Sunday, January 20, 2019

Terminology: trinitarianism, unitarianism, monotheism, polytheism...


Over the last few weeks, I have been in one of my 'reading modes', spending hours each day researching the issue of terminology concerning theology proper—i.e. the doctrine of God. My last post touched on the issue of 'dueling definitions' concerning unitarianism and trinitarianism. Informed discussions concerning unitarianism and trinitarianism should also include an in depth examination of the following labels/terms: monotheism, polytheism, henotheism, monolatry, triune, trinity, tritheism, modalism, monarchianism, adoptionism, Arianism, homoian, homoousian, homoiousian, monoousian, anhomoian, divine, divinity, Godhead, being, nature, essence, substance, person, ousia, hypostasis, prosopon, autotheos, el, eloah, elohim, adonai, the tetragrammaton, et al.

I suspect most folk think that the definitions for many of the above labels/terms are 'set in stone'; however, such is not the case—especially so when one attempts to classify the various theological systems of individuals, sects and religions throughout history. For instance, Arianism has been termed by many as unitarian, while some say it is polytheistic. John Calvin has been called a tritheist by some folk, but a modalist by others. The list of such contrasts can be multiplied into dozens of examples. Hope to write much more on such issues in the near future...

For now, whilst my research continues, I would like to share links to two works I have recently read—and are germane—first, a dissertation by Gordon Allen Carle, titled:

Alexandria in the Shadow of the Hill Cumorah: A Comparative Historical Theology of The Early Christian and Mormon Doctrines of God [LINK

The following is the abstract from the dissertation:

This work is a comparative study of the theological and historical development of the early Christian (Pre-Nicene) and Mormon doctrines of God. For the Christian tradition, I follow a detailed study of the apostolic period, followed by the apologetical period, and then conclude with the pre-Nicene up to around 250 C.E. For the Mormon tradition, I cover the period beginning with the establishment of the Mormon Church in 1830 and conclude with its official doctrinal formulation in 1916. I begin this work with a chronological examination of the development of the Mormon doctrine of God, commencing with Joseph Smith's translation of the Book of Mormon and concluding with his revelations and additional translations of those books that make up the Pearl of Great Price. I then examine Brigham Young's single theological contribution, followed with the speculative contributions of Parley P. Pratt, Orson Pratt, John A. Widtsoe, B. H. Roberts, and concluding with James E. Talmage. This section covers chapters two through four. In chapters five through seven, I examine the theological contributions of Ignatius of Antioch, then Theophilus of Antioch, and conclude my study with the theological contributions of Origen of Alexandria. For the Christian tradition, I trace the development of the pre-Nicene theologians' struggle to explicate the theological and philosophical implications regarding the divinization of Christ within the context of monotheism. At the end of chapters five through seven I include a succinct, comparative study of each father's doctrine with Mormon doctrine. This work will also address the major theological and historical factors that influenced both the Mormon and traditional Christian doctrines of God. Further, I contrast both theological systems and discuss their basic differences and similarities. My conclusion is that the fundamental difference between these two theological systems rests upon their foundational conceptions of reality as absolutist or finitist. The Mormon theological system rests upon a materialistic and monistic conception of reality, whereas traditional Christianity's system rests upon a dualistic conception of reality. In Mormon materialism , the Trinity is divided as individuated Gods; in Christian transcendence, the unity of God may only be maintained, while acknowledging the separate existences of the Persons, if the nature of God is understood as an incorporeal substance.

Carle's, conclusion "that the fundamental difference between these two theological systems rests upon their foundational conceptions of reality as absolutist or finitist", is not a novel one, but the research which leads him to this conclusion is the most exhaustive I have yet to read. [For a number of related papers which delve into the absolutist vs. finitist distinction see this Google search]

The second contribution is a thesis by Anthony R. Meyer titled:

The Divine Name in Early Judaism: Use and Non-Use in Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek [LINK]

Note the following abstract:

During the Second Temple period (516 BCE–70 CE) a series of developments contributed to a growing reticence to use the divine name, YHWH. The name was eventually restricted among priestly and pious circles, and then disappeared. The variables are poorly understood and the evidence is scattered. Scholars have supposed that the second century BCE was a major turning point from the use to non-use of the divine name, and depict this phenomenon as a linear development. Many have arrived at this position, however, through only partial consideration of currently available evidence. The current study offers for the first time a complete collection of extant evidence from the Second Temple period in Aramaic, Hebrew, and Greek in order answer the question of how, when, and in what sources the divine name is used and avoided. The outcome is a modified chronology for the Tetragrammaton’s history. Rather than a linear development from use to avoidance, the extant evidence points to overlapping use and non-use throughout most of the Second Temple period.

Those folk who share my interest in the history of God's unique name, will greatly appreciate this exhaustive work.

Back to my studies...


Grace and peace,

David

54 comments:

TOm said...

Hello David!

I hope I will have a number of things to say about this post and the article(s) to which you have pointed. I thought I would just start with the thing that I have coincidentally been studying recently and see what your thoughts are on this.

From the Introduction:

In his interpretation of the work of Origen, Paulsen demonstrates that the impetus behind Origen's strident anti-materialism for the substance of God was the prevalent belief in the early church in the corporeality of God. Origen, he maintains, completely absorbed Middle Platonic philosophical concepts regarding the transcendence (the immateriality) of God. It was his Platonic mindset that determined how he interpreted scriptural passages that spoke of God's anthropomorphic characteristics by allegorizing such passages in a spiritual, immaterial sense. Paulsen rightly understands that many biblical passages suggest that God is composed of a corporeal substance and form that, when revealed to humanity, resemble their mortal bodies. Thus, Origen's introduction of a totally transcendent God (as inspired by his former teacher, Clement of Alexandria) was an anomaly in the face of the church's earlier belief in an embodied God. For Paulsen and many other Mormons, this was the beginning of the end of the original faith of the church that believed in the corporeality of God. It all began, Paulsen believes, with the introduction of Greek metaphysics in the second century that taught the concept of God's complete transcendence, and which was eventually incorporated into the Church's teaching on the nature of God.



I have read Paulsen’s work in BYU Studies and his two article in Harvard Theological Review covering these subjects. I have also recently dove into Jewish concepts of corporeal/incorporeal God. It is clear in the Bible that God the Father (and the God of the Old Testament) is invisible to normal eyes. I have yet to see any pre-Christian Jewish or VERY Early Christian texts that suggest that this “invisibility” was a product of incorporeality. There are numerous texts and threads of thought that suggest that corporeality/embodiment was a common view in pre-Christian Jewish and early Christian thought.

I am in the beginning of Carle’s work. Will he deal with this? Will he dispel my current view? If he does not what does this mean for the current view of non-LDS Christianity? Does it means something different for the authority & Tradition based Christianity, the Tradition & non-authority based Christianity, AND the Bible only Christianity?

Anyway, looking forward to reading MORE. That being said, I was excited to read 2 days ago and I thought I would be uninterrupted for the next 2 hours, but alas NO. I must go.

Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Thanks much for taking the time to comment. You wrote:

==I have read Paulsen’s work in BYU Studies and his two article in Harvard Theological Review covering these subjects.==

I have only read Dr. Paulsen's three part series in BYU Studies, but would love to read his two HTR articles. Do you have digital copies? If so, could you email them to me?

==I am in the beginning of Carle’s work. Will he deal with this?==

Yes, but I don't think you will approve of his assessment. Note the following Carle:

>> I will suggest that another plausible reason for the prevalence of belief in the
corporeality of God is that the vast majority of new converts to the Christian faith during that time were ex-pagans who came to the church with all their prior philosophical and theological baggage. This became particularly acute with the influx of so many pagans into the church after its legalization by Constantine in 311. Even prior to this date, however, the issue of new pagan believers in the church was a major impetus for the development of the catechetical schools in major urban centers for instruction of new believers prior to baptism. Old concepts of the divine had to be replaced with the new Christian teaching.>> (Page 26)

Carle believes that the vast majority of Gentile converts before their conversion to Christianity held to the prevalent non-philosophical understanding of deity/deities—i.e. pagan polytheism vs. philosophical monotheism.

==Will he dispel my current view?==

Probably not, though he correctly demonstrates that vast majority of early CFs affirmed some form of monotheism, which they believed was compatible with the Greek/Roman philosophical monotheism of their day.

==If he does not what does this mean for the current view of non-LDS Christianity? Does it means something different for the authority & Tradition based Christianity, the Tradition & non-authority based Christianity, AND the Bible only Christianity?==

Complex questions, that require complex answers (IMHO). I may start a new series of posts to address the issues involved.

Shall close (for now), with the following Carle:

>> I would suggest to my Mormon interlocutors that the only way we can sufficiently demonstrate that the ancient church, beginning with Christ and the apostles, believed in an embodied God and in the multiplicity of the Gods, is by finding explicit references to these beliefs from the apostolic fathers and the apologists, who lamented the loss o f the once pristine faith. Because, if the Mormon narrative is true, then the loss of a belief in an embodied God and in the multiplicity of Gods, over to the idea of strict monotheism and absolutism, such a move would be the occasion of a monumental apostasy producing a great deal of literary reaction. In fact, we do not find any literary evidence of such an apostasy having ever occurred; nor do we find any evidence of lamenting over the loss of a once pristine and materialistic conception of God as we find described in the King Follett discourse. In my reading of the material from this period, I find nothing in the early Christian literature that suggests a common belief that God the Father and God the Son are embodied persons, humanoid in form.>> (Pages 250, 251)

Seems Carle believes the extant written narrative of the period in question trumps a proposed oral narrative...

Looking forward to your comments as you continue to read Carle's substantive contribution.


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

David,
Here are some HTR things of note (I think you get 6 free JSTOR articles a month. Perhaps you hit that on the 3rd of January).
Paulsen’s 1990 Original:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1509938?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Kim Paffentroth’s response to Paulsen:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1510005?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
Paulsen’s reply to Kim Paffenroth:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1510006?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Follow up article by Paulsen and David Griffen (my vague memory is that this goes farther than the BYU Studies article).
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4150740?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents
I may be able to make some comments sometime, but most of the comments I thought I discovered without Paulsen’s help seem to be present in the above.
Let me quickly say two things:
1. Toward meeting Carle’s challenge: I think Bishop Melito, Tertullian, and Lacantius meet the challenge Carle puts done. Tertullian is certainly not in alignment with the CoJCoLDS in his materialism, but he not only one who rejects divine incorporeality he does call out philosophy (neo-Platonism in this area) as a perverter of Christianity. Furthermore, I think ALL Christian ECF (who address it) claim that Jews embrace an embodied God. Why would the 1st century Jewish/Christians be so different? And a number of scholars (some referenced by Paulsen) are quite clear there is nothing to suggest a rejection of divine embodiment in pre-Christian Judaism.
2. I have expressed this to you before and I must be out on a limb (perhaps I will explore this with more educated LDS), but I see a dualism of some sort within LDS thought between “intelligence” and “matter.” While Spirit is “more refined matter,” I do not think it follows that “intelligence” is material. I follow Ostler in my view that God the Father like God the Son BECAME embodied. I do not believe originally God the Father or God the Son were embodied. And I do not believe that God the Holy Spirit is currently embodied

Charity, TOm

leeseykay said...

Tom, Hi. .

I think I am misunderstanding what is meant regarding "the challenge Carle puts done" (down?). Melito even refers to two distinct natures in Christ. Maybe you are saying that Melito, Tertullian, and Lactantius cite a significant number of Christians who believe that the teaching that the Father is corporeal?

With regard to the Jewish tradition, I am not familiar with what they believed, nor the dogmatic rigor that they may have had regarding God and man as the same species. The revelation of the Word (incorporeal) becoming flesh (corporeal), and a virgin birth (corporeal), gave important insights to Christians that the Jews lacked. That the Word was God before taking flesh probably made thoughtful Christians more confident in concluding that the Jewish tradition was in error, if it did insist on a corporeal God.

To the Christian, such Jews were in error about the Son, who was already God without a body. Further, the Holy Ghost is bodiless. It follows that if the Father has a body, it would be unnecessary to His divinity. But if the Jews were wrong about Christ and the Holy Spirit, saying God necessarily has a body, it seems reasonable to question whether they were wrong about the Father too.

Rory

Rory said...

Going out on a limb Tom. Different limb, but I will do the same. I doubt that the Apostles and Fathers of the Church understood Apostolic revelation, as well as we their heirs do. Did Blessed Mary know she was conceived immaculately? Did the Apostles know? The writings of the New Testament as well as of the Fathers would have been different, in my opinion, if later definitions had been known. Apostolic revelation came providentially undeveloped. Mary, the papacy, monotheism in light of the New Testament. It was undeveloped. It wasn't, in my opinion, God's plan to explain the mysteries, but to let His Church discover them.

David Waltz said...

Hello again Tom,

Thanks much for the links. I just now finished reading all the HTR articles you linked to. I may have missed something, but I found nothing substantial in those articles that is not present in the BYU Studies contributions. [LINK to Volume 35:4 (1995-96).]

Now, with that said, I must say I feel compelled to reexamine the evidence. Clearly, the Catholic understanding of God underwent development. Rory is of the opinion that this was inherently a necessary process, and in a very real sense, divinely ordained, and divinely protected. The Bible is certainly not a systematic theology, so I think all must affirm some sense of development. Interestingly enough, even LDS scholars affirm development. [For an excellent treatment on this issue, see Brian W. Ricks' BYU master's thesis, "James E. Talmage and the Nature of the Godhead" LINK.]

But, I also believe that there are 'limits' to development. The very question of whether or not God the Father has a body is a 'black and white' one—either He does or He does not. It seems that this question does not leave room for significant development.

Anyway, thanks again for the links. Hope to hear more from you as your reading of Carle continues.


Grace and peace,

David

David Waltz said...

Hi Rory,

Though the following quotes which I shall shortly provide were directed to Tom, I hope you do not mind if I share a few of my own thoughts...

You wrote:

>>I think I am misunderstanding what is meant regarding "the challenge Carle puts done" (down?). Melito even refers to two distinct natures in Christ. Maybe you are saying that Melito, Tertullian, and Lactantius cite a significant number of Christians who believe that the teaching that the Father is corporeal?>>

Melito was charged by Origen as believing in a corporeal God. Tertullian's own extant writings clearly demonstrate that he too believed in a corporeal God, though in the sense of the Stoics and not LDS view. Tertullian equated incorporeal with nothingness, which meant to him that it was impossible for the Supreme God of the universe to be construed as incorporeal.

>>With regard to the Jewish tradition, I am not familiar with what they believed, nor the dogmatic rigor that they may have had regarding God and man as the same species.>>

There seems to be a consensus opinion by scholars the Palestine Jews believed that God was corporeal, while the Hellenized Jews had adopted a Platonic view—Philo being a prime example.


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

Hello Rory,
I was trying to refer to a challenge “put down” by Carle to his “Mormon interlocutors.” I read his challenge as two fold.
1. The LDS rejection of monotheism is not Christian.
2. The LDS rejection of incorporeal divinity is not Christian.

I am less interested in the monotheism portion of the challenge. I consider myself a monotheist. I consider the Catholic development of a “monotheism” built upon one meaning of the word homoousian for Christ’s relation to the Father and a separate meaning of the world homoousian for Christ’s relation to mankind to be a problem. The problems I embrace as I reject some of the most polytheistic teachings of past LDS leaders in favor of the explanations like “the Social Trinity” are IMO less difficult than the tortured development of a monotheism built upon homoousian. And for Carle a Protestant, I find the development of the Trinity to be hopelessly connected to the “authority” he rejects (which doesn’t matter too much to me except that most Protestants seem to put down the Catholic problems and fail to recognize that by rejecting Catholic authority they have “picked up” a whole host of other problems).
Concerning #2 however, I think there are WRITTEN records that point both to divine embodiment and corporeal divinity.
Tertullian and Lacantius both embraced corporeal divinity. Origin says that “the Jews and some of our people” believe in corporeal divinity. Basil and another ECF also claim the Jews embraced the ridiculous (for philosophical reasons) belief that God is embodied. I think there is some evidence that post Christian Jews emphasized (perhaps over emphasized as they described the dimension of God or …) God’s embodiment in response to the Platonizing of Christian thought, but I do not think this is evidence that the Jews who became Christians didn’t believe God was embodied.
Melito is an unusual case. Origen is quite clear that Melito believed in divine embodiment. A later writer also made it clear that Melito held this “heresy.” It is true that in the 20th century a scholar published texts written in Syrian and claimed they were from Melito and prove that he did not embrace divine embodiment. I think these texts point to a secular or religious leader that post-dates Melito’s death and makes his purported authorship impossible (it has been a while since I saw this, perhaps David just knows what I am talking about – or perhaps I am confused). Melito is also quite celebrated anciently and yet his writings have been lost at a high rate (again as I understand).
I use Bishop Melito to show a likely other written corporeal/embodied believer AND to suggest that Carle’s challenge is more difficult because only writings prized for their teachings by those who lived USUALLY centuries later survive to today.
More on Catholic and LDS development in response to you and to David shortly.
Charity, TOm

leeseykay said...

Dave

"But, I also believe that there are 'limits' to development. The very question of whether or not God the Father has a body is a 'black and white' one—either He does or He does not. It seems that this question does not leave room for significant development."

Rory
I can not say that Scripture or Apostolic Tradition clearly establish that the Father is incorporeal. I find it credible that at the time of Origen, many Catholics assumed that the Father had a body, and others were even convinced. There is language that could easily lead to such a conclusion. The right hand of the Father...not so much because of the physicality...but because it seems like Jesus has a desire to return to a location of proximity to His Father after the Resurrection. (I am thinking of that passage from John's Gospel that we reflect upon every year on the Feast of Pentecost). Although as a 21st Century Catholic, I am obliged to disbelieve in the corporeality of the Father, I can see why the Scriptures alone at least, might seem to support anthropomorphism. I can also argue the other way. Scripture alone is always inconclusive.

Dave, do you think that I, as a Catholic, must declare people in Origen's day to be heretics, and separated from the Church, if they believed mistakenly (if Catholicism is true) in the corporeality of the Father? I am not so persuaded. I do not think this was explicitly revealed one way or the other, and therefore, I would argue the need for doctrinal development about the question.

I could agree with Tom that the presence of this phenomenon in the early church makes Dr. Paulsen's theory plausible. But the LDS seem to rely on either malice or foolishness on the part of those who led the early Church to supposedly ignore revelation in favor of philosophy. I can't believe in that. The early church was trying to reconcile monotheism and three Persons. I think THAT is revealed. Apparently it took a while, even though many were prepared for it philosophically, for the Church to eventually conclude that God and man were NOT the same species.

Is it so evil to think that the transcendent God, who was not a man, sent His Son to became man for our sake? There is no way I can call that apostate. Philosophy never shot for that. Philosophy would probably declare it impossible! The idea warms my soul, especially in this Christmas season.

Rory

I do not know what

David Waltz said...

Good morning Tom,

Hope you had a great weekend.

In this thread, you have mentioned Lactantius as one of the Church Fathers who maintained that God is corporeal. I noticed that Griffin in his HTR contribution also affirms the same. However, neither Griffin, nor yourself, have provided examples to support this view. Could you give us some quotes?

Thanks much,

David

TOm said...

On Development.

I like the idea that there is a CCC. I like the idea that there is an infallible Pope, an infallible Council, and a church that teaches all truth and no error. If it is true it is an asset. If it is obviously true it is a powerful apologetic. I do not believe it is obviously true, but instead must be defended from accusations of change and/or error.

I have wonderful family in Mississippi. Multi-generational LDS committed to the gospel. In the collection of wonderful old books by and about the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, I found a different book; it was about the priesthood ban. It said things that my 21st century LDS ears find wrong. Most or all around that teaching (and I embrace the explanation that it was not a revelation) was wrong. Similar things could be said about polygamy, but it IMO was more revelatory and perhaps in its God approved forms not “wrong,” but it is also largely gone. LDS do not teach that we teach all truth and no error. This means that things could change that I think should not change and things could change that I think should change. And …. As one who believes that God lives and is all knowing, the idea that His church receives revelation HUMANLY and plods toward truth as the CoJCoLDS does is not the way I would expect an omnipotent perfect God to run His Church. (As a committed LDS, I should suggest that the 200 years of LDS plodding look more plodding than Dec 1765- Dec 1965 Catholicism, but less or similarly plodding to 33-233 Christianity). The

I do not think Catholicism has the SAME problems, but I think some of the different problems are much worse. And I should note that without authority to “DEVELOP” (or radically CHANGE) doctrine, the Protestant is unequally yoked to his Catholic forefathers.

I am not sure how the idea that God is TOTALLY incorporeal can be a valid development if Palestinian Jews and the original Apostles believed and taught that God the Father had a body, if you have seen Christ you have seen the Father, and we are created in His image (and these things meant to them that God was embodied). Newman’s note of “logical sequence” is totally lacking (I have referred to this note as “early anticipation” before). In addition to this, the note of “preservation of type” is also totally lacking in a way that is very clear if you read how Newman describes “preservation of type.”

This “preservation of type” is a favorite of mine as Newman speaks favorably of Mormonism in this section. He argues that the Early Church was much vilified, accused of being ridiculous, judged negatively without seeking to understand beforehand, and …. He says that this is the Catholicism of his day and only a few other churches, like Mormonism, are similarly ridiculed. The Platonization of Christianity is precisely a change that does not “preserve” the type in this area. I would also suggest that many of Pope Francis’s CHANGES are compromises with educated society too.

So, I was putting together the above when David suggested to you that perhaps there are things that a development thesis CANNOT heft. I do not know what we would know if we could interview Peter, read all ever written by Paul or Luke or … But, I think the evidence leads in the Paulsen direction. If Paulsen is correct, I think it is virtually certain that the DEVELOPMENT of an incorporeality understanding is too much. In other words, I do not think a Catholic can cede the arguement to Paulsen and lean on Development.

I hope to touch on something from Carle shortly AND to address the evil intentions of those early church folks who perverted the gospel (I reject such things and I think I have said so in the past).

Charity, TOm

leeseykay said...

Hi again Tom,

For sake of argument, I am conceding what I do not know, that large numbers of early Christians, along with several Church Fathers believed in the corporeality of the Father. My question to Dave was about whether a Catholic in that era was required to take the incorporeal view. Did such a "folk belief", if it existed, need to be squelched, or could it be tolerated in those years.

Rather than insist to the Jewish Christians that circumcision was necessary for no Christian, St. Paul had St. Timothy circumcised. I believe the Church has the authority to fight her battles when she so decides. With regards to predestination, controversies became so hot between the Franciscans (or maybe it was Jesuits) and Dominicans that the pope stepped in, not to settle the question, but to proclaim that you could believe either way and stop arguing about it. Centuries later, to this day, a faithful Catholic can adhere to the wrong teaching.

During the era of persecution it seems difficult and imprudent to be dividing the flock over beliefs that are not critical enough at that moment in history to make binding definitions. I would put it this way. I doubt that belief in the corporeality of the Father is an obstacle to salvation. I am sure that rejection of Catholic creeds and definitions when they come, are an obstacle to salvation.

Opposing the faith of the Church is the sin. I ask you approximately the same question I asked Dave. Do you think I should believe that Catholics who made mistakes about this question, could not be saved? They would be obliged because of the Scripture, unless they never heard it, as before St. John's first epistle, that Christ came in the flesh. Was it equally important to insist on the incorporeality of the Father?

The Church has never in her missionary work insisted on the rejection of popular beliefs that might be questionable, but could be Christianized. The Church would take a pagan festival and replace it with a Christian one. Over time, the original pagan meaning for the celebration was lost and forgotten. Eventually, as the new Christians continue to learn new habits and teachings, the old folk ways and relatively harmless, but at first strongly held teachings, (like circumcision for Jews), disappear.

That is one way to look at it. I think it needs to be established that the Church was obliged to eradicate this error at the roots whenever and wherever it appeared.

Thanks, Rory (sorry about that LeesieKay stuff, that's my wife and she is calling me to supper...See you soon...hopefully with my own name at the top.

TOm said...


Hello Rory,

I want to remove an argument from your quiver. I do not suggest that I can or will, but I will tell you my thoughts on the matter and why it holds little to no sway for me.

You said:

But the LDS seem to rely on either malice or foolishness on the part of those who led the early Church to supposedly ignore revelation in favor of philosophy. I can’t believe that!

TOm:

I do not believe that either. I will offer you a number of thoughts as to why I find I NEEDN’T believe anything like that.

1. I do not consider philosophy to be evil. Philosophy just is. When ancients Platonists argued that all matter decays and thus God is immaterial, it was an argument. A modern Catholic might say that a handful of humans have died and their bodies didn’t decay because God is omnipotent and prevents it thus the universality of natural decay is not of concern for the supernatural God.

2. Paulsen and other scholars who offer the narrative of the Platonist philosophy changing Christianity point to Origen as a huge player in this change (he was a student of Clement of Alexandria who was also a Platonist). I have not read everything Origen has written, but he did teach that humans had pre-mortal existence. ALL Catholics must acknowledge that Origen was a speculative theologian/philosopher not solely concerned with preserving ancient Christianity. The Catholic narrative is that Origen postulated a pre-mortal existence not because this was apostolic tradition BUT because he was speculating. He was making an argument because it seemed like a reasonable way of reading scripture or whatever. As a LDS, I see Origen as a man trying to understand scripture and his faith. Many ECF including Origen offered all sorts of thoughts. I think he was correct (for whatever reason) when he postulated a pre-mortal existence for mankind AND wrong when he postulated an incorporeal God. But, neither of us can believe his purpose was to preserve apostolic Christianity unperturbed (unless we also postulate he was negligently doing so –a fool perhaps- which I do not; how about you?).

3. Properly understood IMO there is no binding LDS teaching that the Early Church had evil intentions. There are creedal definitions that were used often by political folks to cut off or bind together groups of Christians in their control. Sometimes this activity was performed by evil men and other times by well-intentioned men. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints does a better job of NOT doing this (but is not perfect IMO). LDS must recognize that something needed to be restored, but we do not have to claim Emperor Constantine destroyed God’s Church or …. We speculate (like Origen)…

4. Toward this end, the speculation in the below article has been very helpful to me. It answered a question that always bothered me, “Hasn’t every dispensation claimed to be the last dispensation (or that Christ will return or that they will not cease to be God’s favored), why should our claim make us comfortable?” But I think it also can explain why Peter received public revelation, but this ended in the early church and was only restored much latter. This explanation does not require specific evil people, only that there needs to be a balance between the strength of the church members/membership and the strength of God’s work through leaders of the church. In my gloss on this story, I give the Catholic Church credit for more than merely preserving the Bible and the witness of Christ, but also help changing society and lifting up mankind. Teachings like “God is no respecter of persons,” or all of God’s children are part of God’s work on earth (ie have a vocation) not ONLY high leaders like Popes or Prophets.

https://www.mormoninterpreter.com/a-mormon-theodicy-jacob-and-the-problem-of-evil/

Charity, TOm

TOm said...


Hello Rory,

I want to remove an argument from your quiver. I do not suggest that I can or will, but I will tell you my thoughts on the matter and why it holds little to no sway for me.

You said:

But the LDS seem to rely on either malice or foolishness on the part of those who led the early Church to supposedly ignore revelation in favor of philosophy. I can’t believe that!

TOm:

I do not believe that either. I will offer you a number of thoughts as to why I find I NEEDN’T believe anything like that.

1. I do not consider philosophy to be evil. Philosophy just is. When ancients Platonists argued that all matter decays and thus God is immaterial, it was an argument. A modern Catholic might say that a handful of humans have died and their bodies didn’t decay because God is omnipotent and prevents it thus the universality of natural decay is not of concern for the supernatural God.

2. Paulsen and other scholars who offer the narrative of the Platonist philosophy changing Christianity point to Origen as a huge player in this change (he was a student of Clement of Alexandria who was also a Platonist). I have not read everything Origen has written, but he did teach that humans had pre-mortal existence. ALL Catholics must acknowledge that Origen was a speculative theologian/philosopher not solely concerned with preserving ancient Christianity. The Catholic narrative is that Origen postulated a pre-mortal existence not because this was apostolic tradition BUT because he was speculating. He was making an argument because it seemed like a reasonable way of reading scripture or whatever. As a LDS, I see Origen as a man trying to understand scripture and his faith. Many ECF including Origen offered all sorts of thoughts. I think he was correct (for whatever reason) when he postulated a pre-mortal existence for mankind AND wrong when he postulated an incorporeal God. But, neither of us can believe his purpose was to preserve apostolic Christianity unperturbed (unless we also postulate he was negligently doing so –a fool perhaps- which I do not; how about you?).

3. Properly understood IMO there is no binding LDS teaching that the Early Church had evil intentions. There are creedal definitions that were used often by political folks to cut off or bind together groups of Christians in their control. Sometimes this activity was performed by evil men and other times by well-intentioned men. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints does a better job of NOT doing this (but is not perfect IMO). LDS must recognize that something needed to be restored, but we do not have to claim Emperor Constantine destroyed God’s Church or …. We speculate (like Origen)…

4. Toward this end, the speculation in the below article has been very helpful to me. It answered a question that always bothered me, “Hasn’t every dispensation claimed to be the last dispensation (or that Christ will return or that they will not cease to be God’s favored), why should our claim make us comfortable?” But I think it also can explain why Peter received public revelation, but this ended in the early church and was only restored much latter. This explanation does not require specific evil people, only that there needs to be a balance between the strength of the church members/membership and the strength of God’s work through leaders of the church. In my gloss on this story, I give the Catholic Church credit for more than merely preserving the Bible and the witness of Christ, but also help changing society and lifting up mankind. Teachings like “God is no respecter of persons,” or all of God’s children are part of God’s work on earth (ie have a vocation) not ONLY high leaders like Popes or Prophets.

https://www.mormoninterpreter.com/a-mormon-theodicy-jacob-and-the-problem-of-evil/

Charity, TOm

TOm said...


David and Rory,

I am now to the below passage from Carle and I thought I would comment.

Carle:

There is an indefinite complexity evident in the roles and the relationships of the members of the Trinity in the Book of Mormon. A "tension" must exist between monotheism and polytheism, otherwise the Persons in the Godhead will be expressed either in a modalistic sense (for concern to maintain the unity of God), or in a polytheistic sense (for concern to acknowledge the true existences of the individual Persons). This tension, this delicate balance, can only be maintained if the essence of God is understood to be incorporeal. There is no discussion (that I can find) in the Book of Mormon regarding the essence of God's nature. There is certainly no discussion that the essence of God's nature is transcendent and immaterial.



TOm:

It seems to me that Carle has declared that the only way for monotheism to be preserved when Christ is fully God is the assertion of some transcendent and immaterial root of monotheism.

I would have no idea why Carle postulates this had I not also captured earlier something I consider to be poor “reasoning.” (I hope that is not too snarky, but it is not ONLY that I am saying that Carle’s reasoning is not solid, but also that Carle SEEMS to be asking that we dispense with reasoning all together).

Carle:

Who is to say what God can and cannot be in His nature unless it is given us in some form of revelation? In fact, I will argue that only an immaterial being, a wholly transcendent deity, is capable of being one and three at the same time (logically). This was what pre-Nicene theologians strove to maintain as the only biblical understanding of the Triad of God. God is a completely different category of existence from creatures. As we shall see, such a God is not contrary to ordinary logic, but far removed from it and beyond our intellectual reach.



TOm:

I do not know what “one and three at the same time (logically)” means except that “a wholly transcendent deity” is removed from and thus not “contrary to ordinary logic, but far removed from it and beyond our intellectual reach.”

This is not making three and one at the same time logical, but explaining why it is illogical and we should be fine with that.

I have three thoughts about chocolate and these three thoughts are not one thought in the same way they are three thoughts. And all these thoughts are immaterial and incorporeal. I do not think asserting something is immaterial and incorporeal means that we are justified in declaring they are both three and not three. The law of non-contradiction is the MOST basic law of logic.

I think the best one can do is call it a mystery and chose to not plumb the depths of such a mystery.

What I absolutely reject is that some divorce from an embodied God is warranted because a concept of monotheism not evident in pre-Christian Judaism becomes popular within Greek thought and those immersed in Greek thought KNOW that other monotheistic concepts are inferior in their rigor and oneness. This SEEMS to me to be Carle’s position (well that the embodied God cannot be part of a sufficiently monotheistic concept of God).

Charity, TOm

TOm said...


David (and Rory),

I hope you both had a great weekend also. Mine was fine, but I was taking care of my wife who had a foot operation. I suspect that we three now occupy the East, Center, and West parts of the United States. I don’t see any insanely early breakfasts or trips to the beach anytime soon.

I already asked if you (David) knew more about the Bishop Melito controversy than I did. I generally assume you are better versed in most of these things than I am.

I assume you ask about Lacantius because all of your reading suggests that Lacantius believed in an incorporeal God. I had one confirming source besides the article (and it is a reasonable one), but as I looked at the actual words of Lacantius I am not sure what Griffen&Paulsen AND the Catholic Encyclopedia are suggesting concerning Lacantius.

The Catholic Encyclopedia under Anthropomophism, Anthropomophites claims there are “charges of anthropomorphism preferred against Melito, Tertullian, Origen, and Lacantius.” I guess the inclusion of Origen in that list should give me pause to believe such is any evidence of corporeal beliefs offered by Lacantius.

Anyway, Lacantius in a couple of places sure seems to suggest things like the human soul is incorporeal like God in whose image it is formed (beasts do not have such parallels).

So, I have found nothing. I suspect that you have found nothing or you wouldn’t have asked. If I get adventurous, I might TRY to ask Dr. Paulsen (I have communicated with him before, but it has been probably 10+ years and he might be retired or ???).

Charity, TOm

TOm said...


Rory,

You asked if a folk belief in the corporeality of God needed to squelched.

First, I do not think you need to cede that SEVERAL ECFs believed in a corporeal God. I small minority of ECF did (I would have said three until David asked about Lactantius). Others spoke of its presence in Christianity like Origen and Augustine, but they reject the view. Others claimed that Jews believed in an embodied God, the only one not mentioned above is Basil (I am unaware of any Christian who claimed that Jews didn’t embrace an embodied God). Critics of Christianity like Celsus were quite clear that Christians believed in an embodied God.

That being said, I do not think that several ECF believed in a corporeal God based on the texts that have come down to us. Perhaps if we all writings and not just those preserved the story would be different, but this is an argument from silence.

The early church is a tough. Just because the first mention of doctrine xyz in writing was in the 3rd or 4th century doesn’t necessarily mean that xyz was not believed in some manner from the time of the apostles. Just because Platonists believed in gravity, doesn’t mean that Christians who believe in gravity are perverting the gospel.

I do lean towards divine embodiment being the truth and the belief of the apostles. That being said, I do not think the early church was the dogmatic infallible structure that modern Catholicism claims to be. Scribes were very willingly to add the “Johannian Comma” into the Bible, but today such a thought is anathema. Origen was quite willing to explain why God could not be embodied AND why mankind had a pre-existence. If either of our religions has truth in these areas, Origen was wrong in one or the other.

No, I do not believe the Early Church would find any need to squash MANY weird beliefs. But, I am not sure Newman’s theory adequately describes the Early Church either. It doesn’t OFTEN look like a group of believers who think there ONLY purpose is to guard and perhaps develop the deposit of faith. Arguments against this or that doctrine are offered based on antiquity and this is true, but in the service of this or that doctrine rather than universally. I think Tertullian offered an argument for Creation ex Nihilo that included the idea that the late date of argument germination was an indicator of heresy, but he argued against Hermogenes who wrote before Tertullian (so in the 2nd century) AND who I think some (Tertullian?) have linked to a contemporary of Paul (who had some conflict with Paul) also named Hermogenes who taught the same doctrine (which makes this first Hermogenes teaching more ancient than St. Justin’s rejection of creation ex nihilo (this has been a long time for me, hopefully you or David can correct or confirm this).

So, I think it is common to look at the ECF as if they are trying to preserve the faith once delivered. That they reject “new revelation” like Catholics after Tertullian would. That they look to antiquity to determine how to respond to this or that heresy. But, it seems to me that there are many threads of thoughts within the ECF that call into question these ideas.

Tertillian embraced “the new revelation.” Origen was a speculative theologian that would make Hans Kung look SIMPLY ORTHODOX. Clement of Rome and St. Justine didn’t believe in creation ex nihilo. Lactantius spoke of Jesus and Satan as brothers. I suspect there are more things. I should admit, I am unaware of a similar criticism I could apply to St. Irenaeus and over time, I expect that many ECF will conform to the Newman model.

As I mentioned in a previous post, the diversity of thought from 33-233AD looks like the diversity of thought in the beginnings of the CoJCoLDS (1830-2030). It does not look like the preservation of tradition of 1765-1965 Catholicism. So, I think many ideas would be tolerated.

Charity, TOm

TOm said...


That was probably too long…

If the apostles were brought up in the Jewish tradition and wrote letters and gospels and … that point towards an embodied God, how can the modern Catholic narrative explain the rejection of an embodied God? Origen would “tolerate” some simple Christian beliefs, but he was also busy eradicating them. Was this because he was an educated Platonist and wanted his faith to be reasonable, or because he has access to a hidden truth that I don’t see in the record? And how did Joseph Smith know to poke in this place?

Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Wow, you were busy last night! So much to cover; I need more time for further research, while also taking in the fantastic weather we have been having over the last few days (beautiful, clear blue-skies, and 50+ temps), so it will probably be Thursday/Friday before I get to everything. For now, I would like state that your reference to the Anthropomorphism entry in the Catholic Encyclopedia prompted some in depth research into why Lactantius was mentioned. Here is the final paragraph from CE:

>>Anthropomorphites (Audians)

A sect of Christians that arose in the fourth century in Syria and extended into Scythia, sometimes called Audians, from their founder, Audius. Taking the text of Genesis, i, 27, literally, Audius held that God has a human form. The error was so gross, and, to use St. Jerome's expression (Epist. vi, Ad Pammachium), so absolutely senseless, that it showed no vitality. Towards the end of the century it appeared among some bodies of African Christians. The Fathers who wrote against it dismiss it almost contemptuously. In the time of Cyril of Alexandria, there were some anthropomorphites among the Egyptian monks. He composed a short refutation of their error, which he attributed to extreme ignorance. (Adv. Anthrop. in P.G., LXXVI.) Concerning the charges of anthropomorphism preferred against Melito, Tertullian, Origen, and Lactantius, see the respective articles. The error was revived in northern Italy during the tenth century, but was effectually suppressed by the bishops, notably by the learned Ratherius, Bishop of Verona.>>[https://www.ecatholic2000.com/cathopedia/vol1/volone772.shtml]

Hope to share all that I found in a new thread, but for now, note the following:

>>But we say that those fall from the second step, who, though they understand that there is but one Supreme God, nevertheless, ensnared by the philosophers, and captivated by false arguments, entertain opinions concerning that excellent majesty far removed from the truth ; who either deny that God has any figure, or think that He is moved by no affection, because every affection is a sign of weakness, which has no existence in God.>> (Lactantius, A Treatise on the Anger of God, Chapter 2 - NPNF 7.260)

Much more to come, the Lord willing.


Grace and peace,

David


P.S. Hope your wife's foot heals quickly, and that it does not get too cold in your area.

leeseykay said...

While we are on the subject of anthropomorphism, I would be interested in what both of you, or any of our viewers think about an article I came across almost a year ago that was title "Does God Have Emotions"?
In this article by Dr. Edward Feser, he insists that in God there is joy and delight, and presumably anger and sorrow, but he explains that this would be after a necessarily superior fashion that can be difficult to grasp for rational animals. The article is too long to post the whole but I will give a few excerpts that I found thought provoking, and being against anthropomorphism and admittedly biased, persuasive:

"An accusation sometimes leveled by theistic personalists against the classical theism of thinkers like Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas is that their position makes God out to be “unemotional” or “unfeeling” and thus less than personal. Is the charge just? It is not, as I’ve argued many times. So, does God have emotions? It depends on what you mean. On the one hand, as Aquinas argues in Summa Contra Gentiles I.89, it is not correct to attribute to God what he calls “the passions of the appetites.” For passions involve changeability, and since God is purely actual and without passive potentiality, he cannot change. Hence it makes no sense to think of God becoming agitated or calming down, feeling a sudden pang of sadness or a surge of excitement, or undergoing any of the other shifts in affect that we often have in mind when we talk of the emotions. On the other hand, no sooner does Aquinas say this than he immediately goes on in SCG I.90-91 to argue that there is in God delight, joy, and love. And of course, delight, joy, and love are also among the things we have in mind when we talk of the emotions."

I think I should probably make this two posts. To be continued...

leeseykay said...

"His {God's} delight and joy in a thing does not have anything to do with his being altered by it, or with him having sensations in body parts, or with some particular need being satisfied in a particular way on a particular occasion.

Critics of classical theism are apt to judge that such qualifications must entail that delight and joy can exist in God only in some thin and disappointing manner. They are likely to suppose that God, as the classical theist conceives of him, lacks the rich delight and joy of which we are capable, and can possess only some bloodless, machine-like ersatz. But that is exactly the opposite of the lesson they should be drawing. In fact, our delight and joy are much less than God’s, and precisely because they are limited by the body and the senses. God’s delight and joy never wane, and they are not limited to a succession of fleeting experiences of particular finite goods at specific times and places. Rather, they involve the eternal and metaphysically necessary possession of an infinite good. It is preposterous to think of that as somehow inferior to the piddling pleasures of which we poor rational animals are capable."


---bold mine

Before we wish to attribute passions to God, we should consider that if God is immutable as classical theists say, we cannot do it by impose immutablity on ourselves, and think about how boring and weak of soul we would be like if we never experienced for instance, the "thrill of victory or the agony of defeat". Judging God that way is still anthropomorphic! God is more than a rational animal without ups and downs. Yes, we would be less without these. Feser argues however, that in God He is more, because He does not have a love that waxes and wanes:

"The theological imaginations of critics of classical theism are limited precisely because they rely on imagination, in the sense of forming mental imagery – on exercises like considering what things would seem like for them if they remained conscious and able to think but lost their sense organs and viscera, and concluding, absurdly, that that must be the kind of thing the classical theist has in mind. In effect, they start conceiving of God as a kind of defective human being. They are so lost in anthropomorphism that even when they think they are avoiding it they are in fact only sinking deeper into it. Tell them that God lacks our bodily limitations and they conclude that what he has must be something less than what we have, when in fact the whole point is that it is something more than what we have."

I think we all want the faith of the Apostles. I am not against God the Father corporeally. But fear that if I am correct this error results in humanizing Creator instead of deifying the creature. Or we comfortable with worshipping a God with a body, yes of course. But can He can be experiencing moods, taken by surprise, or refraining from letting a momentary anger get the best of Him. I don't want to worship the greatest man.

I hold that God Almighty is infinitely beyond that. In a mystery revealed by Moses and Jesus, we are given liberty to ponder that God is pure existence, and doesn't experience time as we do. "I am that am", was a clue that prompts some Christians to consider that the anthropomorphic expressions of Scripture are not necessarily indicative of a God with a body, and fluctuating emotions like unto our own.

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2018/04/does-god-have-emotions_15.html

Rory

David Waltz said...

Hi Rory,

Thanks much for the posts. Dr. Feser is one of my favorite 21st century philosophers. I own and have read his Five Proofs For The Existence of God and Scholastic Metaphysics. I am a frequent reader of his blog—which you linked to—and I have found his critiques of Pope Francis to be quite informative and helpful. Somehow, I missed the specific post you referenced, so I am quite pleased that you brought it to my attention.

Now, with that said, Dr. Feser's primary expertise is analytical philosophy, with a heavy emphasis on Aristotelianism as understood through Thomas Aquinas. As such, when Dr. Feser ventures into more theological issues, I tend to be a bit more critical with my assessments. As such, though I found his reflections concerning the question: "Does God have emotions?", to be very helpful, I think there is plenty of room for further discussion on this issue.

One question for me that immediately comes to mind is: what is the relationship between the empirical knowledge that Jesus Christ has through His incarnation, with the issue of omniscience?


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

Hello Rory,

God’s impassibility and immutability are bigger problems for me than is his incorporeality.

Your linking to Feser’s post is not about “what are the facts.” Instead, you are responding to something that I have shared with you in the past. The God of “classical theism” does not love in a meaningful way and would leave Serapion far more adrift than merely the dispelling of divine embodiment.

2 things:

1.What should we believe God is based on the data we possess?

2.Can the God described by “classical theism” be viewed as the Greatest Possible Being, or is His lack of love for us a huge problem?



It is not that the God of classical theism cannot have joy. I do not have a problem with God’s self-reflective joy with Himself. Perhaps even God’s self-love of His triune self.

Concerning #1 I think the God of classical theism is not the God described in the Bible, not the God Aquinas encounter at the altar, not … When the Bible calls us to love one another as God has loved us, it cannot mean the impassible/immutable love of “classical theism.”



But concerning #2 it is not about God’s joy.

Here is an important passage from Feser as he describes what the God of “classical theism” is.

“The doctrine of divine simplicity has a number of crucial implication, which are, accordingly, also essential to classical theism. It entails that God is immutable or changeless, and therefore that He is impassible – that is, that He cannot be affected by anything in the created order.”

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/09/classical-theism.html?m=1

The end of that quote is the problem. The God of classical theism possess aseity. All that He is comes from Himself. He does not take into His person our love of Him, our rebellion against Him, our suffering, our joy, or …

It is NOT MERELY that our love yesterday, rejection today and reunion with God tomorrow is atemporally with God always. Instead, He is literally unaffected because He is unchangingly eternally as He is. This is not the love I would LIKE my Father in heaven to have for me. It may be reality (though I do not think so), but it is not IMO good.

If you think I misunderstand let me offer two takes on how God knows what I did yesterday. Aquinas suggested that my free actions cannot affect God in any way, but that somehow there is a “divine sight” that enables Him to just KNOW what I did yesterday. Molina recognized that claiming a “divine sight” was just verbal assertions and instead postulated that God possess eternal middle knowledge. God knows what I did yesterday because He knows the conditions that lead up to my “free” choice and his middle knowledge is infallible. He does not observe my action in any way He simply knows what I would have done and thus what I did in fact do. My choice does not CHANGE God.

You might see that Molina postulates a determined universe. I am not sure if Aquinas put forth a position in this area. Either way though, the God of classical theism cannot know what I did because my doing it CAUSED His knowledge. If that were to happen, He would not exist eternally and immutably.

Concerning #2 I do not want a God who generically wills the good for me. I want a God who knows me and loves me. Who is affected by me for good or evil.

This does not mean that God who possesses perfect eternal love within the Trinity will become overcome by my hatred or overcome by the greatest evils practiced by mankind. I believe that God’s Triune relationship is such a well of joy and strength that all humans becoming sadists would not necessarily lead Him to despair. But if only I become a sadist, or stub my toe, I believe God is CHANGED in the minutest of ways by little old me. This IMO is at a minimum required for the love/beloved relationship. This is the relationship I want with my Heavenly Father.

So, it is not God’s Joy that the impassible God cannot possess. It is the minutest notice of my love or pain or … that the God of classic theism cannot possess, because if I CAUSED this notice the God of classic theism would cease to be God.

Charity, TOm

The Potato Philosopher said...

As a reminder for myself, I belive some Evangelical Thomist (or was he even a Thomist?) Has some interesting things to say saymon God and emotions. When I have time, I'll try to find it.

leeseykay said...

Tom hi. I have an imperfect analogy.

I don't have good hope that it will help. I think we have reached an impasse. Anyway...here goes.

You wrote:

"The God of classical theism possess aseity. All that He is comes from Himself. He does not take into His person our love of Him, our rebellion against Him, our suffering, our joy, or …"

All that WE are comes from Himself too.

Writing eighteen years after completing the project, the great English novelist, Charles Dickens, wrote a poignant preface to what was then the latest edition of his classic, David Copperfield. He wrote:

"It would concern the reader little, perhaps, to know how sorrowfully the pen is laid down at the close of a two-years’ imaginative task; or how an Author feels as if he were dismissing some portion of himself into the shadowy world, when a crowd of the creatures of his brain are going from him for ever. Yet, I had nothing else to tell; unless, indeed, I were to confess (which might be of less moment still), that no one can ever believe this Narrative, in the reading, more than I believed it in the writing.

So true are these avowals at the present day, that I can now only take the reader into one confidence more. Of all my books, I like this the best. It will be easily believed that I am a fond parent to every child of my fancy, and that no one can ever love that family as dearly as I love them. But, like many fond parents, I have in my heart of hearts a favourite child. And his name is DAVID COPPERFIELD."

We are the children of an Author who is as far beyond us as Dickens was above his "favourite child". We are in Him, as He is necessarily in us, having made us. Granted, the stories are never going to change. The Authors know the beginning and the end of it. I do not see how our Author can possibly be as detached from our joys and sorrows as has been suggested.

I acknowledge what you say about impassibility. God is not "affected" because of any particular event in our lives. But neither was Dickens "affected", when David's first wife died, because like God, he wasn't surprised and anticipated the end. Would Dickens have loved David better if he could have experienced disappointment at misfortunes and relief when David got back up? Is Dickens' professed love somehow inadequate because of his inability to be taken by surprise, and his overall superiority to the character he created?

If I were David Copperfield, I would lovingly adore Charles Dickens for having made me out of nothing. I would believe his preface when he says he loves me. I would know that he is in me and I am from him. I could not worry about how Dickens experiences events as they come and go in my life. I would be grateful to be his child.

I know David isn't a living soul. But there are significant parallels about our relationship with God. The biggest difference is that our Author Himself comes in to the book, and invites us to in a sense, come out of the book, at the end of time. He invites us to an eternity in wondrous contemplation of the astounding fact that in God "we live, and move, and are", and to be with Him forever. (Acts 17:28)

Rory

TOm said...

Rory,
Thank you for what you wrote!
I enjoy reading about your Catholic faith and it would be wonderful to be your Catholic brother.
I am also quite convinced that the God who is not impassible and the God who is impassible do not BOTH exist. I would rather love and be loved by the impassible God than be a goat because I do not believe God properly understood is impassible.
Before I ask how far you wish to push your analogy, I will say that I want an I-Thou relationship with God that I do not think Dickens has with David Copperfield.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_and_Thou
It is possible that I am not WORTH an I-Thou relationship with God because for whatever reason (perhaps it is impossible) He created me such that I can NEVER be in that relationship with Him. David Copperfield will always be in an I-It relationship with Dickens. If this is the actual universe, I would rather be David Copperfield than Edward Murdstone.
That being said, I will not PREFER that this is the case. I have thus far found the arguments about why God simply must be impassible to ring hollow. Surely, a passable God can be trusted. I am sure Mother Teresa and John Paul II NEVER would have thrown in the towel and started a brothel, I find plenty of reason for certainty in God's character.
Surely, a passable God can possess such love and derive such strength from His Triune relationship that I can be certain that He will not be overcome by His emotions.
Finally, the more "otherly" God is does not necessarily hold a lure for me. I fully recognize that my dog does not think as I think. I fully recognize that my God's ways are higher than my ways. There are "ways" that are different that I celebrate and wouldn't want to be the same. God does not get lazy and fail to complete his home teaching. But, being capable of noticing when I love, rebel, have joy or hurt is not a "way" that I wish was different and I do not see why I should.

Before I ask you a more important question, let me ask about your analogy. Do you agree with Molina (certainly) and Aquinas (perhaps) that we live in a determined universe. That God knows what we do because we lack the power to do "other than what we actually do." David Copperfield could not have behaved differently than Charles Dickens declared him to behave. This again MAY be the world in which we live, but if so then we are clearly pre-destined in the way Calvin theorized. If this is truth, I find this to also be an indictment against our creator.


So two questions:
As a human who knows "God's ways are higher than our ways," is it anything but pure mystery as to why the impassible God is the greatest possible God? For me, if God is impassible, then the impassible God is the greatest possible God, and this would be a mystery because I cannot explain it. This mystery does not entail logical contradictions (at least as far as I can tell), but it does not make sense to me.
Same question concerning single predestination.
Charity, TOm

leeseykay said...

Hi Tom.

I believe whatever the Church teaches. My understanding was that the Church allows some speculation. I didn't think we could deny free will. You say that both Molina and Aquinas possibly denied free will like Calvin?

I don't think I should try to answer other question. I thought impassibility goes with what can be learned about God from reason, not faith. It seems to make a big gulf between man and God. Then we find that God becomes a man and He got disciples to explain things to, and its pretty great, and some believe it. We find out that the Man-God's Father wills to adopt us, and some believe it. So once this happens through baptism in water (of all things), if we pray, and don't offend the Father by acting like we belong to ourselves we get to enjoy a partaking of the Divine Nature.

It seems to me like you stop with Aristotle/Plato when you think about personal relationship with God. No wonder you find it distasteful. In my opinion, the revealed Catholic religion is personal beyond belief. You can't believe it without faith that's for sure. It is so crazy good. He gives us His flesh for our spiritual food!

There is no way a practicing Catholic can be troubled because the Father is impassible. Jesus is clearly under orders from a good and loving, but impassible Father who wants us to be members of His family. After the revelation of His Son, we know we can't go our own way on some flimsy and false excuse that we cannot have a personal relationship with God because He is so different from us. Its our fault, not His, if we aren't filled with spiritual riches, having our conversation with Christ in heaven day and night. The reason He came was to offer a profoundly intimate friendship to those who belong to Him, but had become His enemies. To refuse that offer is damnation, and justly so.

Company is here! (I hope the tone is okay...esp. the damnation thing...ah...I hear one of the grandkids!!!! Later.)

Rory

David Waltz said...

Hi Rory and Tom,

Interesting discussion for sure. Hope you guys do not mind if I add a few of my own musings...

Tom asked:

==Do you agree with Molina (certainly) and Aquinas (perhaps) that we live in a determined universe. That God knows what we do because we lack the power to do "other than what we actually do."==

I am pretty sure that both Molina and Aquinas affirmed the view known as "soft determinism". SD is the belief that God infallibly knows the future, while affirming that man has libertarian free will. As such, neither Molina nor Aquinas would say that "we lack the power to do 'other than what we actually do.'"

For an excellent background on the various views of libertarian freedom see Chiew's dissertation, You Know It Completely. From the dissertation we read:

>>...the four most prominent solutions proposed by the libertarians—Boethian, Ockhamist, Open Theist, and Molinist—are analyzed in the following section.>> (Page 6)

In section 1.2.2, Chiew then provides excellent summations of all four positions.

Rory, you asked the following:

==My understanding was that the Church allows some speculation. I didn't think we could deny free will. You say that both Molina and Aquinas possibly denied free will like Calvin?==

First, Calvinists disagree over what Calvin taught, with some affirming 'double-predestination', and other denying. There is also disagreement concerning the definition of 'free will.'

Second, as I said in my response to Tom, neither Molina nor Aquinas, "denied free will"—both clearly asserted their belief in the concept.

Anyway, I have been enjoying the dialogue. Hope both of you get a chance to check out Chiew's dissertation; I think you will both find it both informative and helpful.


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

Hello David,
I think Molina embraced "soft determinism" and maybe Aquinas did too.
But, I think "soft determinism" is not "libertarian free will."
Soft determinism postulates a determined universe. God's middle knowledge (or perhaps "divine sight") infalliblely knows what every human will choose to do given the circumstances involved in the forming of the human and the decision at hand. There is no "power to do otherwise." Thus God is unmoved by us He merely knows what we will do because He knows us and the situations we are in. We are cogs in a wheel, not Thou's.

I think the person who embraces "soft determinism" rejects LFW. Maybe I am wrong.
Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Thanks much for your response. You wrote:

==But, I think "soft determinism" is not "libertarian free will." Soft determinism postulates a determined universe.==

What you are arguing is that for 'libertarian free will' to be true, there cannot exist any form of determinism. As you know, this has been termed 'incompatibilism'. To consistently maintain 'incompatibilism' one must reject dozens of predictive motifs found in the Bible, Book of Mormon and D&C.

Further, the nature between causality and determinism remains unsolved in the 'incompatibilist' worldview. There exists at least three major theories within the 'incompatibilist' worldview concerning this important issue; none of which I find (and many contemporary philosophers) to be totally consistent.

With that said, Alvin Plantinga has clearly demonstrated that 'soft' determinism and 'libertarian free will' are philosophically compatible. [I highly recommend his 'popular level' book, God, Freedom and Evil.]

Now, I have a very important question for you: Do you believe that God the Father has 'libertarian free will'?


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

Hello.
Terms as I see it.

Compatibilism –idea that “free will” is consistent with determinism.

Incompatibilism -idea that if determinism exists, there is no free will.

Determinism –idea that all events are causally determined by previous events /conditions.

Indeterminism –idea that all events are NOT determined by previous events/ conditions.

Event Causation – This is determinism. When a tree falls, it falls because of wind and weakness.

Agent Causation – This is generally an indeterminist position. There is SOMETHING within a particular agent that is not solely a product of past events (because that would be event causation still), that produces an action.

When I say “libertarian free will” (LFW), I mean the power to do other than what one actually does. A genuine “agent causation” in a non-determined universe.

Now, I embrace what Roderick Chisholm says humans have, “a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those events to happen.”

I however embrace SOME of what Elder James E. Talmage has taught. God knows generally what we will do because He knows us. I do not believe that I could choose to kill my dog this evening just so I could demonstrate to you how free I am. I am literally incapable of making this choice. That being said, I could choose to pursue a lifestyle gradually that would lead to a callousness that would over time make such an action possible for me. I reject these choices and instead vacillate between being a better man than I am today and a worse man than I am today. Where I a more principled individual, I could likely walk a path that lead to me continually being better (hopefully this is the general direction of my path, but I know I rebel). One day I might be incapable of losing my temper in a situation that today I would be very likely to lose my temper. My “Agent Causation” view is that I make agent caused choices at the margins and remake my character along the way. AND that I make choices in ambiguous situations and create my future along the way (like to pursue board games or video games during a certain leisure, or to write this before or after I write the email that I need to send about church cleaning assignments).

So, I see the predictive passages in scripture as areas in which God’s actions combined with His very solid knowledge of our choices allows Him to make statements we might call prophetic (in one sense of the word). In this, God is like the grandmaster chess player who KNOWS he is playing a novice. The Grandmaster does not control the actions of the novice, but he knows he will win in the end. However causality works, God does not assert in scripture that the move of the novice will be xyz, God only absolutely asserts the ultimate victory of Himself, the grandmaster.

Now, I like Chisholm assert that God has the ability to choose between futures. I believe His character is such that there are evil actions He could not choose. But, I think He could have rested on the 7th day or on the 8th day. He could have made some changes here or there.



It seems like you believe that we are determined. Do you also believe God is determined? Could God have done anything other than create in 7 days ex nihilo. Speak 1003 times (I made that number up) during the Old Testament and send His Son be born on Christ’s birthday and to die for our sins on Good Friday.



Is God the “unmoved mover” because He is casually determined by His eternal character and not by some other God/condition?

Or is He “unmoved mover” because He has freedom to weave a universe for the glory of Himself because He is the only eternal?

Or is He “the most moved mover” because He has freedom to weave a universe for the exaltation of co-eternal intelligences which He loves?

I choose the third. I am fairly sure Molina was ultimately a determinist, but I don't know if He believed that God was determined.

Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hello again Tom,

Very busy day for me today; but, I finally have some time to respond to your post from yesterday. You wrote:

==It seems like you believe that we are determined.==

Only in the sense that God has perfect foreknowledge; and yet, we have libertarian free will. All that God has planned, and knows, will come to fruition without violating the free will of mankind.

The Mormon philosopher, James E. Faulconer, has delineated a view of determinism/foreknowledge/free will which is virtually identical to mine. Note the following:

Modern scripture speaks unequivocally of the foreknowledge of God: "All things are present before mine eyes" (D&C 38:2). It affirms that God has a fulness of truth, a "knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come" (D&C 93:24,emphasis added).

Divine foreknowledge includes the power to know even the thoughts and intents of the human heart: "There is none else save God that knowest thy thoughts and the intents of thy heart" (D&C 6:16). Divine foreknowledge is at least, in part, knowledge of his own purposive plans for the cosmos and for humankind, plans that "cannot be frustrated, neither can they come to naught" (D&C 3:1). "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world" (Acts 15:18; Abr. 2:8). These include the conditions of the Plan of Salvation. For example, "God did elect or predestinate that all those who would be saved, should be saved in Christ Jesus, and through obedience to the Gospel" (TPJS, p. 189). It is likewise foreknown that all humankind will die, be resurrected, and be brought to judgment.

In scripture, the root terms for divine knowing connote more than a subject-object, cognitive relationship; they imply a close, direct, participative, affective awareness. Divine foreknowledge is the knowledge of a Heavenly Father, not knowledge of a metaphysical abstraction. Scriptures that speak of divine foreknowledge emphasize God's understanding of an experience with his people and their destiny rather than the content and logic of that knowledge. Anyone seeking to understand divine foreknowledge must begin by recognizing that scripture does not directly address the question as it has been formulated in philosophy and theology, where the emphasis is on the content and logic of knowledge. The scriptures are explicit that God knows all and that we can trust him. They have not been explicit about what that means philosophically or theologically. Consequently, short of new revelation, any answer to the theological question of God's foreknowledge can be only speculative.

In an attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge and human freedom, major Jewish and Christian theologians and philosophers have offered three alternatives. In the first, both horns of the dilemma are affirmed: "Everything is foreseen, and freedom of choice is given." This is the position of Rabbi Akiba and Maimonides (Aboth 3, 19; Yad, Teshuvah 5:5), as well as of Augustine and Anselm (City of God 5.9-10; The Harmony of the Foreknowledge, the Predestination, and the Grace of God with Free Choice 1.3). Maimonides argues that though it is logically impossible for human foreknowledge of one's actions to be compatible with freedom, God's foreknowledge, which is of a different and mysterious kind, is compatible with freedom.>>

CONT'D

David Waltz said...

CONT'D

In the second, God's foreknowledge is limited. Since people are free, God knows the possibilities and probabilities of human choice, but not the inevitabilities. God is omniscient in knowing all that can be known; but not in knowing beforehand exactly how people will use their freedom, since that cannot be known because future, contingent events do not exist. This is the view of the Talmudist Gersonides (Levi Ben Gershon, 1288-1344; Milhamot Adonai, III, 6) and, with some modifications, of Charles Hartshorne and process philosophers.

In the third, humans are not genuinely free. Freedom is an illusion that arises from human ignorance of divine cause and necessity. All that individuals do is actually determined and predetermined. God both pre-knows and pre-causes all that occurs. This is the view of Spinoza and Calvin.

Historically, most Latter-day Saints have taken the first general position: everything is foreseen and freedom remains. Some have taken the second, that God's foreknowledge is not absolute. The third alternative, that human freedom is illusory, is incompatible with LDS belief in genuine free agency and responsibility. Praise and blame, accountability and judgment, are meaningless unless humans are free. Any doctrine of foreknowledge that undercuts this principle violates the spirit and letter of LDS scripture. (Encyclopedia of Mormonism, 2.521.)>>

Like "most Latter-day Saints", I embrace "the first general position: everything is foreseen and freedom remains."

You then asked:

==Do you also believe God is determined?==
I concur with all the content from the following selections:

1 Nephi 10:18 - For he is the same yesterday, today, and forever; and the way is prepared for all men from the foundation of the world, if it so be that they repent and come unto him.

Mormon 9:9 - For do we not read that God is the same yesterday, today, and forever, and in him there is no variableness neither shadow of changing?

Mormon 9:19 - And if there were miracles wrought then, why has God ceased to be a God of miracles and yet be an unchangeable Being? And behold, I say unto you he changeth not; if so he would cease to be God; and he ceaseth not to be God, and is a God of miracles.

Moroni 8:18 - For I know that God is not a partial God, neither a changeable being; but he is unchangeable from all eternity to all eternity.

D&C 20:12 - Thereby showing that he is the same God yesterday, today, and forever. Amen.

D&C 20:17 - By these things we know that there is a God in heaven, who is infinite and eternal, from everlasting to everlasting the same unchangeable God, the framer of heaven and earth, and all things which are in them;

What hath Athens to do with Jerusalem?


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

Hello Again.
I am mostly off work today which means I will be busy, but I thought I would reply if I can.
Let me start at the end.
“What has Athens to do with Jerusalem.”
Carle postulated that we must embrace an incorporeal, transcendent God in order to “make sense” of monotheism and the Trinity. It is not that scripture tells us that God is not embodied, it is that Athens has demanded that a reconciliation of statements be made and Carle suggested that such was ONLY possible by turning God into something that applying logical postulates about was beyond our ability.
I introduced the fact that God’s love in Catholic thought is an “unaffected” love in addition to being a timeless love and pointed to Molina and Aquinas trying to reconcile God’s knowledge with what I did yesterday to emphasize how unaffected the Tradition demands God is.
Rory also suggested that God’s impassibility was a logical requirement. I haven’t responded to this yet but my position is that as I recall my Aquinas, this logical requirement is a product of assumptions like God’s absolute simplicity and/or creation ex nihilo which LDS generally reject.
To the question of God’s knowledge (which we got to because I assert that God loves totally unaffected by our situation/actions, that this is clear because of how Molina and Aquinas speak of God’s knowledge totally unaffected by our actions, and this got us into 1. Free will (God knows absolute), 2.Libertarian Free Will (God knows non-absolute), or 3.No free will (God knows absolute).
I embrace the second general position because in the first general position, “the power to do other than what we actually do” does not exist in any logical way. Do you agree that if we demand that the “law of non-contradiction” is applicable in our human grappling with God, that position #1 entails that we do not have the power to do other than what we actually do.
Those who assert they hold position #1 and that free will exist claim that free will consists of doing what we will, not in having the power to do other than what we actually choose to do. Molina’s middle knowledge means that Agent A in situation X will always choose to steal and NEVER choose to not steal (Agent B may always make a different choice and Agent A in situation Y may always make a different choice). This is likely the position of Aquinas. It is the only way God can KNOW what we do without being affected by our “free” choices. And compatibilists claim this is sufficient to claim “free will exists.”
I do not think those who adopt position #1 typically assert that “libertarian free will” exists which means as I understand the terms LFW- “the power to do other than what we actually do.”
Much of what I have written comes from reading Ostler, sources he points me to, and things on the Internet. Perhaps that leaves me with some misunderstanding.
Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Good evening Tom,

Thanks much for your prompt response. I am going to focus on your comments concerning foreknowledge and free will, but I hope to publish a new thread on Carle's musings in the near future.

You wrote:

==I embrace the second general position because in the first general position, “the power to do other than what we actually do” does not exist in any logical way.==

I personally know of, and have read in the past, two philosophers who adamantly disagree with you here—Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig—both have provided logical formulations which support the position that infallible foreknowledge and libertarian free will are compatible.

==Do you agree that if we demand that the “law of non-contradiction” is applicable in our human grappling with God, that position #1 entails that we do not have the power to do other than what we actually do.==

No, I dispute that claim.

==Those who assert they hold position #1 and that free will exist claim that free will consists of doing what we will, not in having the power to do other than what we actually choose to do.==

That is the 'traditional' Calvinistic position; Arminianism (and a number of other theological systems) maintain that the free will spoken of in postion #1 is libertarian free will.

== I do not think those who adopt position #1 typically assert that “libertarian free will” exists which means as I understand the terms LFW- “the power to do other than what we actually do.”==

Many of the folk I have read who affirm position #1 explicitly define the free will they are taking about as, “the power to do other than what we actually do"—i.e. libertarian free will.

In addition to the dissertation and Plantinga's book I recommended earlier, I would like to add the following:

Foreknowledge and Free Will

Divine Omniscience

Now, I am not arguing that the 'open theism' (position #2) that you and Ostler embrace is illogical and/or indefensible, I am merely arguing that some of the solutions to so-called foreknowledge free will dilemma are logical and defensible.


Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

David,
I will need to look into those papers more.
Concerning where we started, do any philosophers assert that we cause our free actions in a necessary way and yet have no causal connection to God's knowledge of our free actions?
Charity, TOm

Sean Killackey said...

I haven't read all of the foregoing, so forgive me if I say anything already said. I'll have time to go back later.

As I understand it, God has free will is claiming something positive that we know not, but does claim something negative which we can grasp: nothing external to God, nor present in the Godhead compelled God to create. But if we take seriously that the will belonging to the Godhead is divine, it will bear only an analogical relation to human free will, which is finite.

Know I don't know if it is right to say that Aquinas beloved in libertarian free will as that is understood in analytic philosophy, but he was not a theological determinist. God didn't determine our choices, that is make us do them, so much as in the course of nature and Grace made us, who able to do this or that, actually choose this. So he didn't make Adam sin, but made the sinning Adam. For God is not a cause within the universe that acts on (affects) things, so as to compell them. But he imparts being to them and their actions, so that he makes them be. In this he doesn't destroy the nature of humankind, so he doesn't erase free will. Rather, he is the cause of every free action. For, he doesn't change you or I when he caused us to be and to do, for without him we would not be there, and a change is what happens when something that already is is then altered. But prior to God's creation / conservation of the world, there is no world.

So, that God is the Cause of our willing, and that we choose to do something freely are as compatible as saying that since you drew the figure there is a triangle on some whiteboard and since that figure instantates triangularity that is why it is a triangle.

Sean Killackey said...

Remember, too, that Aquinas, like the scholastics of his day down to our own, belive that how a thing acts reflects it's being. Now, humans have intellect and will and this means that we can grasp possibilities, counterfactuals, etc. And assess each as being desirable or not. By nature we are not directed to any specific action, so by nature we are free. (More specifically, our wills are free to the extent to which out intellects are unsure as to the best course.) So God's willing does not destroy this potential for other action, which is simply what we have by nature, but makes the world in which, while we could do such and such, we actually do something else. For example, I could have learned Spanish, and still now have a potential to do so. But I only know English. God willed a world which, as of yet, I only ever know English. But in doing so, he also willed the world such that the counterfactual: I could have learned Spanish, is true. And it is true in virtue of God making me as I am (amongg other things.)

Sean Killackey said...

Brian Davies has some good sections on this in his books "Aquinas on God and Evil" (only 11 dollars plus shipping, used) and "The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil" (40 dollars, but a very good book). I will scan the relevant pages, upload them to my drive and link to them here over the weekend. Maybe tonight.

Anyway, off to finish reading "New Kind of Christianity" by Brian McLaren. Wish me luck, since it is an awful book. The only thing worse than it's prose is the content. But fortunately it is not intellectually taxing.

Sean Killackey said...

P.S. Tom. I think I have some names that might interest you. I'll check up to make sure they're right and post them later.

Rory said...

Sean,

I would propose that the unique faculties of intellect and will in homo sapiens is in fact what it means to be created in the image and likeness of God. Many, even many Christians and Jews would perhaps agree with the proposition. But I fear that this great truth has been under appreciated across broad sections of the religious landscape. Without some meditation on its meaning, it can be seen as a rather ho hum axiom. We make choices and have reason, so what?

I sympathize with anyone who might doubt, based on the naked facts that if true, it does not appeal to the will by its apparent goodness, nor to the intellect, because of its beauty. But I would also propose that those who might find the classical understanding of what it means to be made in God's image to be inadequate or even repulsive, cannot afford to be hasty in their assessment.

Sean, your words reminded me of a quote from my favorite Catholic author, Francis de Sales. It is a long quote and I would encourage anyone of any religious affiliation to read the passage I will be quoting thoughtfully. I think that it puts flesh, if you will, to the barebone facts that are less appealing to both will and intellect. I wonder if it could be a beginning for the whole world of a greater desire for the goodness and beauty of God. It is not enough to believe God exists. A better appreciation for the stupendous affinity that exists between the God of the philosophers and His reason for creation out of nothing, to share His image and likeness could not but be helpful in making belief in a good God easier, but much more appealing.

Rory said...

It's kind of late...I will try to copy the quote I promised to Sean above later today.

Rory

leeseykay said...

The following excerpts are from the Treatise on the Love of God, by St. Francis de Sales, bishop of Geneva, died in 1622, and was an instrument of God's mercy in receiving thousands of Swiss Calvinists back to the Catholic faith. The quotes will be from Book One, ch. 15:

"We are created to the image and likeness of God:-what does this mean but that we have an extreme affinity with his divine majesty..."

What I found thought provoking was why St. Francis thinks it is so fitting that such a Being, completely self-satisfied and content in Himself would will to make creatures like us:

But besides this affinity of likenesses, there is an incomparable correspondence between God and man, for their reciprocal perfection: not that God can receive any perfection from man, but because as man cannot be perfected but by the divine goodness, so the divine goodness can scarcely so well exercise its perfection outside itself, as upon our humanity: the one has great want and capacity to receive good, the other great abundance and inclination to bestow it. Nothings is so agreeable to poverty as a liberal abundance, nor to a liberal abundance as a needy poverty...

Thus Theotimus, our emptiness has need of the divine abundance by reason of its want and necessity, but God's abundance had no need of our poverty but by reason of the excellency of his perfection and goodness; a goodness which is not at all bettered by communication, for it acquires nothing in pouring itself out of itself, on the contrary it gives: but our poverty would remain wanting and miserable, if it were not enriched by the divine abundance.

Our soul then seeing that nothing can perfectly content her, and that nothing the world can afford is able to fill her capacity, considering that her understanding has an infinite inclination to know more, and her will an insatiable appetite to find the good;-has she not reason to cry out: Ah! I am not then made for this world, there is a sovereign good on which I depend, some infinite workman who has placed in me this endless desire of knowing, and this appetite which cannot be appeased! And therefore I must extend towards Him, to unite and join myself to the goodness of Him to whom I belong and whose I am! Such is the affinity between God and man's soul.


---comments to follow

leeseykay said...

I find myself a little less optimistic when it is not the middle of the night. The transformative power of this quote lies in the recognition that it is true of every human soul whether that soul recognizes it or not.

If to be made in the image and likeness of God merely implies that God is the same biological species as us already, I am disappointed and in doubt as to whether such a God, could meet the deepest needs of the human soul. The spirituality of St. Francis and of the Catholic Church, of whom he is a doctor, insists that the germ of divinity is placed in us at our baptism, and that our need for light to the intellect and beauty for the will, is only satisfied in this life or the next through contemplative mystical rapture that will never get old for eternity.

Catholic spirituality makes those religions seem impoverished which offer merely a "heaven" where we seem earthly; it might be playing golf, retaining a strong sexual appetite, or listening to country music forever without death or sickness. On the other hand I have heard many Christians from different points on the religious map express their disdain for a heaven where the principle duty is to praise, contemplate, and thank God for ever. I am no mystic here, but my appetite is whetted. I don't want any other heaven except the one offered by the Catholic Church. I am confident that the immortal paradise that is imagined by so many religions could not eternally satisfy those who believe in it if it actually did exist.

The message that the angels sang on Christmas night, must be explained to hungry souls,(whether they know it or not, we are all hungry of soul), along with the words of Moses about the fantastic capacity of the human soul, because we are made in God's image, to receive the divine nature from the God whose name is nothing if not philosophical: "I am Who am." A personal Being whose name means existence. Thanks for your consideration of why I find a lesser Being incapable of meeting the deepest needs of the human soul.

Rory

TOm said...

I could not remember what happened in this thread that lead to me reading a bunch of stuff, time passing, and me not getting back to it. I now remember and am not as excited to get back to it at least just yet.
The Opening of this thread does talk about Trinity terminology, so I thought I would offer a little here.
I have always acknowledged that as a LDS we are to “partake of the divine nature.” I am not sure how much I have inappropriately embraced the idea that “the divine nature” and “the divine -ousia” are synonomous. I have recently decided that to the extent I allowed myself to participate in the DEVELOPMENT, I have betrayed Biblical Christianity in ways that LDS should not.
My recent research shows that the Bible did not express any concept of -ousia based divinity despite the fact that it was written in Greek. When 2 Peter says “partake of the divine nature” it is a very different word than “ousia.”
It looks like St. Justin used -ousia to say that Christ is not a foreign substance to God the Father. I am unsure if this is primarily to demonstrate that Christ is truly begotten only OR if it also indicates that St. Justin embraces a -ousia based divinity.
I also wonder if St. Irenaeus ever used -ousia to establish “divinity as such?”
I thought I would mention this here as it belongs here. I wonder if you have already run this thought to the ground and can just say this is how it is?
Anyway, thought I would mention my thoughts here.
Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Over the weekend, you wrote:

==I have always acknowledged that as a LDS we are to “partake of the divine nature.” I am not sure how much I have inappropriately embraced the idea that “the divine nature” and “the divine -ousia” are synonomous. I have recently decided that to the extent I allowed myself to participate in the DEVELOPMENT, I have betrayed Biblical Christianity in ways that LDS should not.
My recent research shows that the Bible did not express any concept of -ousia based divinity despite the fact that it was written in Greek. When 2 Peter says “partake of the divine nature” it is a very different word than “ousia.”==

I am quite interested in learning which sources led you to this new conclusion.

As one who reads Greek and the owner of a good number of classical, koine and patristic Greek resources, I currently (and for some time now) maintain that all the Biblical Greek terms behind the English words Godhead, Divinity, Deity, Divine—theotēs, theiotēs, theios, theion—are directly related to the being/essence of those persons who are GOD. In the words of Blake Ostler, I believe that the above Greek Biblical terms are concrete descriptions of a "class or kind of being" which theists term GOD.

But, I have made a number of major theological adjustments in my lifetime when confronted with compelling evidence/s; as such, I am looking forward to reading the sources that gave cause to your own adjustment.


Grace and peacce,

David

TOm said...

As one who does not read Greek, I readily acknowledge that this is just something that struck me.
Daniel Keating in **Deification and Grace** says the following:
It is noteworthy that both parts of the “formula of exchange”—the Son became like us, so that we might become like the Son—are expressed in the New Testament in terms of participation. In Hebrews 2:14 the Incarnation itself is depicted in the language of participation: “Since therefore, the children share (koinōnein) in flesh and blood, he himself likewise partook (metechein) of the same [nature].” Here we have an example of the first sense of participation, namely, sharing in a common nature. In order to redeem us and “to bring many sons to glory” (Heb 2:10), the Son of God came to share fully in our nature, that is, he became a human being. But the goal of the Son sharing in our nature is also stated in participationist language. We are told in 2 Peter 1:4 that God’s divine power at work in us is brought to completion by our becoming “partakers (koinōnoi) of the divine nature.” Here we have in bold and demonstrative language the promise that the Father has sent the Son to deliver us from sin and to cause us to become sharers in the divine nature itself. But in 2 Peter 1:4 we have an example of the second sense of participation, the unequal and derivative sharing by the creature in the infinite Creator. In this case, we as partakers never become, strictly speaking, what we partake of. We partake of the divine life, but do not become God by nature. And so we can rephrase the formula of exchange (“the Son of God became the Son of Man, so that the sons of men might become sons of God”) in terms of the two senses of participation found respectively in Hebrews 2 and 2 Peter 1. The Son of God partook of our nature and became fully what we are (human beings), so that we might partake of the divine nature and become by grace and participation what he is by nature. To put this in the creedal terminology of the Council of Chalcedon (a.d. 451): The eternal Word of God, consubstantial with the Father, became fully a human being, consubstantial with us in our nature, so that we might become partakers of his divinity. But we never become consubstantial (one in being) with the Father as he is; rather, we are inserted by grace into the divine communion of Persons. This is what it means to become “gods by grace.” (p. 101)

I have long had a problem with the idea that the first half of the exchange formula was full/complete and the second half of the exchange formula was partial/derivative.
I have similarly had a problem that at Chalcedon the Fathers supposedly said that Christ was homoousian in the numeric sense with the Father and homoousian in the generic sense with mankind. To believe either of these seems to indicate to me that the ECF were more interested in poetic sounding language than in theological truth. Like the bumper sticker, “No Jesus, no peace; Know Jesus, know peace.”

What struck me as I was thinking about some of this was that Keating seemed to me to link nature to substance. I had never really questioned this, but I thought I should check to see if the word for nature in the Bible was the same as the word for substance. It was not.

Ουσία - -ousia – Substance vs. φύσις – Physis – nature

TOm said...

Much of this is from www.biblestudytools.com

The word -ousai is used in the Bible two times. It is the “estate / inheritance” given to and squandered by the prodigal son.


The word physis is used more frequently. Strong’s lists the following as definitions:
nature
a. the nature of things, the force, laws, order of nature
b. as opposed to what is monstrous, abnormal, perverse
c. as opposed what has been produced by the art of man: the natural branches, i.e. branches by the operation of nature
d. birth, physical origin
e. a mode of feeling and acting which by long habit has become nature
f. the sum of innate properties and powers by which one person differs from others, distinctive native peculiarities, natural characteristics: the natural strength, ferocity, and intractability of beasts


Peter uses two different forms of the word. He uses the adjective (physikos[fusikov"]) similarly to Jude ( 2 Peter 2:12 ) in comparing the unrighteous to "creatures of instinct." He uses the noun to refer to the innate character of God when he comments that God's promises have been granted to believers in order that they might become partakers of the "the divine nature"

From comments on Paul’s use:
Although the fall corrupted human nature and predisposed people to turn away from God, Christ's work on the cross has made it possible for redeemed humankind to turn toward God and partake of his divine nature once again. Similarly, although creation suffers under the curse of the fall, it too looks forward to the restoration of the original creation order.

I think the way the “divine nature” differs from the “human nature” is a theme present in the Bible. The clearest example IMO is that the God is unchanging and constant and humans are the changing and unfaithful. In my BIASED mind the second most clear is in the high priestly prayer where Christ asks that his disciples become on like He and the Father are one. The separation and opposition man feels to man and man feels to God is contrasted with the ONENESS of Father and Son.

To me the idea that “partaking of the divine nature” has to do with becoming one who has the “innate properties and powers” of the divine is a better read of the Bible than is some derivative (or COMPLETE) sharing of -ousia.

I do not claim this is of much value to reasonable educated people, just that it struck me.
Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Forgive my somewhat tardy response to your May 17 comments, but Rory's posts in the Pope Francis thread has compelled me to engage in a good deal of research into the issues he raised.

With that said, I shall now attempt to address your May 17 reflections.

1.) Daniel Keating's, Deification and Grace -

You wrote:

==I have long had a problem with the idea that the first half of the exchange formula was full/complete and the second half of the exchange formula was partial/derivative.==

I agree with you here. I am convinced that the Bible and a number of early CFs take on the "exchange formula" suggests a full/complete exchange on both sides of the formula.

2.) Terminology -

==I have similarly had a problem that at Chalcedon the Fathers supposedly said that Christ was homoousian in the numeric sense with the Father and homoousian in the generic sense with mankind.==

The Greek of the Chalcedonian Definition (451) strongly suggests a generic sense for both. My studies indicate that the numeric sense was not adopted until much later when homoousia began to be interpreted as monoousia.

==What struck me as I was thinking about some of this was that Keating seemed to me to link nature to substance. I had never really questioned this, but I thought I should check to see if the word for nature in the Bible was the same as the word for substance. It was not.==

This is true, but one must keep in mind the issue of development. The Greek terms ousia, physis and hypostasis as you now know had multiple meanings in the NT and LXX. The same is true with respect to Classical Greek literature.

However, one can easily discern much more precise meanings emerging in the writings of the CFs. I personally see no conflict between the more precise meanings with the theology found within the pages of the Bible. Further, I see no explicit conflict between the more precise meanings and the theology of the BoM.

Anyway, thanks much for your reflections. I suspect that if you and I were to sit down face-to-face we would discern that we share a lot more in common concerning certain definitions/distinctions concerning the members of the Godhead when contrasted with mankind in general than you think.


Grace and peace,

David

P.S. If you have the time, and interest, I would be very interested in your understanding of the events and messages concerning Fatima.

TOm said...

Hello!
David:
My studies indicate that the numeric sense was not adopted until much later when homoousia began to be interpreted as monoousia.

TOm:
I would agree that homoousia began to be interpreted as monoousia, but what scholars usually say is “homoousia in the numeric sense.” I have not seen folks who suggest that traditional Christian Trinitarian teachings are true use the term monoousia to describe what they believe. Folks like Plantinga might be inclined to point to the developed equivalence of monoousia and homoousia in the numeric sense, but I don’t see things like this from Father Don Davis or Phillip Schaff.

Also, do you not see in Athanasius (at least in his later writings) and in Augustine (though I think you have discussed inconsistencies in his writing) the use of homoousia in the numeric sense?

Father Davis says that those a Nicea probably meant the term in the generic sense, but implicit in the term was ALSO the numeric sense. This seems like a bald assertion to me and I do not know where anyone makes an argument for it. Do you know where anyone attempts to justify this CHANGE/DEVELOPMENT. Most folks I mention it to start of denying it and if they move from here gloss over it with the idea that meanings shifted but truth was always believed and hasn’t changed. I am not satisfied.
Cont...

TOm said...

David:
I personally see no conflict between the more precise meanings with the theology found within the pages of the Bible. Further, I see no explicit conflict between the more precise meanings and the theology of the BoM.

TOm:
It is my position that homoousia in the numeric sense is in contradiction with the ONE phrase (used in two places I think) in the Bible that gives us ANY information as to HOW God the Father and God the Son are ONE.
During the High Priestly prayer Christ asks that His disciples become ONE like He and His Father are one. This IMO points very clearly to a oneness that can be shared by men who are homoousia in the generic sense and who will never be homoousia in the numeric sense. But MORE than this, it implies that the ONENESS Christ has in mind has nothing to do with -ousia because the disciples are already homoousia in the generic sense and will never be homoousia in the numeric sense.
Do you know of any other Biblical (or Book of Mormon) scripture that gives us information on HOW God the Father and God the Son are one. I can’t think of any. They are clearly one, but except in linking their oneness to our future oneness, I do not think there is Biblical expression of HOW they are one.

When you say you do not see “conflict” in the developed meaning, I am not sure I agree. I think the developed meaning conflicts with John 17. In fact, I think “partaking of the divine nature” in 2 Peter aligned with the John 17 supports a “the sum of innate properties and powers by which one person differs from others, distinctive native peculiarities, natural characteristics: the natural strength, ferocity, and intractability of beasts” understanding of “physis.” Such that the Bible is more consistently read as saying divinity is associated with the physis of being one (Father and Son) and becoming one (mankind) as compared to a divine substance (ousia) verses a human substance (ousia). As I mentioned before I think there are other aspects of the divine nature (physis) the Bible suggests God possesses and we do not (but are called to) possess such as being unchanging in covenantal faithfulness.
I suspect you and I and Ostler and Paulsen agree that there are two ways in which God is one. God is one because God the Father is One God and is the fount of divinity. God is one because Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are united into One God. The second oneness is best expressed in language of the Social Trinity.
What I, as a believer that the ECF were not inspired and were not protected from error in defining theological positions, suggest; is that I have no reason to embrace that God’s oneness consists of His homoousia. This word in the generic sense was embraced to designate Christ as divine and not human and Nicea, but it came to mean the oneness in the numeric sense. I think Christ’s divinity is/was a product of His perfect union with the Father, his perfect covenental faithfulness, his sinlessness, … not his homoousia with the Father in either the generic or the numeric sense. Nicea was correct that Christ was homoousia with the Father in the generic, but wrong that this indicated that He was divine.

Divinity is a product of physis which is not synonymous with ousia. It is about properties, powers, and character/characteristics.

As I mentioned in my first post, St. Justin looks like he might have already embraced a concept of divine ousia vs. non-divine ousia. I suspect you would say that this is part of St. Justin. I still think it is likely not part of the Bible.
Charity, TOm

TOm said...

David,
As I look over my post (and notice a few errors, but that is not my point), I feel compelled to say that I still do not know Greek and still have less experience in the ECF than you do.
What keeps striking me and results in my likely unwise conviction is that the difficulties I see in how theology developed usually multiply rather than diminish as I learn more.

Over a century after the council most Christian’s point to when they claim “God is one,” the word they (Father Davis and Schaff and many) use to express this oneness still doesn’t mean the type of oneness THEY embrace as necessary. The type of oneness embraced by those who call me a polytheist. The type of oneness embraced by those who claim the Social Trinity is polytheist. If Bryan Cross is right, then the bulk of the ECF until after the 4th council were polytheists.

And …
And …
A bunch of stuff I boldly claimed in the previous post.

Anyway, I do not know much Greek and I could read in the ECF for most of the next 5 years and still be far behind you. But, I sometimes struggle to see how Bryan Cross can maintain his view if he has studied as much of the ECF as he has philosophy. OR if he pushes the philosophy really hard how he doesn’t get to the place where he must say, “how this TRUTH doesn’t violate the simple law of non-contradictions is a mystery, but I have faith ...”

I will say that I do not see how there can be an infinite number of actually eternal intelligences so perhaps there is not?
I will say that I lean towards a view from William Lane Craig that God the Father eternally willed to enter into time and now is in time and away from Ostler’s view that God the Father was eternally in time always, but either view presents some issues I cannot completely solve?
I am a fan of the general theory of relativity and quantum information understandings that make God’s immediate knowledge of all truths everywhere in the universe impossible, but I simply think God is above these things as we understanding them. How is a mystery?

But 3 does not equal 1 in the same way. This is contradiction and seems well within my limited intellect to understand and reject.

Unwise conviction is me!

Charity, TOm

David Waltz said...

Hi Tom,

Thanks much for taking the time to write up your thoughts on our topic at hand. I have a very busy day ahead of me, so I will not be able to do justice to all that you brought up. However, this weekend I plan to dedicate a new thread to address the issues you raised. Until then, I would like to share with you a quote from Schaff that I posted way back in June 2008:

>>The term homoousion, in its strict grammatical sense, differs from monoousion...and signifies not numerical identity, but equality of essence or community of nature among several beings. It is clearly used thus in the Chalcedonian symbol, where it is said that Christ is “consubstantial (homoousios) with the Father as touching the Godhead, and consubstantial with us [and yet individually distinct from us] as touching the manhood.” The Nicene Creed does not expressly assert the singleness or numerical unity of the divine essence...and the main point with the Nicene fathers was to urge against Arianism the strict divinity and essential equality of the Son and the Holy Ghost with the Father.[23]

[23] Philip Schaff, History of the Church volume 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1981 edition) pp.672-673.>> [LINK]

J.N.D. Kelly wrote:

>>It is reasonable to suppose, pace Eusebius, that a similar meaning, viz. 'of the same nature', was read into the homoousion. But if this is granted, a further question at once arises: are we to understand 'of the same nature' in the 'generic' sense in which Origen, for example, had employed ὁμοούσιος, or are we to take it as having the meaning accepted by later Catholic [i.e. Western] theology, viz. numerical identity of substance? The root word οὺσία could signify the kind of substance or stuff common to several individuals of a class, or it could connote an individual thing as such. (Early Christian Doctrine, 2nd ed. 1960, p. 234.)>>

So much more to share, and hope to do so this weekend, the Lord willing.

Grace and peace,

David

TOm said...

On my phone and travelling, but thought I would add a another comment from Schaff that seems different to me.
Also, I may ad Father Leo D. Davis's words someday.
Schaff:
Ὁμοούσιος , consubstantialis (al. coessentialis ), is used in both clauses, though with a shade of difference. Christ’s homoousia with the Father implies numerical unity, or identity of essence (God being one in being, or monoousios); Christ’s homoousia with men means only generic unity, or equality of nature. ** Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical notes. Volume II. The History of Creeds. – Phillip Schaff**


I look forward to your thread and thanks. But make sure you get enough beach!
Charity, TOm