Trent, semi-Pelagianism and Berkouwer: are R.C. Sproul's misrepresentations cases of dishonesty or just shoddy scholarship

In a recent thread here at AF (LINK), I took issue (yet once again) with a renewed assertion by Ken Temple that the decrees of the Council of Trent concerning justification and salvation are essentially "semi-Pelagian". To support this charge, Ken relies heavily on the polemics of R.C. Sproul, as expressed in his published works, Faith Alone and Willing to Believe (see THIS THREAD for some critical reflections). Ken invokes Sproul's use Herman Bavinck, who wrote, "although semi-Pelagianism had been condemned by Rome, it reappeared in a ‘roundabout way", and adds the following from G. C. Berkouwer (via Sproul):

Between Orange and Trent lies a long process of development, namely, scholasticism, with its elaboration of the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, and the Roman system of penitence...

For a fuller context of the above quotes, I now turn to Sproul's, Faith Alone—wherein after quoting chapter 5 of Trent's sixth session—we read:

Here Rome makes it clear that fallen man cannot convert himself or even move himself to justice in God's sight without the aid of grace. Again Pelagiansim is repudiated.

This predisposing grace, however, is rejectable. It is not in itself effectual. Its effectiveness depends on the fallen person's assent and cooperation. This sounds very much like semi-Pelagianism, which had been condemned at Orange. Earlier in the fifth session, which treated original sin, Trent affirmed some aspects of the decrees of Orange.

Rome has repeatedly been accused of condemning semi-Pelagianism at Orange but embracing it anew at Trent. Herman Bavinck held that "although semi-Pelagianism had been condemned by Rome, it reappeared in a 'roundabout way'". G. C. Berkouwer observed:

"Between Orange and Trent lies a long process of development, namely, scholasticism, with its elaboration of the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, and the Roman system of penitence...Hence the situation became much more complicated for Rome in Trent than when, in 529, semi-Pelagianism had to be condemned for its "weakening" of grace...Trent had to ward off the Reformers' attack without derograting from the decrees of Orange...The gratia praeveniens had to be taught without relapsing into the sola fide of the Reformers. That is why the Orange texts are repeated in Trent, especially in the decree on justification."

The Council of Trent to steer a course on the razor's edge between semi-Pelagianism and Reformed thought. It is arguable that they cut themselves on that razor. At issue was the residual power of man's weakened, fallen will. Rome tried to argue that the will is weaker than semi-Pelagianism allowed, but not as weak as the Reformer's insisted. Berkouwer concludes: "At Trent there was no concern with the threat to grace as there was at Orange. But Trent is concerned with the natural freedom of the will. The latter, it is true, has been weakened by sin (Orange, Valence, Trent) but not at all extinguished."

...To avoid the Reformation and Augustinian view of the enslaved will, Rome speaks of the power of fallen man to assent and cooperate with prevenient grace. That grace is not effectual without the sinner's response. (Sproul, Faith Alone, pp. 140-141.)

Now, the above has certainly given Ken the impression Sproul believes that Trent is semi-Pelagian, and that Sproul believes he has support from Bavinck and Berkouwer on this issue. But what one will fail to uncover in Sproul's writings is a clear, definitive description of what semi-Pelagianism actually is. The nearest I have been able to find is in his book, Willing to Believe, wherein he seems to identify any system of soteriology that does not embrace "monergistic regeneration" as a form of semi-Pelagianism (see pp. 20-29, 69-84). As such, he is convinced that the vast majority of modern Evangelicals  embrace semi-Pelagianism, and that in official Roman Catholic doctrine, we have the, "triumph of semi-Pelagianism over Augustinianism" (p. 84).

The major error in Sproul's assessments lies in the fact that he has incorrectly described/understood what actually constitutes semi-Pelagianism. This fact comes as shock to me, for a number of the scholars he has quoted (e.g. Berkouwer, Harnack, Schaff), in his two referenced books above, do define the distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism—i.e. the rejection of the belief that preceding/prevenient grace (gratia praeveniens) is necessary for one to accept the Gospel.  Sproul has substituted this distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism with the notion that it is the rejection of "monergistic regeneration" that makes one's theology semi-Pelagian—to do so is either a case of dishonesty or very shoddy scholarship.

Before moving on to Sproul's misrepresentation/misunderstanding of Berkouwer, I would like to provide a few scholarly selections that identify the distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism:

SEMI-PELAGIANISM. The doctrines on human nature upheld in the 4th and 5th cents. by a group of theologians who, while not denying the necessity of *Grace for salvation, maintained that the first steps towards the Christian life were ordinarily taken by the human will and Grace supervened only later. (The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 2nd ed. 1974, 1985 reprint, p. 1258.)


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. Doctrines, upheld during the period from 427 to 529, that rejected the extreme views of Pelagius and of Augustine in regards to the priority of divine grace and human will in the initial work of salvation...

Cassian taught that though a sickness is inherited through Adam's sin, human free will has not been entirely obliterated. Divine grace is indispensable for salvation, but does not necessarily need to precede a free human choice, because, despite the weakness of human volition, the will takes the initiative toward God. (Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 1984, p. 1000.)

In opposition to both systems [Pelagianism and Augustinianism]  he [John Cassian] taught that the divine image and human freedom were not annihilated, but only weakened, by the fall; in other words, that man is sick, but not dead, that he cannot indeed help himself, but that he can desire the help of a physician, and either accept or refuse it when offered, and that he must cooperate with the grace of God in his salvation. The question, which of the two factors has the initiative, he answers, altogether empirically, to this effect: that sometimes, and indeed usually, the human will, as in the cases of the Prodigal Son, Zacchaeus, the Penitent Thief, and Cornelius, determines itself to conversion; sometimes grace anticipates it, and, as with Matthew and Paul, draws the resisting will—yet, even in this case, without constraint—to God. Here, therefore, the gratia praeveniens is manifestly overlooked. 

These are essentially Semi-Pelagian principles, though capable of various modification and applications. The church, even the Roman church, has rightly emphasized the necessity of prevenient grace... (Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 1910, 1981 reprint, 3.861, 862.)

The preeminent Christian doctrinal/historical scholar of the latter-half of the 20th century, Jaroslav Pelikan, 'puts-the-icing-on the-cake' (so to speak). He begins his section on Semi-Pelagianism with:

The opposition to Augustine earned this position the title "Semi-Pelagian" in the sixteenth century, but already in the fifth century the partisans of Augustine were calling it "the remnants of the Pelagian heresy [Pelagianae pravitatis reliquiae]." The term is used to cover a group of theologians from the fifth and sixth centuries, the most prominent of whom were John Cassian, Vincent of Lérins, and Fautus of Riez. (The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), p. 319.)

After presenting the doctrines that the adherents of "Pelagianae pravitatis reliquiae" agreed upon with Augustine and the catholic tradition, Pelikan then delineates where they departed:

Even while asserting that without divine assistance none of these virtues could attain perfection, Augustine's critics still insisted that "it cannot be doubted that there are by nature some  seeds of goodness in every soul implanted by the kindness of the Creator." This did not detract from the glory of redemption. If is was said "that one should not pay attention to what is good by nature because before the coming of Christ, the Gentiles obviously did not attain to salvation," the reply was the axiom: "Anyone who denies that nature is to be proclaimed in its good qualities, simply does not know that the Author of nature is the same as the Author of grace," and that therefore "since the Creator is the same as the Restorer, one and the same is celebrated when we praise either work." Praising the free will of man meant praising its Creator and did not detract from his grace.

This was evident from the Bible itself, where "the bounty of God is actually shaped according to the capacity of man's faith." Sometimes, for example in the conversion of Paul or of Matthew, divine grace had preceded any desire or good will on the part of man. But in other instances, for example in the account of Zacchaeus or of the thief on the cross, the free will of man had taken some initiative. By the goodness of the Creator there still remained the capacity to initiate the will for salvation. (Ibid., pp. 323, 324)

He then moves on to the synod of Orange (529) and its clear, direct condemnation of the teaching that "there still remained the capacity [in fallen mankind] to initiate the will for salvation":

...in response to the argument that there was a diversity of operations by which in some cases men took the initiative and in others God took the initiative, the synod condemned as "alien to the true faith" anyone who taught that "some have come to the grace of baptism by mercy, but others by free will." Citing the specific biblical examples that had been used in support of this teaching, Caesarius affirmed that the conversion of Zacchaeus and of the thief on the cross had also been "not achievements of nature, but gifts from the generosity of divine grace." The "beginning of faith" was always due to the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. (Ibid., p. 328)

So, the question for me is: why did Sproul substitute the distinguishing feature of semi-Pelagianism—the belief that "there still remained the capacity [in fallen mankind] to initiate the will for salvation"—with the notion that it is the rejection of "monergistic regeneration" that makes one's theology semi-Pelagian ? What makes this substitution even more baffling is the fact Sproul informs his readers that it was the Synod of Orange in 529 which, "condemned the system of semi-Pelagianism"; and yet, one will look in vain to find ANY reference to "monergistic regeneration" in the decrees of that synod.

Time to move onto Sproul's use of Berkouwer. Does Berkouwer side with Sproul's view that Trent, and subsequent Catholic theology, had adopted semi-Pelagianism ? Sproul's surrounding context of the two quotes from Berkouwer in Faith Alone gives the reader the strong impression that he believed this. However, a deeper, more extensive reading of Berkouwer reveals that Berkouwer did not believe Trent, and subsequent Catholic theology, had embraced semi-Pelagianism. Berkouwer discusses this issue at length in two of his important works that have been translated into English: The Conflict with Rome (English 1958) and Studies in Dogmatics - Divine Election (English 1960).

Sproul quotes Berkouwer three times in his Faith Alone (pp. 140, 141), all of which are from The Conflict with Rome (pp. 80, 82, 84). Two of those three quotes are directly related to the topic at hand (the third deals with Calvin) and are provided in their entirety above. If one limits their reading of Berkouwer concerning semi-Pelagianism and Catholicism to what Sproul has provided, a severely flawed impression is difficult to avoid. However, if one reads Berkouwer's full contributions on this issue as found in The Conflict with Rome (pp. 76-112) and Studies in Dogmatics - Divine Election (pp. 28-52) a much different impression emerges. One will find Berkouwer's clearest assessment on whether or not the Roman Catholic Church teaches semi-Pelagianism in the following selection:

The Council of Orange (529) condemned not only Pelagianism but also semi-Pelagianism, a condemnation to which the Roman Catholic Church still adheres for the reason that even semi-Pelagianism thinks too depreciatively of the necessity of God's grace. To be sure, semi-Pelagianism rejected Pelagianism and did not teach an inviolate ibberum arbitrium, but it still maintained a belief in free will — although a weakened free will (infirmitas liberi arbitrii). It taught that man retains his free will, but because it has been weakened by sin it is in need of God's helping grace, so that a cooperation between God's grace and man's freedom is necessary. Rome rejects this doctrine because she does not think the necessity of grace is sufficiently confessed by it. (Studies in Dogmatics - Divine Election, p. 30 - bold emphasis mine.)

I don't think that Berkouwer could be much clearer on what his position concerning semi-Pelgainism and the RCC is. (Anyone who thinks Berkouwer maintained that the RCC is semi-Pelagian after reading the above is in dire need of some help.)

Before ending this somewhat lengthy post, I would like to point out one more significant difference between Sproul and Berkouwer. Note the following from Sproul's pen:

A theologian friend of mine says frequently that in church history there have been only three basic types of theology. There have been a multitude of theological schools with subtle nuances, but in the final analysis there are only three kinds of theology: what we call Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, and Augustinianism. Virtually every church in Western church history, and Eastern church history as well, has fallen into one of those three categories. (Saved from What ?, p. 46.)

It was after reading the above that I came to understand why Sproul labels Arminian, Lutheran and Catholic theologies as semi-Pelagianism, for in his worldview, "there are only three kinds of theology".

But, Berkouwer does not agree with Sproul on this matter. Berkouwer's view adds a fourth kind of theology: synergism. In Studies in Dogmatics - Divine Election, he makes a clear distinction between Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, synergism and monergism, and places the Arminian, Lutheran and Catholic theologies into the synergistic category.

I shall end here, feeling fairly confident that I established some significant flaws in a number of Sproul's assessments.

Grace and peace,

David


P.S. I think it is prudent that I let my Calvinistic readers know that this thread is not a critique of monergism and/or an endorsement of synergism (in any form).

Ken Temple and Trent: a continued reliance on inaccurate definitions and historical errors

Back on June 7, 2011, Ken Temple published a thread at the Beggars All blog called "Between Orange and Trent" (LINK), which was an attempt to defend the following:

"Semi-Pelagianism condemned at Orange in 529 AD, but reaffirmed at Trent"

The above is a very popular view among anti-Catholic apologists, including Dr. R. C. Sproul—who should know better.

In the last comment of the above thread, I provided the URL to a thread here AF  which should have put to rest any further attempts to construe the teachings of the Council of Trent as "Semi-Pelagianism" (LINK).

Ken himself participated in the combox of that thread, so it came as a bit of a surprise to me to discover that three years later (almost to the day) he has produced yet another thread (LINK) which attempts to paint the Council of Trent as Semi-Pelagian !!! Note the following:

R. C. Sproul demonstrates the contradiction in Roman Catholic Theology, when it claims it agrees with Augustine against Pelagius and the Semi-Pelagians (Provincial Synod of Orange in 529 AD), but later re-affirms Semi-Pelagianism by the decrees of Trent (1545-1563)...

My discovery of this thread came on June 30th. I subsequently attempted to post the following in the combox of that thread (BA comments are now moderated):

Hi Ken,

I have not had much 'spare' time to spend on the internet over the last couple of months; as such, I was not aware of the existence of this thread until today. With that said, I am somewhat amazed that you chose to publish it, given our past exchanges concerning the issue of semi-Pelagianism. IMO, the threads contained in THIS LINK, have exposed some grave errors in your reasoning on this matter.

The essence of those threads can be summarized by the following:

Semi-Pelaganianism teaches that an individual apart from grace can accept the offer of salvation, and that once accepted one then cooperates with the grace that God gives. In other words, semi-Pelagianism denies the necessity of grace for one to believe/accept the gospel.

While Pelagianism denies that ANY grace is necessary for salvation (both before and after the acceptance of the Gospel), semi-Pelaganism only denies that grace is necessary for one to accept the gospel.

Grace and peace,

David

My comment/post has yet to be published, so I thought it prudent to point out yet once again here at AF that Ken's and Sproul's continued attempts to define the teachings of the Council of Trent as Semi-Pelagianism are based on grave historical errors and false definitions. Trent (and all official Catholic teaching on soteriology) clearly denies both Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism, affirming time and time again that, grace is necessary for salvation both before and after the acceptance of the Gospel. No amount of sophistry will change these facts...

Grace and peace,

David

Does the Roman Catholic Church teach either Pelagianism or semi-Pelagianism? - When facts and objectivity take a 'backseat' to polemics

As I mentioned in my last post, "I have been in one of my intense reading modes", but I am a big fan of tennis, as such, I have been 'multi-tasking' during this 2011 Wimbledon season. Today was the men's quarterfinals and of the four gents I had hoped would advance into the semis, only one did so (Andy Murray). I was a bit 'bummed' by the other outcomes, and not in much of a mood to continue today's studies, so I thought I would check in on some of the apologetics sites that have been of interest to me. Those familiar with my blog are aware of my past interest in the Beggars All blog, especially those threads that reflect on Catholicism. With the departure of John Bugay, the number of anti-Catholic threads at BA seemed to have dropped off the high level of intensity that persisted during John's presence as a "contributor", but the month of June has seen a significant upturn in polemical threads directed at Catholicism (many, but certainly not all, revolve around the Vulgate version of the Bible). I went back through the new threads posted at BA over the last three weeks and counted no less than 19 threads devoted to one aspect or another of BA's negative stance on Catholicism; of those 19 threads 2 in particular caught my attention: Orange and Trent and In Catholic theological anthropology, human nature is not selfish or sinful; human nature is good.

These two threads touch on an issue that I have spent of good deal of time researching: whether or not the official doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church (i.e. doctrine delineated in the accepted Catholic councils) is either Pelagian or semi-Pelagian.

In the Orange and Trent thread penned by Ken Temple, we read:

“Semi-Pelagianism condemned at Orange in 529 AD, but reaffirmed at Trent” (1545-1563) (Basically, the essence of statements by Bavinck, Berkouwer, and Sproul; see below)


Ken then links to two "articles that focus on the beneficial canons of the Council of Orange that Protestant Reformers also emphasized in their battles against the false doctrines of Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism and how the Council of Trent is contradictory to much of the council of Orange."

It seems that Ken has pretty much relied on the conclusions drawn by the above two articles, along with those of R. C. Sproul; unfortunately, many of those conclusions are fundamentally flawed. I am going to focus on Sproul in this thread, for I have read a good deal of Sproul's treatments on this subject, and have already touched on some of his skewed assessments here at AF. Once again from Orange and Trent we read:

Faith Alone: The Evangelical Doctrine of Justification, by R. C. Sproul. Baker, 1995.

In chapter 7, entitled “Merit and Grace”, R. C. Sproul discusses the issues of merit and grace, Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism, the Council of Orange in 529 AD and the council of Trent (1545-1463), which seems to affirm semi-Pelagianism.

“Rome has repeatedly been accused of condemning semi-Pelagianism at Orange [in 529 AD] but embracing it anew at Trent. Herman Bavinck held that “although semi-Pelagianism had been condemned by Rome, it reappeared in a ‘roundabout way’”. G. C. Berkouwer observed:


“Between Orange and Trent lies a long process of development, namely, scholasticism, with its elaboration of the doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works, and the Roman system of penitence . . .”

Bavinck and Berkouwer are cited by Sproul in Faith Alone, pages 140-141.


I touched on Sproul's Faith Alone: The Evangelical Doctrine of Justification in my thread, An Evangelical Critique of R. C. Sproul's "Faith alone", but address the issue of semi-Pelagianism more directly the thread, Why terminology is important, which interacts with Sroul's subsequent book, Willing to Believe (1997). [BTW, Sproul has certainly misread Berkouwer concerning his reflections on Trent and its relationship to Orange and semi-Pelagianism; hope to post a thread on this in the near future.]

I do not wish to duplicate the entire thread here, so I shall focus on but one of Sproul's faulty assessments; Sproul penned (provided in the above thread):

The classic issue between Augustinian theology and all forms of semi-Pelagianism focuses on one aspect of the order of salvation (ordo salutis): What is the relationship between regeneration and faith? Is regeneration a monergistic or synergistic work? Must a person first exercise faith in order to be born again? Or must rebirth occur before a person is able to exercise faith? Another way to state the question is this: Is the grace of regeneration operative or cooperative?


Dr. Sproul is just plain wrong here, and I clearly pointed this out in the same thread:

...a careful reading of the historical context of the birth of semi-Pelagianism reveals a much different landscape. And what is disconcerting to me, is that Sproul, in his Willing To Believe, has obviously read the history behind the emergence of semi-Pelgaianism, as well as the early Church’s reaction to it. Sproul in pages 69-76 gives a brief, but for the most part, accurate portrayal of the rise of semi-Pelagianism, citing three esteemed authorities, whose primary discipline is that of Christian history: Philip Schaff, Adolf von Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg. Yet amazingly, Sproul, in spite of the very quotes he provides from these scholars, misses THE KEY INGREDIENT which distinguishes semi-Pelagianism from all forms of Augustinianism! That KEY INGREDIENT is this:

Semi-Pelaganianism teaches that an individual apart from grace can accept the offer of salvation, and that once accepted one then cooperates with the grace that God gives. In other words, semi-Pelagianism denies the necessity of grace for one to believe/accept the gospel.


While Pelagianism denies that ANY grace is necessary for salvation (both before and after the acceptance of the Gospel), semi-Pelagainism only denies that grace is necessary for one to accept the gospel.


Note the following:

SEMI-PELAGIANISM. The doctrines on human nature upheld in the 4th and 5th cents. by a group of theologians who, while not denying the necessity of *Grace for salvation, maintained that the first steps towards the Christian life were ordinarily taken by the human will and Grace supervened only later. (The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 2nd ed. 1974 - 1985 reprint, p. 1258.)


SEMI-PELAGIANISM. Doctrines, upheld during the period from 427 to 529, that rejected the extreme views of Pelagius and of Augustine in regards to the priority of divine grace and human will in the initial work of salvation...


Cassian [one of the early leaders of semi-Pelagianism] taught that though a sickness is inherited through Adam's sin, human free will has not been entirely obliterated. Divine grace is indispensable for salvation, but does not necessarily need to precede a free human choice, because, despite the weakness of human volition, the will takes the initiative toward God [apart from supernatural grace]. (Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, 1984, p. 1000.)


Sproul in Willing to Believe even quotes the following from Dr. Philip Schaff (History of the Christian Church) which affirms the above:

In opposition to both systems he taught that the divine image and human freedom were not annihilated, but only weakened, by the fall; in other words, that man is sick, but not dead, that he cannot indeed help himself, but that he can desire the help of a physician, and either accept or refuse it when offered, and that he must cooperate with the grace of God in his salvation. The question, which of the two factors has the initiative, he answers, altogether empirically, to this effect: that sometimes, and indeed usually, the human will, as in the cases of the Prodigal Son, Zacchaeus, the Penitent Thief, and Cornelius, determines itself to conversion; sometimes grace anticipates it, and, as with Matthew and Paul, draws the resisting will—yet, even in this case, without constraint—to God. Here, therefore, the gratia praeveniens is manifestly overlooked. (Sproul, Willing, p. 74; Schaff, History, 3.861)


How Dr. Sproul could miss THE key distinguishing feature after citing the above is quite baffling to me. That Ken and so many others mistakenly attribute the charge of semi-Pelagianism to the Roman Catholic Church, seemingly relying on such flawed assessments, comes as no surprise to me.


Grace and peace,

David

CHARLES HODGE: “Is the Church of Rome a Part of the Visible Church?”

An individual who posts under the name “Interlocutor”, provided a link to an interesting article/review written by the esteemed Reformed theologian, Dr. Charles Hodge (see combox of THIS THREAD). Hodge’s article/review, “Is the Church of Rome a Part of the Visible Church?”, was originally published in the April, 1846 The Princeton Review (pages 320-344 – available online HERE).

This article/review was a response to “Essays in the Presbyterian by Theophius on the question : Is Baptism in the Church of Rome valid? Nos. XL. XII.” These essays were in turn, a response to Dr. Hodge’s July, 1845 article, “Validity of Romish Baptism” (entire article has been republished in Hodge’s book, Discussions in Church Polity – Charles Scribner’s Sons: New York, 1878, pp. 191- 215, and can be accessed online HERE).

Enlisting impeccable logic and an in depth knowledge of the pertinent data (with a heavy dose of refreshing honesty), Dr. Hodge defends the position that the Church of Rome is in fact a valid Christian church (though, of course, he also argues that doctrinal errors exist in the communion). Dr. Hodge notes: “The real difficulty in the case, is that it is impossible to give any one definition of a church, except in the most general terms, which includes all the established uses of the word.” (Page 326.) He then provides four different uses/senses of the term “church”; concerning the fourth use/sense, he writes:

There is a fourth established meaning of the word church, which has more direct reference to the question before us. It often means an organized society professing the true religion, united for the purpose of worship and discipline, and subject to the same form of government and to some common tribunal. A multitude of controversies turn upon the correctness of this definition. It includes the following particulars. 1. A church is an organized society. It is thus distinguished from the casual or temporary assemblies of Christians, for the purpose of divine worship. 2. It must profess the true religion. By the true religion cannot be meant all the doctrines of the true religion, and nothing more or less. For then no human society would be a church unless perfect both in knowledge and faith. Nor can it mean all the clearly revealed and important doctrines of the Bible for then no man could ne a Christian and no body of men a church, which rejects or is ignorant of those doctrines. But it must mean the essential doctrines of the gospel, those doctrines without which no man can be saved. This is plain, because nothing can be essential, as far as truth is concerned, to a church, which is not essential to union with Christ. We are prohibited by our allegiance to the word of God from recognizing as a true Christian, any man who rejects any doctrine which the Scriptures declare to be essential to salvation; and we are bound by that allegiance not to refuse such recognition, on account of ignorance or error, to any man who professes what the Bible teaches is saving truth. It is absurd that we should make more truth essential to a visible church, than Christ has made essential to the church invisible and to salvation. This distinction between essential and unessential doctrines Protestants have always insisted upon, and Romanists and Anglicans as strenuously rejected. It is, however, so plainly recognized in Scripture, and so obviously necessary in practice, that those who reject it in terms in opposition to Protestants, are forced to admit it in reality. They make substantially the same distinction when they distinguish between matters of faith and matters of opinion, and between those truths which must be received with explicit faith i.e., known as well as believed) and those which may be received with implicit faith; i.e., received without knowledge, as a man who believes the Bible to be the word of God may be said to believe all it teaches, though it may contain many things of which he is ignorant. Romanists say that every doctrine on which the church has pronounced judgment as part of the revelation of God, is a matter of faith, and essential to the salvation of those to whom it is duly proposed. Anglicans say the same thing of those doctrines which are sustained by tradition. Here is virtually the same distinction between fundamental and other doctrines which Protestants make. The only difference is as to the criterion by which the one class is to be distinguished from the other. Romanists and Anglicans say that criterion is the judgment of the church; Protestants say it is the word of God. What the Bible declares to be essential to salvation, is essential: what it does not make absolutely necessary to be believed and professed, no man can rightfully declare to be absolutely necessary. And what is not essential to the true church, the spiritual body of Christ, or to salvation, cannot be essential to the visible church. This is really only saying that those whom Christ declares to be his people, we have no right to say are not his people. If any man thinks he has such a right, it would be well for him to take heed how he exercises it. By the true religion, therefore, which a society must profess in order to its being recognized as a church, must be meant those doctrines which are essential to salvation.
3. Such society must not only profess the true religion, but its object must be the worship of God and the exercise of discipline. A church is thus distinguished from a Bible, missionary, or any similar society of Christians.4. To constitute it a church, i.e., externally one body, it must have the same form of government and be subject to the same common tribunal. The different classes of Presbyterians in this country, though professing the same doctrines and adopting the same form of government, are not all members of the same external church, because subject to different tribunals. (Pages 328-330.)

A bit later he condenses this fourth use/sense down to:

Is a church an organized society professing the true religion, united for the worship of God and the exercise of discipline, and subject to the same for of government and to common tribunal? (Page 333.)

And then adds:

This definition is substantially the one given in our standards. “A particular church consists of a number of professing Christians with their offspring, voluntarily associated together for divine worship and godly living agreeably to the Holy Scriptures; and submitting to a certain form of government. (Page 333.)

Dr. Hodge continues to defend this definition under four more headings which interact with the Scriptures, and then writes:

The next step in the argument is, of course, the consideration of the question, whether the church of Rome comes within the definition, the correctness of which we have endeavored to establish? (Page 336.)

After brief examination of possible (but weak) objections he states:

The only point really open to debate is, whether the Romish church as a society professes the true religion…That by true religion in this connection, has ever been understood, and from the nature of the case must be understood, the essential doctrines of the gospel. (Page 338.)

Now to the ‘meat’ of Dr. Hodge’s defense:

That Romanists as a society profess the true religion, meaning thereby the essential doctrines of the gospel, those doctrines which if truly believed will save the soul, is, as we think, plain. 1. Because they believe the Scriptures to be the word of God. 2. They direct that the Scriptures should be understood and received as they were understood by the Christian Fathers. 3. They receive the three general creeds of the church, the Apostle’s, the Nicene, and the Athanasian, or as these are summed up in the creed of Pius V. 4. They believe in one God, the Father Almighty, maker of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible. In one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made. Who for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man. And was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate, suffered and was buried. And the third day rose again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead, whose kingdom shall have no end. And they believe in one catholic apostolic church. They acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins, and look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.

If this creed were submitted to any intelligent Christian without his knowing whence it came, could he hesitate to say that it was the creed of a Christian church? Could he deny that these are the very terms in which for ages the general faith of Christendom has been expressed? Could he, without renouncing the Bible, say that the sincere belief of these doctrines would not secure eternal life? Can any man take it upon himself in the sight of God, to assert there is not truth enough in the above summary to save the soul? (Pages 340, 341 – bold emphasis mine.)

Indeed Dr. Hodge. He finishes the article/review with:

The most common and plausible objections to the admission that the church of Rome is still a part of the visible church are the following. First, it is said that she does not profess the true religion, because though she retains the forms or propositions in which the truth is stated, she vitiates them by her explanation. To which we answer, 1. That in her general creeds, adopted and professed by the people, no explanations are given. The doctrines are asserted in the general terms, just as they were presented and professed before the Romish apostasy. 2. That the explanations, as given by the Council of Trent, are as stated by Theophilus, designedly two-sided and ambiguous; so that while one class of Romanists take them in a sense consistent with their saving efficacy, others take them in a sense which destroys their value. It is notorious that the thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England are taken in a Calvinistic sense by one class of her theologians; in a semi-Pelagian sense by another class; and in a Romish sense by a third. 3. While we admit the truth of the objection as a fact, viz., that the dominant class of theologians do explain away most of the saving doctrines of her ancient creeds, yet we deny that this destroys the argument from the profession of those creeds, in proof that as a society she retains saving truth. Because it is the creeds and not the explanations, that constitute the profession of the people.

Secondly, it is objected that Rome Professes fundamental errors. To this we answer, 1. That we acknowledge that the teaching of many of her most authoritative authors is fatally erroneous. 2. That the decisions of the Council of Trent, as understood by one class of Romish theologians, are not less at variance with the truth; but not as they are in fact explained by another class of her doctors. 3. That these decisions and explanations are not incorporated into the creed professed by the people. 4. That the profession of fundamental error by a society retains with such error the essential truths of religion. The Jewish church at the time of Christ, by her officers, in the synagogues and in the sanhedrim [sic], and by all her great parties professed fundamental error justification by the law, for example; and yet retained its being as a church, in the bosom of which the elect of God still lived.

Thirdly, Rome is idolatrous, and therefore in no sense a church. To this we answer, 1. That the practice of the great body of the church of Rome is beyond doubt idolatrous. 2. That the avowed principles of the majority of her teachers are also justly liable to the same charge. 3. That the principles of another class of her doctors, who say they worship neither the images themselves, nor through them, but simply in the presence of them, are not idolatrous in the ordinary meaning of the term. 4. That it is not necessary that every man should be, in the fatal sense of that word, an idolater in order to remain in that church; otherwise there could be not true children of God within its pale. But the contrary is, as a fact, on all hands conceded. 5. We know that the Jewish church, though often overrun with idolatry, never ceased to exist.

Fourthly, it is objected that the people of God are commanded to come out of the church of Rome, which would not be the case were she still a part of the visible church. To this we answer, that the people of God are commanded to come out of every church which either professes error, or which imposes any terms of communion which hurt an enlightened conscience. The non-conformists in the time of Charles II, were bound to leave the church of England, and yet did not thereby assert that it was no longer a church.

Fifthly, it is said we give up too much to the papists if we admit Romanists to be in the church. To this we answer, Every false position is a weak position. The cause of truth. The cause of truth suffers in no way more than from identifying it with error, which is always done when its friends advocate it on false principles. When one says, we favor intemperance, unless we say that the use of intoxicating liquors is sinful; another, that we favor slavery, unless we say slaveholding is a sin; and a third, that we favor popery unless we say the church of Rome is no church, they all, as it seems to us, make the same mistake, and greatly injure the cause in which they are engaged. They dive the adversary an advantage over them, and they fail to enlist the strength of their own side. Men who are anxious to promote temperance, cannot join societies which avow principles which they believe to be untrue; and men who believe popery to be the greatest modern enemy of the gospel, cannot co-operate in measures of opposition to that growing evil, which are founded on the denial of what appear to be important scriptural principles. It is a great mistake to suppose popery is aided by admitting what truth it does include. What gives it its power, what constitutes its peculiarly dangerous character, is that it is not pure infidelity; it is not the entire rejection of the gospel, but truth surrounded with enticing and destructive error. Poison by itself is not so seductive, and therefore not so dangerous, as when mixed with food. We do not believe that those of our brethren from whom we are so unfortunate as to differ on this subject, have a deeper impression than we have either of the destructive character of the errors of popery, or of the danger to which religion and liberty are exposed from its progress. We believe it to be by far the most dangerous forms of delusion and error that has ever arisen in the Christian world, and all the more dangerous from its having arisen and established itself in the church, or temple of God. (Pages 341-344 – bold emphasis mine.)

Dr. Hodge’s last (the 5th) analysis of possible objections is the certainly the harshest; and yet, his criticisms of “popery” only serve to strengthen his overall premise that the Church of Rome is a true Christian church. (And I do wonder if his assessment of the papacy would have been as severe if he had lived in our post-Vatican II era.)

In conclusion, though I certainly differ with our esteemed Reformed author over doctrinal items that he would term “non-essentials”, as well as much of his criticisms concerning the papacy, when it comes to the defense of his basic premise (i.e. that the Church of Rome is a valid Christian church), I find little that I could argue against.


Postscript: Let us hope, and pray, that the hosts of internet anti-Catholic adherents/writers actually take the time to read Dr. Hodge’s informative and reasoned contribution.


Grace and peace,

David