Irenaeus, Bishop of Lugdunum (Lyon) – an enigmatic passage from his Proof of the Apostolic Preaching

Over this last weekend, I spent a number of hours comparing the four English translations I have of Irenaeus’ Demonstration/Proof of the Apostolic Preaching. One particular passage made an impression on me, that no previous reading had done. The following are the four English translations of that passage [the bold emphasis concerns the portion of passage that caught my eye]:

11. Now, by His hand He created man taking the purest and finest particles from the earth, mixing a determined portion of His power with the dust. Moreover He gave His image to the creature that even what is visible might have the divine form, because the created man was placed upon the earth as one having the divine image and that he might be living, he breathed in his face the breath of life that, both by this breathing and by this creation, man might be like God. (Bishop Karapet and S. G. Wilson, Patrologia Orientalis, vol. 12, 1907, p. 667 - link to pdf)

11. But man He formed with His own hands, taking from the earth that which was, purest and finest, and mingling in measure His own power with the earth. For He traced His own form on the formation, that that which should be seen should be of divine form : for (as) the image of God was man formed and set on the earth. And that he might become living, He breathed on his face the breath of life ; that both for the breath and for the formation man should be like unto God. (J. Armitage Robinson, St. Irenaeus -  The Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 1920, p. 80 - link to pdf)

11. But man He fashioned with His own hands, taking of the purest and finest of earth, in measured wise mingling with the earth His own power; for He gave his frame the outline of His own form, that the visible appearance too should be godlike — for it was as an image of God that man was fashioned and set on earth — and that he might come to life, He breathed into his face the breath of life, so that the man became like God in inspiration as well as in frame. (Joseph P. Smith, S.J., St. Irenaeus - Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, 1952, p. 54 - link to pdf)

11. But He fashioned (πλάσσω) man with His own Hands, taking the purest, the finest <and the most delicate> [elements] of the earth, mixing (συγκράννυμι) with the earth, in due measure, His own power (δύναμις); and because He <sketched upon> the handiwork (πλάσμα) His own form—in order that what would be seen should be godlike (θεοειδής), for man was placed on the earth fashioned <in> the image (εἰκών) of God—and that he might be alive, "He breathed into His face a breath of life": so that both according to the inspiration and according to the formation, man was like (ὃμοιος) God. (Fr. John Behr, St. Irenaeus - On the Apostolic Preaching, 1997 pp. 46, 47 - link to Google Books preview)

A question that immediately came to mind is, what did Irenaeus mean by “His [God] own form”?

An interesting answer to my question has been provided by Joseph P. Smith in his note on the passage:

"He gave his frame the outline of His own form, that the visible appearance too should be godlike": stelcuacin ziwrsn paragreac jews, zi ew or tesanic'inn Astuacajew ice, more literally "for the formation He outlined His own form, that also what would be seen should be deiform"; there can be no doubt that Irenaeus is here teaching man's bodily resemblance to God. (pp. 148, 149)

Man’s bodily resemblance to God? I would like to hear from folk who take the time to read is post—is Smith correct, or are there better interpretations?

Grace and peace,

David

Divine Embodiment in Jewish Antiquity: Rediscovering The Jewishness of John’s Incarnate Christ - a doctoral dissertation

Beginning with my January 20, 2019 post (link), I began to explore the issue of divine embodiment, creating a new LABEL—Corporeality and God— specifically for the topic (link). This post will be the sixth contribution included under that label/topic.

The first five threads concerning 'Corporeality and God' have to date elicited 99 comments. I suspect/hope that the dissertation I am about to introduce will stimulate some continued interest and discussion on this topic.

It was just a few days ago that I discovered Deborah L. Forger's 2017 doctoral dissertation— Divine Embodiment in Jewish Antiquity: Rediscovering The Jewishness of John’s Incarnate Christ—whilst engaged in online research (PDF). The following excerpts will serve as an introduction to this engaging and thought provoking contribution:

At the heart of this dissertation is my definition of the notion of divine embodiment. Divine embodiment for my purposes encompasses a wide variety of ways in which an aspect, or attribute, or personification of Israel’s supreme God enters into the created world, though much of my work centers on how these manifestations became localized or mediated through humans. These entities are not synonymous with Israel’s supreme deity, but they participate in the divinity of that ineffable and uncreated One, and thereby can also be considered divine. As a close corollary, I define human apotheosis as instances in which created humans, or human-like figures, either undergo the process of deification or are presented as being divine themselves. These figures, though created, also participate in the divinity of Israel’s supreme deity, and thus can also be considered divine.

Throughout this dissertation I intentionally employ the phrase “divine embodiment,” instead of “God’s embodiment” or “incarnation.” With respect to the notion of “God’s embodiment,” I draw a distinction between the words God and divine, because although Jews had a conceptualization of one supreme God who was uncreated himself, there were many other entities that could participate in that high God’s divinity and thereby be conceived of as divine as well. (Pages 8,  9)

A bit later we read:

...I suggest that within the period of Jewish Antiquity which I investigate, there were a number of ways that the “divine” could became “embodied,” and thus the notion of incarnation emerged out of the matrix of and not as a significant deviation from, other Jewish thought. Specifically, I claim that the description found in John 1:14 that the divine word became flesh (ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο) was just one of the many ways that Jews in the early centuries of the Common Era understood that God, or an aspect of God, was embodied, or took on a corporeal form. Thus, in the first century CE, both immediately before and in the aftermath of the destruction of the Second Temple, the notion of divine embodiment was not antithetical to Jewish religious thought, but rather integral to it. (Page 13)

And:

The primary question that I ask throughout this dissertation is why it is at this particular time in Jewish history that so many Jewish texts present a manner by which God can become embodied or humans can become deified. I do not assume that the authors of these texts necessarily knew one another. Nor do I claim that they were dependent upon one another. What I do observe, however, is the wide variety of ways that Jews in this period thought about how God and humanity could be connected through embodiment. Thus, though I posit a number of different ways that first-century Jews conceived of divine embodiment, I demonstrate how the Gospel of John’s description of this phenomenon both stands in continuity with other Jewish descriptions and is distinct from them as well. (Page 44)

Forger has cogently, and importantly, identified that more than one interpretation of what divine embodiment entailed was in existence during the life of Jesus Christ, and the subsequent emergence of Christianity as new religion. Forger also advances a somewhat provocative understanding of the term 'monotheism'; a term which is inextricably related to the issue of divine embodiment—note the following:

My dissertation makes this argument in three primary parts. In the first part, which also comprises chapter two, I re-contextualize one pivotal term—namely, the notion of ancient Jewish monotheism—with respect to my broader investigation of divine embodiment in the Second Temple Period. Such re-contextualization enables me to move past debates that have stymied progress in this arena, particularly the question of how early Christians, who were Jewish monotheists themselves, could have believed in a Jesus who was also divine. Wouldn’t that move have implied a step towards ditheism? My work in this chapter complicates and ultimately dismantles this assumption from two primary perspectives: First, I challenge the appropriateness of the term “monotheism” to describe Jewish belief during this period by showing that “monotheism” and its derived adjective “monotheistic” did not exist in antiquity. It was only in the midst of seventeenth-century CE philosophical debates that Henry Moore first coined the term. To impose it onto the ideological imagination of Jews living in the first-century CE is anachronistic and does not fully encapsulate the complexity of ancient Jewish beliefs about God. Second, I suggest that to use descriptors of a supreme uncreated God from whom all other reality flows is a better way of conceiving of God in the Second Temple Period, because this is the language that ancient Jews actually employed when describing God. I argue that though Jewish monotheism did not exist per se, since ancient Jews conceived of the oneness of the godhead in a complex and hierarchical manner, they did understand there to be a clear separation between the one uncreated God and all other reality. (Page 47)

Before ending this introduction to Forger's dissertation, I would like point out one more important aspect directly related to the issue of divine embodiment: the development of doctrine. Forger's contribution clearly demonstrates that the 'traditional' understanding of divine embodiment—contra the competing Stoic and cruder anthropomorphic views—emerged within a Jewish matrix, rather than a Hellenistic one.

Looking forward to further discussion on these important topics...

Grace and peace,

David

God, LDS Metaphysics, and the Development of Doctrine - Blake Ostler: "all things indwell in God and God indwells all things"

In the combox of the previous thread, Tom has been postulating that a doctrinal development concerning the nature God found in the writings of the majority of the early Church Fathers was a corruption rather than a true development. In the first comment post of the thread, Tom wrote:

...I thought to claim that “preservation of type” was lacking in the CHANGE from an embodied God to a totally incorporeal God.

And in a later post, we read:

Now perhaps more important to this discussion you said,
Rory:
Development cannot be used as a cover for contradiction.
TOm:
What could be a more perfect example of contradiction? Where once Jews and Christians believed God was embodied, latter they DEMAND it is ridiculous to believe God is embodied and He in fact is totally incorporeal.

In this thread, I am going to propose that the phrase "totally incorporeal" lacks a certain degree of clarity when describing the person and or persons termed "God", as found in the Bible, writings of the early Church Fathers—and importantly for this thread—in the LDS Triple Combination.

Before moving forward with my proposition, it is necessary to delineate how the term "God" will be used throughout this thread. I will be relying heavily on a number of descriptions utilized by Blake Ostler in his,  Exploring Mormon Thought - The Attributes of God (2001).

First and foremost, "God" will refer to a "class or kind of being", which "kind K" has a certain set of properties that are:

"essential properties of a natural kind" because anything that lacks such properties would not belong to the kind...for anything to count as God, it would have to have properties of a perfect being such as omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence etc. Moreover, God is understood to be that being who possesses all great-making properties in their fullest. No other being could be more powerful, or more wise, or more good...

The monotheistic use of "God" presupposes that God must have each of his properties in a special sort of way, i.e., perfectly and uniquely. Thus, the term God is such that the individual that bears those properties must be the unique and exclusive member of a unique and exclusive class. The notion that God must be absolutely one seemed to be supported in the earliest years of Christianity by both Jewish monotheism and Greek metaphysics. Despite the obvious subordination of the Son to the Father in the Christian scriptures, the Jewish scriptures contained statements of monotheism which did not permit any real competitor to Yahweh: "I am Yahweh, and there is none else, there is no God beside me" (Isa. 45:5, 21, 22). In addition that, the notion that God is incomparable, literally in a class by himself, required that all contenders are merely pretenders to divinity: "thou shalt have no other gods but the Lord thy God." Here "gods" refers to beings who aspire to belong to "God's" class, but there can be only one legitimate being in the class, the God Yahweh. This usage is more or less equivalent to the Hebrew meaning of Elohim and the English expressions such as "deity," "the Godhead," "the Almighty," "the Lord," "the Supreme Being." or "the Most High." These terms for deity imply that there is a single, supreme member of the class "God Almighty." (2001 - pp. 6, 7)

In the next page, Ostler acknowledges another use of the term God, and its plural, Gods:

The very term "God" has seemed to include in it the notions of supremacy and perfection. Nevertheless, "God" or "Gods" is found in the Hebrew scriptures referring to beings that are not supreme. For example, there are divinities who are inferior or subordinate or divinities only by permission of the head God. (2001 - p. 8)

The rest of this opening post will focus on the "class or kind of being" identified in the KJV and Triple Combination as the 'eternal God', 'everlasting God', 'one God', 'true God', 'Lord God', 'Lord Omnipotent', 'Lord God Omnipotent', 'LORD', 'Jehovah', 'Most High', "Most High God', 'Almighty God', 'God of Gods', 'Lord of Lords', etc.

Moving forward, note the following from Oslter:

In 1832, Joseph Smith received a revelation which elucidated God's immanence—the doctrine that God is present to but is not identical with all realities. Immanence is more than omnipresence or being present at all places.  Immanence includes the notion that God is: (1) present in terms of power and awareness at all places; (2) able to effectuate his will at all places without intermediary; and (3) the experience or information of every reality is included within God's experience and knowledge. Put another way, all things indwell in God and God indwells in all things. Immanence, as conceived by Joseph Smith, is preeminently a reciprocal relation, for it is true that God is in and through all things as that all things are in and through God. A revelation to Joseph Smith referred to God's power and knowledge in terms of supreme relatedness and immediacy to all aspects of the physical universe" "He comprehended all things, that the might be in all and through all things, the light of truth. . . . Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space" (D&C 88:6, 12).

God is aware of or "comprehendeth" all things because they are before him. However, things are not merely present to God, but God is also to all things. He is not merely present to, but actually through all things. (2001 - pp. 75, 76 - bold emphasis mine)

And just a bit later, we read:

This revelation, and others received by Joseph Smith use the terms "spirit," "intelligence," "power," "light." and "law," as synonyms and mutually reinforcing notions. (2001 - p. 76)

With Ostler's reflections in mind, I will now turn to a number of verses from the Bible and Triple Combination which describe the attributes and nature of God:

Jeremiah 23:24 - Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the LORD. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the LORD.

1 Kings 8:27 - But will God indeed dwell on the earth? behold, the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have builded?

Chronicles 2:6 - But who is able to build him an house, seeing the heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain him? who am I then, that I should build him an house, save only to burn sacrifice before him?

Isaiah 66:1 - Thus saith the LORD, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool: where is the house that ye build unto me? and where is the place of my rest?

John 4:24 God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.

1 John 5:7 - For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one.

2 Nephi 31:21b - ...this is the doctrine of Christ, and the only and true doctrine of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, which is one God, without end. Amen.

Alma 11:44b - ...and shall be brought and be arraigned before the bar of Christ the Son, and God the Father, and the Holy Spirit, which is one Eternal God, to be judged according to their works, whether they be good or whether they be evil.

3 Nephi 11:36 - And thus will the Father bear record of me, and the Holy Ghost will bear record unto him of the Father and me; for the Father, and I, and the Holy Ghost are one.

Mormon 7:7 - And he hath brought to pass the redemption of the world, whereby he that is found guiltless before him at the judgment day hath it given unto him to dwell in the presence of God in his kingdom, to sing ceaseless praises with the choirs above, unto the Father, and unto the Son, and unto the Holy Ghost, which are one God, in a state of happiness which hath no end.

D&C 20:17 - By these things we know that there is a God in heaven, who is infinite and eternal, from everlasting to everlasting the same unchangeable God, the framer of heaven and earth, and all things which are in them;

D&C 20: 27, 28 - As well as those who should come after, who should believe in the gifts and callings of God by the Holy Ghost, which beareth record of the Father and of the Son; Which Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, infinite and eternal, without end. Amen.

D&C 88: 11-13 - And the light which shineth, which giveth you light, is through him who enlighteneth your eyes, which is the same light that quickeneth your understandings; Which light proceedeth forth from the presence of God to fill the immensity of space. The light which is in all things, which giveth life to all things, which is the law by which all things are governed, even the power of God who  sitteth upon his throne, who is in the bosom of eternity, who is in the midst of all things.

The descriptions of God in the above passages strongly suggest to me that those attributes which make God 'eternal', 'everlasting', 'infinite', 'one God', 'fill heaven and earth', 'fill the immensity of space', 'in all things', 'Spirit', etc., are descriptions of God's divine nature; a divine nature that sure seems to be identifying a "class or kind of being" who has a spiritual, infinite essence, rather than a corporeal, finite one.

I can now delineate why I believe that the phrase "totally incorporeal" lacks a certain degree of clarity when describing the person and or persons termed "God". Though God's divine nature is essentially "Spirit", this does not preclude Him from taking on corporeal form. With that said, I cannot help but maintain a correct reading of Scripture demands that we acknowledge God has in fact done so.

If the above assessment of mine is an accurate one, it then seems to follow that the development of the doctrine of God—via the reflections of the early Church Fathers—constituted a “preservation of type”, and was not a corruption.

But then, this beachbum may have missed somethnig...

Grace and peace,

David

Is Theology Poetry? - the nature and necessity of the development of doctrine

In the January 20, 2019 thread I linked to Gordon Carle's doctoral dissertation, "Alexandria in the Shadow of the Hill Cumorah: A Comparative Historical Theology of The Early Christian and Mormon Doctrines of God" (link). The primary content and context of the dissertation, "is a comparative study of the theological and historical development of the early Christian (Pre-Nicene) and Mormon doctrines of God." The post gave rise to a robust discussion concerning which of the two above paradigms has been the more faithful development of the divine revelations recorded in the Old and New Testaments, with a focus on anthropomorphism.

The issue of the development of doctrine has been one of the major topics explored here at AF for over a decade now, with 55 prior posts delving into the subject (see THIS LINK). However, the relationship between anthropomorphism and development of doctrine was not explored until the above referenced thread. My current studies into this topic has brought to light an essay presented by C. S. Lewis to the 'Socratic Club'—an Oxford debating society—back in 1944. 

This essay provides some fascinating contrasts between theology, mythology and poetry; but it is page 10 where the issue of doctrinal development begins. Note the following:

What did the early Christians believe? Did they believe that God really has a material palace in the sky and that He received His Son in a decorated state chair placed a little to the right of His own? — or did they not? The answer is that the alternative we are offering them was probably never present to their minds at all. As soon as it was present, we know quite well which side of the fence they came down. As soon as the issue of Anthropomorphism was explicitly before the Church in, I think, the second century, Anthropomorphism was condemned. The Church knew the answer (that God has no body and therefore couldn’t sit in a chair) as soon as it knew the question. But till the question was raised, of course, people believed neither the one answer nor the other. There is no more tiresome error in the history of thought than to try to sort our ancestors on to this or that side of a distinction which was not in their minds at all. You are asking a question to which no answer exists.

It is very probable that most (almost certainly not all) of the first generation of Christians never thought of their faith without anthropomorphic imagery, and that they were not explicitly conscious, as a modern would be, that it was mere imagery. But this does not in the least mean that the essence of their belief was concerned with details about a celestial throne room. That was not what they valued, or what they were prepared to die for. Any one of them who went to Alexandria and got a philosophical education would have recognised the imagery at once for what it was, and would not have felt that his belief had been altered in any way that mattered...

The earliest Christians were not so much like a man who mistakes the shell for the kernel as like a man carrying a nut which he hasn’t yet cracked. The moment it is cracked, he knows which part to throw away. Till then he holds on to the nut, not because he is a fool but because he isn’t. (Pages 10, 11 - LINK to PDF)

Those who are familiar with John Henry Newman's, An Essay On The Development of Christian Doctrine, will most likely discern his motif of organic development in Lewis' essay.

Before ending, I would like to issue a challenge of sorts: take Newman's famous seven notes concerning doctrinal development—Preservation of Type, Continuity of its Principles, Its Power of Assimilation, Its Logical Sequence, Anticipation of its Future, Conservative Action Upon its Past, and Its Chronic Vigor—and apply them to the two different paradigms contrasted in Carle's dissertation.

Hope to hear from those folk who take up the challenge soon...

Grace and peace,

David

"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" - Jewish Midrash concerning Genesis 1:26

Over the weekend, I read Jacob Neusner's, Judaism When Christianity Began (link to Google Preview). 

Given the recent AF topic on corporeality and God, I felt compelled to share the following selection:

The Torah's single most important teaching about God is that humanity is like God, so Genesis 1:26: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." God and the human being are mirror images of one another. Here we find the simple claim that the angels could not discern any physical difference whatever between man—Adam—and God:

Genesis Rabbah VIII:X

A. Said R. Hoshaiah, "When the Holy One, blessed be he, came to create the first man, the ministering angels mistook him [for God, for man was in God's image,] and wanted to say before the latter, Holy, [holy, holy is the Lord of hosts].' (Page 29)

This brought back to mind an essay by Neusner which I read back in the late 90s—"Conversation in Nauvoo about the Corporeality of God"—which was published in volume 36.1 (1996) of the BYU Studies Quarterly. I grabbed the issue from my collection, and on page 14 found the exact same Midrash quote referenced above—which I must admit, I had forgotten. (PDF copy available online HERE.)

I think many folk will find Neusner's book and essay of interest...

Grace and peace,

David

Lactantius on the figure/form of God

In the previous thread the dissertation by Gordon Allen Carle, which I linked to, has elicited a robust discussion concerning the issue of whether or not God in some sense has a 'body'. An important element of the topic concerns whether or not any extant writings of early post-apostolic Christians support the view that God in some real sense possesses bodily form. Support for God having bodily form is explicitly found in the extant writings of Tertullian and in the collection of Jewish Christian writings commonly known as the Clementine literature. A consensus of Patristic scholars also believe that Melito of Sardis held to the belief.

In the above referenced discussion the question of whether or not Lactantius affirmed the notion that God has a bodily figure/form was raised. One of the participants—TOm—included Lactantius with Tertullian and Melito as those folk who affirmed a bodily form of God. This was the first time I had seen Lactantius associated with the view. TOm related that he inherited this understanding from two sources: first, The Harvard Theological Review article, "Augustine and the Corporeality of God" by Griffin and Paulsen [link]; and second, The Catholic Encyclopedia entry, "Anthropomorphism". The HTR article merely mentions the name along with Tertullian (see page 107). The following is an excerpt from the TCE entry:

Anthropomorphites (Audians)

A sect of Christians that arose in the fourth century in Syria and extended into Scythia, sometimes called Audians, from their founder, Audius. Taking the text of Genesis, i, 27, literally, Audius held that God has a human form. The error was so gross, and, to use St. Jerome's expression (Epist. vi, Ad Pammachium), so absolutely senseless, that it showed no vitality. Towards the end of the century it appeared among some bodies of African Christians. The Fathers who wrote against it dismiss it almost contemptuously. In the time of Cyril of Alexandria, there were some anthropomorphites among the Egyptian monks. He composed a short refutation of their error, which he attributed to extreme ignorance. (Adv. Anthrop. in P.G., LXXVI.) Concerning the charges of anthropomorphism preferred against Melito, Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius, see the respective articles. The error was revived in northern Italy during the tenth century, but was effectually suppressed by the bishops, notably by the learned Ratherius, Bishop of Verona.  (The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume I, 1907, p. 559.)

Once again, we have merely the mention of Lactantius, with no reference/s to his extant works. But the TCE entry prompts one to, "see the respective articles." Under the "Lactantius" entry we read:

Another treatise, "De Ira Dei", directed against the Stoics and Epicureans, is supplementary to the "Divine Institutions" (II,xvii,5) and deals with anthropomorphism in its true sense. (The Catholic Encyclopedia, Volume VIII, p. 736.)

"De Ira Dei"—The Anger/Wrath of God—is one of Lactanitus' minor works. It had been over three decades ago since I last read Volume Seven of the Nicene and Post-Nicene series, which contains the English translations of many of Lactantius' works, including his De Ira Dei. I pulled down the volume from the self a couple of days ago and found the following:

But we say that those fall from the second step, who, though they understand that there is but one Supreme God, nevertheless, ensnared by the philosophers, and captivated by false arguments, entertain opinions concerning that excellent majesty far removed from the truth ; who either deny that God has any figure, or think that He is moved by no affection, because every affection is a sign of weakness, which has no existence in God. (Lactantius, A Treatise on the Anger of God, Chapter 2 - NPNF 7.260 - bold emphasis mine.)

An, 'ah hah moment' for sure! Next step for me was to find out what the Latin reading was. From Migne's Patrologia Latina we read:

qui aut figuram negant habere ullam Deum (Migne, Patrologiæ Cursus Completus, Tomus VII, Columns 82, 83.)

Armed with the Latin and Google, I found two contributions that are germane to our issue at hand. From the first:

Lactantius, as is usual with him, displays considerable acuteness in detecting the weak points of his adversary's argument ; but a deficiency of soundness and clearness in his own views. He describes the steps towards Truth, from each of which he represents the fall into fatal error as prone and easy ; and he shows how low were the attainments even of those among the philosophers who made the nearest approaches to right opinions. But in speaking of those who attributed absolute quiescence to the Deity, he himself employs language from which it may not unfairly be inferred that he considered God to have both a body and bodily affections. "They entertain sentiments wide of the Truth, who deny that God has any shape, or can be excited by any feeling ." (Jacob Henry Brooke Mountain, A Summary of the Writings of Lactantius, Page 133 - bold emphasis mine.)

And the second:

The crudest form of anthropomorphism, proceeding from a misapprehension of the expression "Image of God" in Genesis, represented God as Man per eminentiam. It was held by Melito, bishop of Sardis in the second century, who wrote a book entitled περί ἐνσωμάτου θεοῦ, which treated not, as some suppose, of the Incarnation, but of the corporeity of God in a sensuous human figure, as Origen testifies. Somewhat more refined is another form according to which God was conceived of as an ethereal being of light. This view is maintained in the Clementine Homilies, and even by Tertullian ; notwithstanding the depth and purity of his religious feelings, he says—"Who shall deny that God is a body, although God is a Spirit.";* He maintains that there is nothing uncorporeal, except what does not exist.† Spirit is Body of a peculiar quality.‡ Some have tried to excuse him as if he only wanted another word in order to express real existence. But this is certainly unfounded. The errors of thought and language here exactly coincide. Tertullian, with his vivid religious feeling and his robust realism, knew not how to separate the ideas of Reality and Corporeity. We remark similar representations in Lactantius, who combats those who deny that God possesses form and affections. When we read in writers of this period that God is sine corpore, it does not follow that they conceived of him as a purely spiritual Being, but possibly they only meant to express a contrariety to earthly bodies. (Neander, The History of Christian Dogmas, Vol. 1, pp. 103, 104 - bold emphasis mine.)

And so, it seems that Lactantius must be included with the Clementine literature, Tertullian, and Melito as one of the early Christian writers who believed that God exists in some bodily form.

Grace and peace,

David

Terminology: trinitarianism, unitarianism, monotheism, polytheism...

Over the last few weeks, I have been in one of my 'reading modes', spending hours each day researching the issue of terminology concerning theology proper—i.e. the doctrine of God. My last post touched on the issue of 'dueling definitions' concerning unitarianism and trinitarianism. Informed discussions concerning unitarianism and trinitarianism should also include an in depth examination of the following labels/terms: monotheism, polytheism, henotheism, monolatry, triune, trinity, tritheism, modalism, monarchianism, adoptionism, Arianism, homoian, homoousian, homoiousian, monoousian, anhomoian, divine, divinity, Godhead, being, nature, essence, substance, person, ousia, hypostasis, prosopon, autotheos, el, eloah, elohim, adonai, the tetragrammaton, et al.

I suspect most folk think that the definitions for many of the above labels/terms are 'set in stone'; however, such is not the case—especially so when one attempts to classify the various theological systems of individuals, sects and religions throughout history. For instance, Arianism has been termed by many as unitarian, while some say it is polytheistic. John Calvin has been called a tritheist by some folk, but a modalist by others. The list of such contrasts can be multiplied into dozens of examples. Hope to write much more on such issues in the near future...

For now, whilst my research continues, I would like to share links to two works I have recently read—and are germane—first, a dissertation by Gordon Allen Carle, titled:

Alexandria in the Shadow of the Hill Cumorah: A Comparative Historical Theology of The Early Christian and Mormon Doctrines of God [LINK] 

The following is the abstract from the dissertation:

This work is a comparative study of the theological and historical development of the early Christian (Pre-Nicene) and Mormon doctrines of God. For the Christian tradition, I follow a detailed study of the apostolic period, followed by the apologetical period, and then conclude with the pre-Nicene up to around 250 C.E. For the Mormon tradition, I cover the period beginning with the establishment of the Mormon Church in 1830 and conclude with its official doctrinal formulation in 1916. I begin this work with a chronological examination of the development of the Mormon doctrine of God, commencing with Joseph Smith's translation of the Book of Mormon and concluding with his revelations and additional translations of those books that make up the Pearl of Great Price. I then examine Brigham Young's single theological contribution, followed with the speculative contributions of Parley P. Pratt, Orson Pratt, John A. Widtsoe, B. H. Roberts, and concluding with James E. Talmage. This section covers chapters two through four. In chapters five through seven, I examine the theological contributions of Ignatius of Antioch, then Theophilus of Antioch, and conclude my study with the theological contributions of Origen of Alexandria. For the Christian tradition, I trace the development of the pre-Nicene theologians' struggle to explicate the theological and philosophical implications regarding the divinization of Christ within the context of monotheism. At the end of chapters five through seven I include a succinct, comparative study of each father's doctrine with Mormon doctrine. This work will also address the major theological and historical factors that influenced both the Mormon and traditional Christian doctrines of God. Further, I contrast both theological systems and discuss their basic differences and similarities. My conclusion is that the fundamental difference between these two theological systems rests upon their foundational conceptions of reality as absolutist or finitist. The Mormon theological system rests upon a materialistic and monistic conception of reality, whereas traditional Christianity's system rests upon a dualistic conception of reality. In Mormon materialism , the Trinity is divided as individuated Gods; in Christian transcendence, the unity of God may only be maintained, while acknowledging the separate existences of the Persons, if the nature of God is understood as an incorporeal substance.

Carle's, conclusion "that the fundamental difference between these two theological systems rests upon their foundational conceptions of reality as absolutist or finitist", is not a novel one, but the research which leads him to this conclusion is the most exhaustive I have yet to read. [For a number of related papers which delve into the absolutist vs. finitist distinction see this Google search]

The second contribution is a thesis by Anthony R. Meyer titled:

The Divine Name in Early Judaism: Use and Non-Use in Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek [LINK]

Note the following abstract:

During the Second Temple period (516 BCE–70 CE) a series of developments contributed to a growing reticence to use the divine name, YHWH. The name was eventually restricted among priestly and pious circles, and then disappeared. The variables are poorly understood and the evidence is scattered. Scholars have supposed that the second century BCE was a major turning point from the use to non-use of the divine name, and depict this phenomenon as a linear development. Many have arrived at this position, however, through only partial consideration of currently available evidence. The current study offers for the first time a complete collection of extant evidence from the Second Temple period in Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek in order answer the question of how, when, and in what sources the divine name is used and avoided. The outcome is a modified chronology for the Tetragrammaton’s history. Rather than a linear development from use to avoidance, the extant evidence points to overlapping use and non-use throughout most of the Second Temple period.

Those folk who share my interest in the history of God's unique name, will greatly appreciate this exhaustive work.

Back to my studies...

Grace and peace,

David