation. It derives in particular from that (well known) pronouncement of our Lord, who says, Except a man be born of water he cannot have life. (On Baptism, 12.1)

Grace and peace,

David

Appendix: Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica Part 3, Q. 66, Art. 11

On the contrary, on Heb. 6:2, Of the doctrine of Baptisms, the gloss says : He uses the plural, because there is Baptism of Water, of Repentance, and of Blood.

  I answer that, As stated above (Q. 62, A. 5), Baptism of Water has its efficacy from Christ's Passion, to which a man is conformed by Baptism, and also from the Holy Ghost, as first cause. Now although the effect depends on the first cause, the cause far surpasses the effect, nor does it depend on it. Consequently, a man may, without Baptism of Water, receive the sacramental effect from Christ's Passion, in so far as he is conformed to Christ by suffering for Him. Hence it is written (Apoc. vii. 14) : These are they who are come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and have made them white in the blood of the Lamb. In like manner a man receives the effect of Baptism by the power of the Holy Ghost, not only without Baptism of Water, but also without Baptism of Blood: forasmuch as his heart is moved by the Holy Ghost to believe in and love God and to repent of his sins: wherefore this is also called Baptism of Repentance. Of this it is written (Isa. iv. 4) If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning. Thus, therefore, each of these other Baptisms is called Baptism, forasmuch as it takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore Augustine says (De Unico Baptismo Parvulorum iv) : The Blessed Cyprian argues with considerable reason from the thief to whom, though not baptized, it was said: "Today shalt thou be with Me in Paradise" that suffering can take the place of Baptism. Having weighed this in my mind again and again, I perceive that not only can suffering for the name of Christ supply for what was lacking in Baptism, but even faith and conversion of heart, if perchance on account of the stress of the times the celebration of the mystery of Baptism is not practicable.

 Reply to Obj. 1.  The other two Baptisms are included in the Baptism of Water, which derives its efficacy, both from Christ's Passion and from the Holy Ghost. Consequently for this reason the unity of Baptism is not destroyed.


  Reply to Objection 2.  As stated above (Q. 60, A. 1), a sacrament is a kind of sign. The other two, however, are like the Baptism of Water, not, indeed, in the nature of sign, but in the baptismal effect. Consequently they are not sacraments.

  Reply to Objection 3.  Damascene enumerates certain figurative Baptisms. For instance, the Deluge was a figure of our Baptism, in respect of the salvation of the faithful in the Church; since then a few . . . souls were saved in the ark [Vulg.: 'by water'], according to 1 Pt. 3:20. He also mentions the crossing of the Red Sea : which was a figure of our Baptism, in respect of our delivery from the bondage of sin; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. x. 2) that all . . . were baptized in the cloud and in the sea. And again he mentions the various washings which were customary under the Old Law, which were figures of our Baptism, as to the cleansing from sins: also the Baptism of John, which prepared the way for our Baptism. (Summa Theologica, Pt. III, Q. 66. A. 11; CHRISTIAN CLASSICS - Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 1911, 1948, 1981, IV. pp. 2384, 2385—html version available online link.)

Aquinas and the doctrine of the Trinity: difficulties, inconsistencies and problems (contradictions ?)

Back on 10/22/13, a gent who posts under the name dguller, provided an argument in the combox of  the Aquinas and the doctrine of the Trinity: introduction and resources thread which exposes what sure seems to me to be a logical contradiction in the Trinitarian thought of Aquinas. In my own readings of Aquinas, I too have detected, what appears to be, difficulties/inconsistencies/problems, but dguller's presentation is much more sophisticated than my own musings. In an attempt to bring students and/or scholars of Aquinas' thought 'to-the-table', I am reposting dguller's comment/s anew in this thread, without any alteration.

Here's an argument that purports to demonstrate the inconsistency of Thomism and the Trinity.

Let’s begin with some preliminaries.

Say that you have A and B, and that A and B are really distinct from one another. A and B would necessarily have some things in common, and some things not in common. You can call what A and B have in common, their “principle of commonality” (or P(C)), and you can call what A and B do not have in common, their “principle of distinction” (or P(D)).

Two points follow from this.

First, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). If P(C) were really identical to P(D), then it would follow that what A and B have in common is really identical to what A and B do not have in common, which is a logical contradiction. It would logically be the equivalent of saying that X = not-X, which is impossible. So, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D).

Second, P(C) cannot account for the real distinction between A and B. Only P(D) can account for the real distinction between A and B. If there was only P(C) between A and B, then A and B would not be really distinct at all, but rather would be really identical. In other words, if A and B have everything in common, then A is identical to B. There must be something about A that differs from B in order for A and B, or vice versa, to be really distinct. That “something” is P(D). To reject this would mean that it is possible for A to be really distinct from B and yet A does not differ from B in any way, which is absurd.

Putting this all together, we have the following principle:

(P) A is really distinct from B if and only if (a) there is P(C) and P(D) between A and B, and (b) P(D) between A and B cannot be really identical to P(C) between A and B (i.e. P(C) = not-P(D)).

It should be noted that Aquinas himself endorses this principle. He writes: “In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction” (ST 1.40.2), and he mentions this principle within the context of a discussion of the Trinity, meaning that it must be applicable to the Trinity itself.

So, let’s apply (P) to the Trinity, which is what Aquinas has already given us license to do.

We agree that the divine persons are really distinct from one another. It would follow, based upon (P), that (a) there must be a P(C) and a P(D) between the divine persons, and (b) P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). Now, what would P(C) and P(D) be in this context?

Aquinas helpfully supplies us with an answer. He states that because “the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations” (ST 1.40.2), specifically “by relation of origin” (ST 1.29.4). That means that the divine essence is P(C) and the divine relations are P(D). This is consistent with what Aquinas says elsewhere when he writes that “the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence” (ST 1.39.1). In other words, the real distinction between the divine persons cannot be accounted for by the divine essence, because you cannot distinguish between the divine persons on the basis of what they have in common (i.e. the divine essence), but only upon what they do not have in common (i.e. the divine relations). Hence, on the basis of (P) it would necessarily follow that the divine relations (= P(D)) are not really identical to the divine essence (= P(C)).

But then we reach three severe problems.

First, Aquinas has written that “a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting” (ST 1.29.4), and thus the divine persons are the divine subsistent relations. So, this account is fundamentally circular and tautological. Saying that the real distinction between the divine persons is due to the real distinction between the divine persons does not really explain anything at all.

Second, Aquinas has written that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). So, we have a logical contradiction, because the divine essence cannot be really identical to the divine relations, according to (P), and the divine essence is really identical to the divine relations, according to the doctrine of the Trinity.

(Furthermore, to say that the distinction between the divine essence and the divine relations is “only … in its mode of intelligibility” (ST 1.28.2) and “differ in our way of thinking” (ST 1.39.1) just means that there is no difference in reality between the divine essence and the divine relations. The distinction between them is exclusively and only in our minds, and does not correspond to reality at all. It is like the distinction between goodness and being, which also “differ only in idea” and “differ in thought” (ST 1.5.1). And that means that a key element in the doctrine of the Trinity is nothing but a mental construct that does not correspond to anything in reality, which makes the Trinity a subjective truth of the human mind, and not an objective truth about reality. And that, in itself, undermines the truth of the Trinity.)

Third, Aquinas has written: “Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature” and “if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature” (ST 1.28.2). And this makes perfect sense, because, according to divine simplicity, the divine essence is Being Itself (ST 1.3.4), and only Being Itself does not depend upon anything else for its existence. Anything that is not Being Itself must depend upon something else for its existence, and anything that must depend upon something else for its existence is necessarily a creature. Thus, anything that is not Being Itself (i.e. the divine essence) is a creature. It would follow, therefore, that since the divine relations are not the divine essence, and everything that is not the divine essence is a creature, that the divine relations are creatures. Not only does this negate the Trinity, but it also has a number of absurd consequences, such as that the divine relations could not exist as cause until their effects first existed, that the divine relations must be composite entities, that the divine relations would exist in a relation of dependence upon creation, and so on.

In conclusion, if one endorses (P), and I do not see how one can coherently reject (P), and also endorses a number of other Trinitarian and Thomist principles, then one is led to a number of logical contradictions. Specifically, the following premises, when taken in conjunction, lead to inconsistency:

(1) A is really distinct from B if and only if (a) there is P(C) and P(D) between A and B, and (b) P(D) between A and B cannot be really identical to P(C) between A and B (i.e. P(C) = not-P(D))
(2) Everything that is not the divine essence is a creature
(3) The divine relations are really distinct from one another
(4) The divine relations share the divine essence in common
(5) The divine relations are really identical to the divine essence

One must reject, at least, one premise in order to avoid logical inconsistency. The question is which one.

Looking forward to some charitable and spirited discussion...

Grace and peace,

David

Aquinas and the doctrine of the Trinity: John 1:1

In the previous thread, a selection from Aquinas' Commentary on the Gospel of John was provided, wherein he argues for the divinity of the Son of God with an appeal to the doctrine of deification. In that same selection, Aquinas states: The word "God" is also used in three senses. [Personally, I think that the word "God" is used in more than just "three senses"—more on this in an upcoming thread.]

In this thread, I am going to provide another selection from Aquinas' Commentary on the Gospel of John, wherein he delves into John 1:1, expounding on how the word "God" is to be understood. This verse has played a huge role in the understanding and development of the doctrine of the Trinity. From the pen of Aquinas we read:

44 At the outset, we should note that the name “God” signifies the divinity concretely and as inherent in a subject, while the name “deity” signifies the divinity in the abstract and absolutely. Thus the name “deity” cannot naturally and by its mode of signifying stand for a [divine] person, but only for the [divine] nature. But the name “God” can, by its natural mode of signifying, stand for any one of the [divine] persons, just as the name “man” stands for any individual (suppositum) possessing humanity. Therefore, whenever the truth of a statement or its predicate requires that the name “God” stand for the person, then it stands for the person, as when we say, “God begets God.” Thus, when it says here that the Word was with God, it is necessary that God stand for the person of the Father, because the preposition with signifies the distinction of the Word, which is said to be with God. And although this preposition signifies a distinction in person, it does not signify a distinction in nature, since the nature of the Father and of the Son is the same. Consequently, the Evangelist wished to signify the person of the Father when he said God.

45 Here we should note that the preposition with signifies a certain union of the thing signified by its grammatical antecedent to the thing signified by its grammatical object, just as the preposition “in” does. However, there is a difference, because the preposition “in” signifies a certain intrinsic union, whereas the preposition with implies in a certain way an extrinsic union. And we state both in divine matters, namely, that the Son is in the Father and with the Father. Here the intrinsic union pertains to consubstantiality, but the extrinsic union (if we may use such an expression, since “extrinsic” is improperly employed in divine matters) refers only to a personal distinction, because the Son is distinguished from the Father by origin alone. And so these two words designate both a consubstantiality in nature and distinction in person: consubstantiality inasmuch as a certain union is implied; but distinction, inasmuch as a certain otherness is signified as was said above.

The preposition “in,” as was said, principally signifies consubstantiality, as implying an intrinsic union and, by way of consequence, a distinction of persons, inasmuch as every preposition is transitive. The preposition “with” principally signifies a personal distinction, but also a consubstantiality inasmuch as it signifies a certain extrinsic, so to speak, union. For these reasons the Evangelist specifically used here the preposition “with” in order to express the distinction of the person of the Son from the Father, saying, and the Word was with God, that is, the Son was with the Father as one person with another.

46 We should note further that this preposition with has four meanings, and these eliminate four objections. First, the preposition with signifies the subsistence of its antecedent, because things that do not subsist of themselves are not properly said to be “with” another; thus we do not say that a color is with a body, and the same applies to other things that do not subsist of themselves. But things that do subsist of themselves are properly said to be “with” another; thus we say that a man is with a man, and a stone with a stone.

Secondly, it signifies authority in its grammatical object. For we do not, properly speaking, say that a king is with a soldier, but that the soldier is with the king. Thirdly, it asserts a distinction. For it is not proper to say that a person is with himself but rather that one man is with another. Fourthly, it signifies a certain union and fellowship. For when some person is said to be with another, it suggests to us that there is some social union between them.

Considering these four conditions implied in the meaning of this preposition with, the Evangelist quite appropriately joins to the first clause, In the beginning was the Word, this second clause, and the Word was with God. For if we omit one of the three explanations of, In the beginning was the Word (namely, the one in which principium was understood as the Son), certain heretics make a twofold objection against each of the other explanations (namely, the one in which principium means the same as “before all things,” and the one in which it is understood as the Father). Thus there are four objections, and we can answer these by the four conditions indicated by this preposition with.

47 The first of these objections is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But before all things there was nothing. So if before all things there was nothing, where then was the Word? This objection arises due to the imaginings of those who think that whatever exists is somewhere and in some place. But this is rejected by John when he says, with God, which indicates the union mentioned in the last four conditions. So, according to Basil, the meaning is this: Where was the Word? The answer is: with God; not in some place, since he is unsurroundable, but he is with the Father, who is not enclosed by any place.

48 The second objection against the same explanation is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., before all things. But whatever exists before all things appears to proceed from no one, since that from which something proceeds seems to be prior to that which proceeds from it. Therefore, the Word does not proceed from another. This objection is rejected when he says, the Word was with God, taking “with” according to its second condition, as implying authority in what is causing. So the meaning, according to Hilary, is this: From whom is the Word if he exists before all things? The Evangelist answers: the Word was with God, i.e., although the Word has no beginning of duration, still he does not lack a principium or author, for he was with God as his author.

49 The third objection, directed to the explanation in which principium is understood as the Father, is this. You say that In the beginning was the Word, i.e., the Son was in the Father. But that which is in something does not seem to be subsistent, as a hypostasis; just as the whiteness in a body does not subsist. This objection is solved by the statement, the Word was with God, taking “with” in its first condition, as implying the subsistence of its grammatical antecedent. So according to Chrysostom, the meaning is this: In the beginning was the Word, not as an accident, but he was with God, as subsisting, and a divine hypostasis.

50 The fourth objection, against the same explanation, is this. You say that the Word was in the beginning, i.e., in the Father. But whatever is in something is not distinct from it. So the Son is not distinct from the Father. This objection is answered by the statement, and the Word was with God, taking “with” in its third condition, as indicating distinction. Thus the meaning, according to Alcuin and Bede, is this: The Word was with God, and he was with the Father by a consubstantiality of nature, while still being “with” him through a distinction in person.

51 And so, and the Word was with God, indicates: the union of the Word with the Father in nature, according to Basil; their distinction in person, according to Alcuin and Bede; the subsistence of the Word in the divine nature, according to Chrysostom; and the authorship of the Father in relation to the Word, according to Hilary.

A bit later, we read:

56 The other question comes from his saying, with God. For since “with” indicates a distinction, it could be thought that the Word was with God, i.e., the Father, as distinct from him in nature. So to exclude this he adds at once the consubstantiality of the Word with the Father, saying, and the Word was God. As if to say: the Word is not separated from the Father by a diversity of nature, because the Word itself is God.

57 Note also the special way of signifying, since he says, the Word was God, using “God” absolutely to show that he is not God in the same way in which the name of the deity is given to a creature in Sacred Scripture. For a creature sometimes shares this name with some added qualification, as when it says, “I have appointed you the God of Pharaoh” (Ex 7:1), in order to indicate that he was not God absolutely or by nature, because he was appointed the god of someone in a qualified sense. Again, it says in the Psalm (81:6): “I said, ‘You are gods.’” —as if to say: in my opinion, but not in reality. Thus the Word is called God absolutely because he is God by his own essence, and not by participation, as men and angels are.

58 We should note that Origen disgracefully misunderstood this clause, led astray by the Greek manner of speaking. It is the custom among the Greeks to put the article before every name in order to indicate a distinction. In the Greek version of John’s Gospel the name “Word” in the statement, In the beginning was the Word, and also the name “God” in the statement, and the Word was with God, are prefixed by the article, so as to read “the Word” and “the God,” in order to indicate the eminence and distinction of the Word from other words, and the principality of the Father in the divinity. But in the statement, the Word was God, the article is not prefixed to the noun “God,” which stands for the person of the Son. Because of this Origen blasphemed that the Word, although he was Word by essence, was not God by essence, but is called God by participation; while the Father alone is God by essence. And so he held that the Son is inferior to the Father.

59 Chrysostom proves that this is not true, because if the article used with the name “God” implied the superiority of the Father in respect to the Son, it would never be used with the name “God” when it is used as a predicate of another, but only when it is predicated of the Father. Further, whenever said of the Father, it would be accompanied by the article. However, we find the opposite to be the case in two statements of the Apostle, who calls Christ “God,” using the article. For in Titus (2:13) he says, “the coming of the glory of the great God and our Savior Jesus Christ,” where “God” stands for the Son, and in the Greek the article is used. Therefore, Christ is the great God. Again he says (Rom 9:5): “Christ, who is God over all things, blessed forever,” and again the article is used with “God” in the Greek. Further, in 1 John (5:20) it says: “That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ; he is the true God and eternal life.” Thus, Christ is not God by participation, but truly God. And so the theory of Origen is clearly false. (LINK)

Grace and peace,

David

Aquinas and the doctrine of the Trinity: deification

One of the most powerful arguments employed by a number of the early Church Fathers for the divinity of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was the doctrine of deification—i.e. if Jesus Christ was not God, he could not truly 'save' mankind through deification.

Perhaps the most famous example of this doctrine was from the pen of Athanasius:

For He was made man that we might be made God. (Athanasius - De Incarnation, 54; NPNF, second series, 4.65). [For more than 100 examples from the CFs, see THIS THREAD.]

Aquinas was a serious student of the Church Fathers, and retained the doctrine of deification in his thought. Note the following:

1459 The word "God" is also used in three senses. Sometimes it signifies the divine nature itself, and then it is used only in the singular: "Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God is one Lord" (Deut 6:4). At other times it is taken in a denominative sense: in this way idols are called gods: "All the gods of the peoples are idols" (Ps 96:5). And sometimes someone is called a god because of a certain participation in divinity, or in some sublime power divinely infused. In this way, even judges are called gods in Scripture: "If the thief is not known, the owner of the house shall be brought to the gods," that is, to the judges [Ex 22:8]; "You shall not speak ill of the gods," that is, of the rulers [Ex 22:28]. This is the way the word "god" is taken here, when he says, I said, you are gods, i.e., you share in some divine power superior to the human.

1460 Then when he says, If he called them gods to whom the word of God came, he shows the meaning of the authority he cited. This was like saying: He called them gods because they participated in something divine insofar as they participated in God's word, which was spoken to them. For due to God's word a person obtains some participation in the divine power and purity: "You are already made clean by the word which I have spoken to you" (15:3); and in Exodus (c 34) we read that the face of Moses shone when he heard the words of the Lord.

From what has been said above, one might argue in this way: It is clear that a person by participating in the word of God becomes god by participation. But a thing does not become this or that by participation unless it participates in what is this or that by its essence: for example, a thing does not become fire by participation unless it participates in what is fire by its essence. Therefore, one does not become god by participation unless he participates in what is God by essence. Therefore, the Word of God, that is the Son, by participation in whom we become gods, is God by essence. But our Lord, rather than argue so profoundly against the Jews, preferred to argue in a more human way. He says, and scripture cannot be broken, in order to show the irrefutable truth of Scripture: "O Lord, your word endures forever" [Ps 118:89]. (Commentary on the Gospel of John.)

Like so many of the Church Fathers before him, Aquinas argues that, "The Word of God, that is the Son", must be God, for if He is not God, then redeemed mankind could not become "Gods" (i.e. Sons of God).

More later, the Lord willing...

Grace and peace,

David

Aquinas and the doctrine of the Trinity: introduction and resources

Back on April 7, 2013, I called into question Drake Shelton's attempt to identify Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the Trinity as Sabellian (link to the thread).

Because of my respect for Drake, since that post, I have been reading a great deal of Aquinas' writings on the doctrine of the Trinity (as time has allowed), to determine if I might have possibly been wrong in my assessment. My studies are still continuing, but I would like to share some of my reflections on the material I have read up to this point. Before I delve into this topic in upcoming threads (the Lord willing), I would like to provide interested readers with links to some important Aquinas online sources concerning his doctrine of the Trinity.

Summa Theologica - Questions 27-43

Summa Contra Gentiles - Book 4, Chapters 1-26

De Potentia - Questions 7-10

Commentary on the Gospel of John (Scattered throughout this commentary are numerous reflections on the doctrine of the Trinity and a number of its opponents.)

Sincerely hope that interested readers will take the time to look into the above resources before I begin my own musings (hopefully early next week, the Lord willing).

Grace and peace,

David

Aquinas and Drake Shelton's, "Triunism and Sabellianism; Is There a Difference?": some initial reflections

This last Tuesday, Drake Shelton, on his blog "UNCREATED LIGHT", posted a thread under the title, "Triunism and Sabellianism; Is There a Difference?" (LINK). Though I have sincerely appreciated a number of Drake's threads on 'Nicene Monarchism' and 'Triadology' (his output is very impressive), this recent thread is not among them, due to a few 'difficulties' that I have with some key aspects of the post. In the rest of this thread, I will be delving into some of those 'difficulties'; Drake opens his thread with the following:

It is the desperate and hopeless cause of the Triunists to distinguish their view from Sabellianism. There is a reason for this: it cannot be done. I have cataloged here a list of popular historic Triunist Theologians, their accounts of Sabellianism and their desperate and meaningless attempts to distinguish the Triune view from it.

The first "Triunist" theologian he examines is Thomas Aquinas, beginning with the following quote from his Summa Theologica [Drake is using the Christian Classics Ethereal Library online edition (no date and no translator provided); I will be using the Christian Classics 1981 reprint of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1911 translation - link to online edition]:

“On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God “the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity.” Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.”

Drake comments on the above quote with the following:

The problem with Aquinas’ view is that his theology makes persons relations. This is ad hoc nonsense. I am a brother, I am a son, I am a cousin, but that does not make me multiple persons.

IMO, the identification of the 'persons' as 'relations' by Aquinas (he is following Augustine and Boethius here) is not problematic if one has a clear understanding of what Aquinas meant by 'relation'. In the first article of Question 28, Aquinas in his answer states that, "relations exit in God [i.e. the Divine essence/nature] really", and that:

"...when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4), these relations, according to divine processions, are necessarily real relations." (P1.Q.28.A1)

In the next Question (29), Aquinas goes on to defend Boethius's famous definition of person: "a person is an individual substance of rational nature". Aquinas writes:

I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself ; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called this, because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own ; for they are called hypostases, or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions ; and which are not only made to act, like others ; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances ; and this name is person. (P1.Q.29.A1)

One of the most important 'relational' distinctions between the three persons of the Trinity is that, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead" (P1.Q.39.A5), the "fontal principle of the entire divinity" (fontale principium totius divinitatis - Aquinas, Commentum in Lib. 1 Sententiarum, D.34.Q.2)

Now, I sincerely doubt that a Sabellian would be able to honestly embrace a number of the above affirmations by Aquinas, especially that the three persons of the Godhead are "individual substances" that have "real relations" with each other. Maybe I have misunderstood Aquinas and/or Drake; if so, I would greatly appreciate some correction.

Grace and peace,

David