Back on
10/22/13, a gent who posts under the name dguller, provided an argument
in the combox of the Aquinas
and the doctrine of the Trinity: introduction and resources thread which exposes what sure seems to me to be a
logical contradiction in the Trinitarian thought of Aquinas. In my own readings
of Aquinas, I too have detected, what appears to be,
difficulties/inconsistencies/problems, but dguller's presentation is
much more sophisticated than my own musings. In an attempt to bring students
and/or scholars of Aquinas' thought 'to-the-table', I am reposting dguller's
comment/s anew in this thread, without any alteration.
Here's an
argument that purports to demonstrate the inconsistency of Thomism and the
Trinity.
Let’s begin with some preliminaries.
Say that you have A and B, and that A and B are really distinct from one another. A and B would necessarily have some things in common, and some things not in common. You can call what A and B have in common, their “principle of commonality” (or P(C)), and you can call what A and B do not have in common, their “principle of distinction” (or P(D)).
Two points follow from this.
First, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). If P(C) were really identical to P(D), then it would follow that what A and B have in common is really identical to what A and B do not have in common, which is a logical contradiction. It would logically be the equivalent of saying that X = not-X, which is impossible. So, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D).
Second, P(C) cannot account for the real distinction between A and B. Only P(D) can account for the real distinction between A and B. If there was only P(C) between A and B, then A and B would not be really distinct at all, but rather would be really identical. In other words, if A and B have everything in common, then A is identical to B. There must be something about A that differs from B in order for A and B, or vice versa, to be really distinct. That “something” is P(D). To reject this would mean that it is possible for A to be really distinct from B and yet A does not differ from B in any way, which is absurd.
Putting this all together, we have the following principle:
(P) A is really distinct from B if and only if (a) there is P(C) and P(D) between A and B, and (b) P(D) between A and B cannot be really identical to P(C) between A and B (i.e. P(C) = not-P(D)).
It should be noted that Aquinas himself endorses this principle. He writes: “In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction” (ST 1.40.2), and he mentions this principle within the context of a discussion of the Trinity, meaning that it must be applicable to the Trinity itself.
So, let’s apply (P) to the Trinity, which is what Aquinas has already given us license to do.
We agree that the divine persons are really distinct from one another. It would follow, based upon (P), that (a) there must be a P(C) and a P(D) between the divine persons, and (b) P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). Now, what would P(C) and P(D) be in this context?
Aquinas helpfully supplies us with an answer. He states that because “the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations” (ST 1.40.2), specifically “by relation of origin” (ST 1.29.4). That means that the divine essence is P(C) and the divine relations are P(D). This is consistent with what Aquinas says elsewhere when he writes that “the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence” (ST 1.39.1). In other words, the real distinction between the divine persons cannot be accounted for by the divine essence, because you cannot distinguish between the divine persons on the basis of what they have in common (i.e. the divine essence), but only upon what they do not have in common (i.e. the divine relations). Hence, on the basis of (P) it would necessarily follow that the divine relations (= P(D)) are not really identical to the divine essence (= P(C)).
Let’s begin with some preliminaries.
Say that you have A and B, and that A and B are really distinct from one another. A and B would necessarily have some things in common, and some things not in common. You can call what A and B have in common, their “principle of commonality” (or P(C)), and you can call what A and B do not have in common, their “principle of distinction” (or P(D)).
Two points follow from this.
First, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). If P(C) were really identical to P(D), then it would follow that what A and B have in common is really identical to what A and B do not have in common, which is a logical contradiction. It would logically be the equivalent of saying that X = not-X, which is impossible. So, P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D).
Second, P(C) cannot account for the real distinction between A and B. Only P(D) can account for the real distinction between A and B. If there was only P(C) between A and B, then A and B would not be really distinct at all, but rather would be really identical. In other words, if A and B have everything in common, then A is identical to B. There must be something about A that differs from B in order for A and B, or vice versa, to be really distinct. That “something” is P(D). To reject this would mean that it is possible for A to be really distinct from B and yet A does not differ from B in any way, which is absurd.
Putting this all together, we have the following principle:
(P) A is really distinct from B if and only if (a) there is P(C) and P(D) between A and B, and (b) P(D) between A and B cannot be really identical to P(C) between A and B (i.e. P(C) = not-P(D)).
It should be noted that Aquinas himself endorses this principle. He writes: “In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction” (ST 1.40.2), and he mentions this principle within the context of a discussion of the Trinity, meaning that it must be applicable to the Trinity itself.
So, let’s apply (P) to the Trinity, which is what Aquinas has already given us license to do.
We agree that the divine persons are really distinct from one another. It would follow, based upon (P), that (a) there must be a P(C) and a P(D) between the divine persons, and (b) P(C) cannot be really identical to P(D). Now, what would P(C) and P(D) be in this context?
Aquinas helpfully supplies us with an answer. He states that because “the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations” (ST 1.40.2), specifically “by relation of origin” (ST 1.29.4). That means that the divine essence is P(C) and the divine relations are P(D). This is consistent with what Aquinas says elsewhere when he writes that “the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence” (ST 1.39.1). In other words, the real distinction between the divine persons cannot be accounted for by the divine essence, because you cannot distinguish between the divine persons on the basis of what they have in common (i.e. the divine essence), but only upon what they do not have in common (i.e. the divine relations). Hence, on the basis of (P) it would necessarily follow that the divine relations (= P(D)) are not really identical to the divine essence (= P(C)).
But then we reach three severe problems.
First, Aquinas has written that “a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting” (ST 1.29.4), and thus the divine persons are the divine subsistent relations. So, this account is fundamentally circular and tautological. Saying that the real distinction between the divine persons is due to the real distinction between the divine persons does not really explain anything at all.
Second, Aquinas has written that “relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility” and “in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same” (ST 1.28.2). So, we have a logical contradiction, because the divine essence cannot be really identical to the divine relations, according to (P), and the divine essence is really identical to the divine relations, according to the doctrine of the Trinity.
(Furthermore, to say that the distinction between the divine essence and the divine relations is “only … in its mode of intelligibility” (ST 1.28.2) and “differ in our way of thinking” (ST 1.39.1) just means that there is no difference in reality between the divine essence and the divine relations. The distinction between them is exclusively and only in our minds, and does not correspond to reality at all. It is like the distinction between goodness and being, which also “differ only in idea” and “differ in thought” (ST 1.5.1). And that means that a key element in the doctrine of the Trinity is nothing but a mental construct that does not correspond to anything in reality, which makes the Trinity a subjective truth of the human mind, and not an objective truth about reality. And that, in itself, undermines the truth of the Trinity.)
Third, Aquinas has written: “Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature” and “if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature” (ST 1.28.2). And this makes perfect sense, because, according to divine simplicity, the divine essence is Being Itself (ST 1.3.4), and only Being Itself does not depend upon anything else for its existence. Anything that is not Being Itself must depend upon something else for its existence, and anything that must depend upon something else for its existence is necessarily a creature. Thus, anything that is not Being Itself (i.e. the divine essence) is a creature. It would follow, therefore, that since the divine relations are not the divine essence, and everything that is not the divine essence is a creature, that the divine relations are creatures. Not only does this negate the Trinity, but it also has a number of absurd consequences, such as that the divine relations could not exist as cause until their effects first existed, that the divine relations must be composite entities, that the divine relations would exist in a relation of dependence upon creation, and so on.
In conclusion, if one endorses (P), and I do not see how one can coherently reject (P), and also endorses a number of other Trinitarian and Thomist principles, then one is led to a number of logical contradictions. Specifically, the following premises, when taken in conjunction, lead to inconsistency:
(1) A is really distinct from B if and only if (a) there is P(C) and P(D) between A and B, and (b) P(D) between A and B cannot be really identical to P(C) between A and B (i.e. P(C) = not-P(D))
(2) Everything that is not the divine essence is a creature
(3) The divine relations are really distinct from one another
(4) The divine relations share the divine essence in common
(5) The divine relations are really identical to the divine essence
One must reject, at least, one premise in order to avoid logical inconsistency. The question is which one.
Looking
forward to some charitable and spirited discussion...
Grace and
peace,
David, dguller, greetings.
ReplyDeleteMy response may seem somewhat backwards, but I ask that you bear with me.
dguller wrote, Not only does this negate the Trinity, but it also has a number of absurd consequences, such as that the divine relations could not exist as cause until their effects first existed, that the divine relations must be composite entities, that the divine relations would exist in a relation of dependence upon creation, and so on.
If I look at this objection, I can see it has a certain face-value. Applying the concept to my own personal experience, I see that I - as a person - existed prior to my children being born. The existence of my person did not rely on birth or creation (to use dguller's wording) of my offspring. But there are a couple of problems with applying this concept, using the same face-value, to the Godhead.
The first is that it implies a time-based event. This would suggest that there was "a time when the Son was not," and such a suggestion is heretical. It would also imply that the Son is a created creature (thus my bolding of dguller's wording). Since the Godhead is eternal and all persons of the Trinity existed prior to the existence of time itself, there was never a time in which the relations between the persons of the Godhead were not manifest -- there was no dependence on creation.
Before moving forward to proposition which dguller uses to analyze Aquinas, I'd first like to discuss Boethius. Boethius wrote five tracts on the Christian faith;
(TR1) The Trinity is One God Not Three Gods,
(TR2) Whether Father, Son, and Holy spirit may be Substantially Predicated of the Divinity,
(TR3) How Substances can be Good in Virtue of their Existence Without Being Absolute Goods,
(TR4) On the Catholic Faith, and
(TR5) A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius.
These tracts are available on-line at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/boethius/tracts.html There is a link to a .pdf which has all 5 tracts in a single 53-page document. (Less than 40 pages if you don't read the various introductions, forwards, and index.)
Boethius is important because he developed the definition of person which is 1) used by Aquinas, and 2) still in use by many (if not most) western theologians today. I know that David is familiar with this definition. Furthermore, Aquinas references Boethius in many of his works, including Summa Theologica. Many Church historians will say that if Aquinas is the doctor of scholasticism, then Boethius was the first scholastic. Finally, Boethius lived at a time when the Eastern and Western Empires were split, but he actively worked to ensure a unity of the Church even under this political split. This means that he was somewhat versed with both Eastern and Western theologians of his time. Sadly, the Western Emperor thought that ecclesiastical unity also meant political unity and had Boethius executed for treason.
(cont)
Each tract in some way identifies the Godhead as a pure substance, and implies that men are of a less than pure substance. For example, in TR1(I) he writes, Now numerical difference is caused by variety of accidents; three men differ neither by genus nor species but by their accidents, for if we mentally remove from them all other accidents, still each one occupies a different place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two bodies cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore it is because men are plural by their accidents that they are plural in number, with the implication that there are no accidents (such as space) separating the Divine Substance. In section II of the same tract, Boethius further solidifies this concept saying, But the Divine Substance is Form without matter, and is therefore One, and is its own essence. In section III he states this position most clearly as, Now God differs from God in no respect, for there cannot be divine essences distinguished either by accidents or by substantial differences belonging to a substrate. But where there is no difference, there is no sort of plurality and accordingly no number; here, therefore, is unity alone. For whereas we say God thrice when we name the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, these three unities do not produce a plurality of number in their own essences, if we think of what we count instead of what we count with. And finally in section IV, When we say God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance that is supersubstantial.
ReplyDeleteIn the interest of space, I'm not providing references in the other tracts. The link where people can easily read Boethius is above.
It is in TR5 that Boethius derives his famous definition of person, The individual substance of a rational creature. (TR5:III) Using this definition, one could easily conclude that the Godhead is one essence or subsistence, but three unique substances of that same subsistence -- just as David, dguller, and I are three unique human substances of the subsistence which is humanity. But in the paragraphs following his famous defintion, Boethius goes to great length to note that the Greek language has more words to describe or denote both substance and person than Latin did. In fact, he notes that one of his contemporaries joked that the Greek language was not short of words. Boethius also notes that the Church did not allow him to speak of God as three substances. Rather than arguing against the church, he returns to the supersubstantial type language (see TR1 quotes above) saying, For did not the language of the Church forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God,52 substance might seem a right term to apply to Him, not because He underlies all other things like a substrate, but because, just as He excells above all things, so He is the foundation and support of things, supplying them all with οσισθαι or subsistence.
It seems to me that Boethius, when applying his definition of person to the members of the Godhead, is looking at the concept of a substance (person) within a supersubstance (substance), or a substance within a substance. But as he consistently describes God as pure substance, the term "substance" to denote a person is seen as impure and does not mean the same thing we mean when we say "substance" as applied to the Godhead. In fact, in TR5:IV he goes on to state that the context of the ecclesiastical usage should define which specific term is used.
This concept of God being pure substance, and therefore there is no absolutely precise correlation between terms as they are applied to humans, is retained by Aquinas. Thus, if he speaks of a relation or a person being substantial for God, he means it in a manner similar to Boethius: a substance within a (super)substance.
(cont)
Now to discussing dguller's proposition. First, I am in complete agreement with the basic thought; namely that between two distinct items, a point cannot be both common and simultaneously different to those items. And when dguller quotes Aquinas as saying, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction (ST1:XL:2), I also concur with dguller that Aquinas is stating a belief in the same basic proposition. However, one of the first things to catch my eye is that when trying to show that Aquinas violates this principle, each of the quotes dguller used is from sections in Summa Theologica prior to Question 40, Article 2.
ReplyDeleteThis is important. The objection/discussion/short-reply-to-objection format of Summa Theologica does not lend itself to using a single sentence in a discussion as a summary of previous sections. Summa Theologica is written in a forward-thinking manner. That is if a point is brought up with the suggestion that it ought to be explored, you should expect that exploration to come up afterward. This, coupled with my discussion above on the need to be very careful with terms for both Boethius and Aquinas, leads me to wonder if the dguller's quotes ended up taking Aquinas out of context. This suspicion is further strengthened when you consider that one of the "quotes," by relation of origin, is such a short fragment and so completely void of setting that it could have meant almost anything in the original context!
In the interest of full disclosure, I admit that I have not had the time to work through all the preceeding sections of Summa Theologica to say for certain if dguller is taking Aquinas out of context by using these specific quotes as examples. It is simply a suspicion at this point.
But continuing in equal candor, I truly do not feel bad for not working through each of these previous quotes. If you keep reading Summa Theologica (XL:2) beyond where Aquinas says, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction, we will see that St Thomas says that some people may try to argue relation of origin (as suggested by dguller), but Aquinas does not make this argument. After telling the reader that this position (arguing relation of origin) cannot be successful, he writes, Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic. This is in the second paragraph after inviting us to explore what is distinct within the Trinity. In other words, Aquinas specifically tells us not to make the argument that dguller makes on his behalf. St Thomas does not fall prey to the contradiction asserted simply because he does not make the argument which is analyzed.
Interestingly enough, in his discussion, Aquinas not only agrees with dguller that analyzing origin does not constitute a true distinction; but he agrees with dguller on another point. Aquinas writes, For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter. This is simply another way of stating the absurdity which dguller expressed as, such as that the divine relations could not exist as cause until their effects first existed, that the divine relations must be composite entities, that the divine relations would exist in a relation of dependence upon creation, and so on!
In conclusion, I would have to say that Aquinas does not make the argument which dguller asserts for him. We can know this, because Aquinas specifically says he does not make this argument. But going beyond simply avoiding the logical trap, it seems that St Thomas anticipated and answered this specific objection several hundred years in advance.
Hi Jamie,
ReplyDeleteIt is great to see you back !!! I printed off your informative comments today, and plan to read them in depth later tonight. Hope to share my thoughts after I have thoroughly digested your reflections, but I probably will not be able to do so until this weekend (have a full Friday).
God bless,
David
Hello again Jamie,
ReplyDeleteFinally had some time to read your comment/s in depth, and reread dguller's contribution. Would now like to share some of my thoughts...
First, I sincerely appreciate your effort; I found it to be quite informative, and a very helpful response todguller's contribution.
Second, I like the fact that you began your treatment with selections from Boethius, for as you pointed out, Aquinas (and many others) adopted his definition of 'person'. (I also would liked to have seen some background on Aristotle's Categories, for Aquinas adopted his definition of relative/s, but perhaps that is too much to ask for a combox treatment.)
Third, you caught an important flaw in dguller's contribution that I had missed in my first reading: the "relation of origin". Aquinas is quite clear in his position on the issue of origin as not being the ground for distinction in God, for he states:
"Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to the thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone..." (ST I.40.2).
And a bit later:
"It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations..." (Ibid.).
However, it seems to me that an apparent contradiction still remains, namely the relationship between 'relation' and 'essence' in Aquinas' thought. In ST I.28.2 we read:
"Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence; and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same." (He adds a bit later that this is, "by reason of God's supreme simplicity".)
If, "relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same", and the essence is P(C) (as both you and dguller affirm), how can there also be P(D) ?
Have I missed something ???
Looking forward to your thoughts...
Grace and peace,
David
David,
ReplyDeleteGreetings and I hope that you enjoyed your "busy" Friday. I'm hoping it was a good type of busy.
You returned to ST1:XXVIII:2 where it Aquinas says, Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence; and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
I would point out that prior to this, he has said (in the same discussion), Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature ... He goes on to analyze Gilbert de la Porree's error of assigning relation to being as an accident, but notes in God there are no accidents (also in agreement with Boethius). In Aquinas' mind, to view something as purely accidental for God is to render that thing as unreal. Recall that in your 7 APR 2013 blog, you quoted Aquinas as saying Sabellius' error rendered the relations in the Trinity as being unreal.
So at this point in Summa Theologica, I think Aquinas is only trying to state that the Relations in the Trinity (and therefore the Persons) are real. Staying with the substance within a (super)substance view, he's only saying that the Divine Essence has relation and you can't separate them from each other (otherwise, one would be an accident). Note that he is not at this point stating whether there are multiple Relations within God, but rather that whatever Relation(s) exist are real and are substantial to the Essence of God. He gives a hint to the belief that there are multiple Relations when he says, ... only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence.
Remembering the forward-thinking mode that ST is written in, you will note that articles 3 and 4 of this question further develop the distinctions between the Relations. Here Aquinas quotes Boethius as saying that while Essences is singular, Relation can be multiplied in the Trinity. In the next question, he starts to work on the concept of "person." As you can see, St Thomas is peeling back the onion in stages or layers, and only slowly working to describe the differences in the Persons/Relations in the Trinity.
But at this point, he is only making the case that the Relations are real and of (as well as inseparable from) the Divine Essence. In my opinion, to use this section to say more than that is to remove it from context.
Jamie,
ReplyDeleteThank you so much for the your last response. I sincerely appreciate your continuing efforts (and patience). At the end, you stated:
==But at this point, he is only making the case that the Relations are real and of (as well as inseparable from) the Divine Essence. In my opinion, to use this section to say more than that is to remove it from context.==
Given the fact that Aquinas has certainly affirmed the existence of distinctions within the Godhead (and his repeated repudiations of Sabellianism) , your assessment seems acceptable.
But, I suspect that many who do not share a willingness to reconcile the apparent logical contradiction (i.e. that, "relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same") will continue to harbor some suspicion...
God bless,
David
David,
ReplyDeleteI share the same suspicion that there are those who will continue to harbor these particular doubts. But if it takes entire tracts (and sometimes multiple tracts) for both theologians and philosophers to hammer out the details and definitions of concepts such as "person," "essence," "relation," etc, why should we limit Aquinas to just a few sentences when he is dealing with each of these concepts? Would it not be better to incorporate things he's said in other places (especially in the same document!) in order to read to understand? After all, you can't truly disagree with someone until after you understand him. Without understanding, there is the potential that you're both really saying the same thing -- thus, no disagreement.
Blessings and Peace to you and yours for this Thanksgiving.
-- Jamie
Good evening Jamie,
ReplyDeleteEarlier today, you wrote:
==But if it takes entire tracts (and sometimes multiple tracts) for both theologians and philosophers to hammer out the details and definitions of concepts such as "person," "essence," "relation," etc, why should we limit Aquinas to just a few sentences when he is dealing with each of these concepts? Would it not be better to incorporate things he's said in other places (especially in the same document!) in order to read to understand?==
Me: Agreed, and well said.
==After all, you can't truly disagree with someone until after you understand him. Without understanding, there is the potential that you're both really saying the same thing -- thus, no disagreement.==
Me: Excellent points. The primary reason I created a new thread for dguller's critique is entailed in your above thoughts. It was difficult for me to accept that Aquinas had committed what appeared to be a blatant logical contradiction. It seemed so out of place to me that Aquinas would have done so, but a solid answer(s) to dguller was eluding me. So, thanks again Jamie for taking the time to cogently address the critique.
In addition to your reflections, I have also found the following online treatments (which I found earlier today) to be quite useful:
Question 28 - The Divine Relations
Relations
Grace and peace,
David
P.S. Hope you and yours have a great Thanksgiving Day.
Hello David and Jamie,
ReplyDeleteI have now read and re-read this and I guess I lack intelligence or worse yet charity.
When I first read dguller’s principles of commonality and principles of distinction, I thought it was a great way of distilling this. It was interesting that Aquinas also spoke like this.
Let me say something about God that I think everyone has agreed with here:
1. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are one in essence and we can call this a principle of commonality P(C).
2. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are three persons (are three in their relations, are three in their origins or are three in SOMETHING) and we can call this a principle of distinction P(D).
After reading through Jamie’s treatment I saw were it was questioned that God’s relations equal to His essence. I saw were the definition of Person was more complex. I saw where origins and relations were distinguished. I saw a lot of reason to excuse Aquinas from adopting the position that God’s essence is God’s relations and thus essence=relations. But ...
It seems to me that Aquinas cannot say God’s relations are distinct from His essence or Aquinas makes God a composite being. God’s grace is God’s love is God’s justice is ... we mere humans just experience these as different attributes. So if Aquinas at one time says that God’s relations are identical to God’s essence and thus God is not composite and is simple. Then later or before says P(C) is essence and P(D) is relations and P(C) is not the same as P(D) and thus God the Father is not the same as God the Son. But, Aquinas cannot have it both ways.
I think Aquinas was brilliant, but I usually believe that there is zero logical space for the Trinity to exist. God is less than 1.5 in quantity and greater than 2.5 in quantity (and don’t say the way He is less is different than the way He is more else He is composite or ???). But there is no quantity that is less than 1.5 and greater than 2.5 so God as defined like this occupies an irrational space that is not only beyond human comprehension, but is a violation of any rationality.
At other times, I question if everyone else is just so much smarter than I am or I am just too uncharitable to let people define their beliefs.
Charity, TOm
BTW, concerning the P(D) within God I am generally a Social Trinitarian and I think I am regularly criticized for over-emphasizing the fact that there are P(D) in God. I in turn think that most Trinitarians who criticize me are modalist despite their objections. If the “via negative” defines what God is not, what if it leaves nothing for God to actually BE?
It stretches credulity to think that the silver bullet that lays Aquinas low has been discovered now. The argument as stated is such an obvious absurdity that it seems impossible that we are correctly understanding Aquinas. Has no one else spoken of this? Ever? For 750 years this obvious absurdity has been laying wide open for discovery and it hasn't been until now?
ReplyDeleteI am not an Aquinas scholar but I understand history.
1) It seems difficult to believe that someone as circumspect as Aquinas made such an obvious blunder.
2) It is impossible for me to believe that such an obvious blunder has remained hidden for so long.
3) It seems likely that the alleged absurdity has been raised and answered to the satisfaction of Roman Catholics and to the dissatisfaction of those opposed to Catholic theology. But the arguments become so obscure that nobody is persuaded one way or the other.
"No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to reveal Him."
Those who have this belief didn't figure it out. It is not revealed to everybody. We can't insist on comprehension even if those with whom we dialogue insist. If we to whom it has been revealed can't comprehend it, how much less those to whom it has NOT been revealed? Catholics must receive the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity humbly because we have to get used to unceasing generations of scoffers saying that it is foolishness.
A Catholic cannot be surprised when non-Catholics think they have demonstrated the absurdity of our faith. But they are wrong. They have only discovered what we already know:
"A simple glance at the dogma as it is proposed to us by the Church is all that is needed to perceive that not the Trinity, but the indemonstrability of the Trinity, admits of strict theological and philosophical truth. This is the firm unanimous view of practically all theologians from St. Thomas down to recent times..."
----from the Mysteries of Christianity, Matthias Scheeben, B. Herder Book Co., 1947, p.26
Okay, even let's assume Aquinas had some "senior moment" here, even though he only lived to age 47. What follows according to the non-Catholic? He failed to demonstrate the Trinity (even though he agreed it was indemonstrable)? The Catholic agrees. What next?
I am not interested in untangling relations and essence and simple and composite. What follows if it is true that the Catholic theologian Thos. Aquinas made a ridiculous mistake in the Summa Theologica regarding essence and relations and simple and composite?
Hello Rory,
ReplyDeleteHappy Thanksgiving.
It never occurred to me that Aquinas was “laid low” by this.
It has occurred to me that I lack the intellect to understand these technical points. So this could be just that, but I have seldom been served by assuming I was too intellectually weak to understand something when some who understands it thoroughly explains it.
I do not have the faith in the technical points of the Trinity and in Aquinas that you seem to have. As I have observed these questions, I have found many folks who are unsatisfied with the explanations of the Trinity currently available. One might say I have too much faith in Plantinga and Barth and Ostler and the things that that are discussed on this blog. Surely if Aquinas (or Augustine) had solved this all and “there was nothing to see here” we wouldn’t be talking about it.
That being said, as best I can tell, I am not really placing my faith in Plantinga, Barth, and Ostler. Instead, I am trying to understand these questions as best I can. And as best I can understand these questions there is much to be criticized when a Thomist (or an orthodox Trinitarian) proclaims that they are monotheist and there are no logical problems in their monotheism. I am especially sensitive (which might be a block to my rational mind that has nothing to do with my intellectual insufficiency) when these same folks claim I am just too tritheistic. As one who says that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are One due to their perfect union best modeled via a “social” explanation (and I should mention I have subordination in my view too) I maintain that rationality is an advantage to my view. I would also say that modalism scores points over Aquinas when it comes to not violating laws of non-contradiction.
Anyway, my questions/comments do not require you to “untangle” anything, but I am no less (and slightly more actually) concerned that Aquinas has failed to thread a needle that I think is unthreadable.
That does not mean that I do not still admire your faith and the fact that you do think deeply about these issues. I just these issues are close to solved.
Charity, TOm
P.S. Happy Thanksgiving David and Jamie too!
Greetings, TOm.
ReplyDeleteI think that I am going to have to agree with Rory when he says the Trinity is not demonstrable. In fact, we can never completely describe God. Why? Because God transcends creation. Thus, we could exhaust all of the universe and still be wanting for a complete description of God.
I know that previously when I said God's ways are above ours and this limits our understanding of Him, you suggested this might be some type of cop-out (P.Hoffer's blog). Or at least, you seemed somewhat dissatisfied with that explanation. I think the same is true when I suggested that a 2-dimensional being would be very confused by our 3-D representation of the world, and may end up perceiving a single item as being in two places at once. Yet, I am not the first to suggest this. Returning to Boethius, he says, In all the liberal arts some limit is set beyond which reason may not reach. Medicine, for instance, does not always bring health to the sick, though the doctor will not be to blame if he has left nothing undone which he ought to do. So with the other arts. (TR1:intro) At some point, our ability to reason will fail to completely describe God. But we must do the best we can. He also says, It is otherwise, of course, with God. “He is everywhere” does not mean that He is in every place, for He cannot be in any place at all - but that every place is present to Him for Him to occupy, although He Himself can be received by no place, and therefore He cannot anywhere be in a place, since He is everywhere but in no place. (TR1:IV) He asserts the same about God being present to every time. (As an aside, this gives me a clue as how to reconcile Thomas' and Molina's understandings of predestination.)
So God is both everwhere and everywhen, but also nowhere at all. A paradox. I suspect that it would be at this point where Fr Kimel (Orthodox) would encourage us to embrace the paradox and accept it in faith.
The Trinity being three real Persons, yet still One Being is a similar paradox. If I can construct a 3-D object such that a 2-D person would see it as being in two places at once; then knowing that God is an infinite number of dimensions above me, I can accept Him as being Three yet One. If God, by being present to every place and time, is everywhere and everywhen; then I can accept His number as being on both sides of 2.5 on the numberline.
Since you have given me only general disagreements - which I had previously addressed in response to dguller's thoughts, I cannot be any more specific than the above in reply to you. Have you worked through Summa Theologica through each of these sections to see how St Thomas arrives at his conclusions? If so, which specific areas are of concern?
The other point I would make is that your own viewpoint is not "more rational." Rather, you accept your own logical contradictions just as, in faith, I accept mine. While it is not my purpose here to do a detailed critique of Social Trinitarianism, I would like to take a moment to (very) briefly outline some of the logical inconsistencies.
(cont)
(cont from above)
ReplyDeleteIn general, Social Trinitarianism is prone to being polytheism; three distinct gods. This creates a situation where no single divine being is omnipresent nor infinite. This is simply because the other two divine beings must occupy a logical space where the one divine being is not. Thus, each is finite. The sum of three finites is still finite; and under this construct, God cannot be infinite. The same can be said about omnipotence.
If you posit a system with absolute subordination, then there is something that the primary has which is not a part of the two subordinates. This is a substantial difference, making the two subordinates of a different substance than the primary. If the subordination is by choice on the part of the two, then the primary is not truly omnipotent over them. He only has the power which they allow him. Because they allow it, one could say that the two subordinates actually have power over the primary.
Furthermore, if you avoid polytheism by saying that there is a first "one god" who self-generates his own divine being, and then generates the other two divine beings (such as through begetting or procession), you still have problems. For example, in Greek mythology, Gaea was the self-generated divinity. She then begets her consort, Uranus; and the two of them beget the first generation which includes Kronos and Rhea. Kronos and Rhea beget Zeus and his generation. All in all, we have multiple divine beings who are generated from one initial, self-generating divine being or god. Yet no one calls this "monotheism." Still, if we allow this designation of a first "one god" who self-generates as a representation of monotheism, and have the two others as distinct beings; then there is some substantial difference between the first and the other two. If there is a substantial difference, then they cannot be of the same substance and the other two are not "fully god."
The Social Trinitarian must accept logical inconsistencies just as the Trinitarian must. This makes Social Trinitarianism no more "rational" than Trinitarianism. In my view, looking at the concept as a substance within a (super)substance, I am able to overcome the logical contradictions I see in Social Trinitarianism. There can be One Person who is self-generating and who generates the other Two Persons. He can be, in some way primary over the Others, as I do not need the (sub)substance of Person to be in-and-of-itself omnipotent nor omnipresent. These qualities are of the (super)substance or Being. I see the Persons as being distinct (3) from Each Other, yet One in Being. And I do acknowledge that last sentence as being somewhat paradoxical. But, as Fr Kimel has suggested, I will embrace the paradox. I will also place my faith in nearly 2000 years of Tradition, trusting that God the Father, through His Son our Savior, by the power of the Holy Spirit keeps the Church on the right path which leads to, but in this time never fully arrives at, the full understanding of Himself.
Peace and Blessings to you.
Hi Jamie,
ReplyDeleteSome excellent assessments in your reponse/s to Tom. With that said though, I do have some thoughts I would like to share concerning the following that you wrote:
==Still, if we allow this designation of a first "one god" who self-generates as a representation of monotheism, and have the two others as distinct beings; then there is some substantial difference between the first and the other two. If there is a substantial difference, then they cannot be of the same substance and the other two are not "fully god."==
This where it gets unclear for me. If we substitute "self-generates" with 'ungenerated', we have the Catholic/Orthodox (maybe most Prots) position of God the Father being the font of divinity and ultimate source of the other two persons of the Godhead. Some Catholic theologians (e.g. Kasper, Newman) apply the term "Absolute God" to the Father alone; and Aquinas wrote:
>>One of the most important 'relational' distinctions between the three persons of the Trinity is that, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead" (P1.Q.39.A5), the "fontal principle of the entire divinity" (fontale principium totius divinitatis - Aquinas, Commentum in Lib. 1 Sententiarum, D.34.Q.2)>>
Such affirmations sure seem more in line with the Monarchy of God Father position than with a more 'traditional' Trinitarian take.
Grace and peace,
David
Hi Tom,
ReplyDeleteSo good of you to drop by and participate in the discussion. I share many of the concerns you have expressed in your post, especially the daunting task of trying to grasp the incredible depth of Aquinas's thought. With this in mind, I would like to recommend that you utilize the resources I listed in the opening thread of this series on Aquinas (LINK).
I would also recommend the READING THE SUMMA blog. (I linked to a couple of important posts from this site in an above comment.)
And lastly (at least for now), I think you will find the following resource of great value:
The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas
Grace and peace,
David
Hi, David,
ReplyDeleteFirst, let me say that I am no theologian, and I do not have all the answers. But like Boethius' physician, I do my best with the tools I have. Should my efforts fall short, I hope they at least bear some fruit. And, as I said in my reply to TOm, I do recognize that the fullness of the Trinity is something that cannot be fully demonstrated. So I may have what appear to be logical inconsistencies.
Having said that, I looked at your quote from ST1:XXXIX:5, the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead. I also note that this is a partial quote. If I were to use it, I would cite the following, So when we say, "the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead," the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. (emphasis added). It seems to me that Aquinas is referencing personhood, not essence or subsistence. It's important to remember that, like Boethius, St Thomas sees "person" as substantial, but more as a subsubstance to essence in the Godhead.
To better set the context, the quote above comes from Aquinas' reply to objection 6 in the article. But in the discussion section (which is sandwiched between the objections and his reply to them), St Thomas points out that people err when they apply a property to essence which should be properly applied to person; Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, "God," as, for instance we can say "God is begotten" or is "Begetter," as above explained (article 4). (ST1:XXXIX:5 - discussion, emphasis added).
So, with this in mind, and remembering that Person is a (sub)substance of the Divine Essence - a (super)substance, I can affirm a form of primacy for the Person of the Father. There can be, and I believe is, a substantial difference in Persons of the Trinity. But there is not, nor can there be, a substantial difference in Their Essence. I have no issue refering to this primacy as "The Principle" of the Godhead (or Trinity), nor to refering to it as a "Monarchy of the (Person of the) Father." And just as the Son has multiple Names - each refering to the same Person, I have no issue with the Person of the Father holding the name "One God." I can affirm each of these an still affirm a Oneness of Being.
Peace be with you
PS Work is supposed to be picking up for me with an intense, months-long special project. I do not know how much time I will have to participate in com-boxes. Since I don't normally do as much research and double checking in e-mail exchanges, I may be able to keep up with you via that mode. (Of course, I may not - don't know yet). I sincerely hope my participation in this discussion has been beneficial. -- Jamie
Jamie, thanks much.
ReplyDeleteI have found Dave's arguments for the monarchy of the Father biblically compelling. But it seems like there is usually reticence from my fellow Catholics to admit "substantial difference in the Persons of the Trinity." I think it is probably from an inability to demonstrate that this would not lead to a "substantial difference in Their Essence."
Anyway, I really appreciate your participation. I hope it can point the way to how a faithful Catholic like me, committed to defined dogmas, can affirm the truth that Dave has been asserting, while maintaining its compatibility with doctrines that in some ways seem less clear, except that they have been definitely affirmed by the Church.
Regards,
Rory
Jamie,
ReplyDeleteThank you for your response. I try to be sympathetic to the Biblical idea I see in all theologies that “God’s ways are higher than our ways.”
To me I saw Aquinas say one thing when he was trying to define God’s simplicity and another thing when he was trying to define away from a modalist position. Your explanation made it more complex, but I didn’t think that it did what I thought Aquinas was trying to do.
Concerning different spatial dimensions, I have read Flatland and really struggled to hold 4-spatial dimensions in my mind. I cannot to my satisfactions hold 4-spatial dimensions in my mind, but I can work with them mathematically. The rules of logic and math are not violated when a 4th spatial dimension is postulated and used, it just becomes hard to hold these things in my head. I can almost see a 4 dimensional being pass through my three dimensional world and appear at one point to be clearly two non-connected bodies floating in space (see the magician pass a three dimensional ring around one and not the other) and at a different point in time appear as a single being and then latter completely disappear again.
The issue with Trinity discussions is that I see points where we get simple enough for me to hold the variables in my head and understand them well enough to say, “that does not work!” When I say God’s ways are higher than my ways I try to mean that I cannot hold the variables in my head simultaneously not that I have a concept in my head that violates logic.
In the 80’s I watched NFL with my family. In 1987 I went to the Naval Academy and as a freshman was required to learn about Navy football and report to upperclassmen what happened. I was once sure that a score was produced by a touchdown, missed extra point, and a safety. I didn’t know about college 2 point conversion (and in the 80’s the NFL didn’t have that, I do not know if they do now). My ignorance made me certain, but I was wrong. It was a big deal for a freshman at the NA, but I offer it because it was a place where additional knowledge made what I knew to be impossible, possible. Of course, as soon as I was told of a 2 point conversion I knew that my previous knowledge lead to a certainty that was flawed because my knowledge was flawed.
If God or Jamie or Aquinas were to sit down with me and explain would I see why the variables I quite easily hold in my head do not represent the whole of the question and then the problem either disappears OR becomes obviously something like a clarity of 4 spatial dimensions that escapes me but is not a violation of logic.
It seems to me that Jamie and Aquinas do not have the tools to remove all things that scream logical contradiction. Why? Folks like Plantinga and Barth back off the Catholic understanding of the councils to remove these logical contradictions (more on the ones introduced later). The councils also seem committed to human reasoning to determine what Tradition is rather than Revelation (or something).
I am a rejecter of the authority of the Catholic Church, but I try to be fair. I would suggest that being asked to accept something that I cannot make sense of is another reason to be a rejecter. As I mentioned on the other blog, I think that most Protestants have most of the problems Catholics do and then they pick up a lot more. Of course, I have problems too (I can offer clear reasons to not be Catholic, Protestant, or Mormon).
Charity, TOm
On the problems with Social Trinity and Subordinationism, I have left behind a lot if not all the ones you bring up. I do not believe God is omnipotent such that He can make it so that I freely choose to do xyz. I have the power to will my actions, God may give me the power to carry out an action I will, but the will is mine. I love this quote:
ReplyDelete“The submission of one's will is really the only uniquely personal thing we have to place on God's altar. The many other things we 'give' are actually the things He has already given or loaned to us.”
But, I think this compromises God’s omnipotence. The Son and the Holy Spirit have this ability to will too.
Blake Ostler has gone through much of these issues in his various books.
God’s relation to time has been an interesting area for logical problems for me. Ostler dragged me kicking and screaming from the belief that God was “outside of time” completely. But, I understand Ostler to suggest that God has eternally been in time and that the infinite past is not a problem. I lean towards something from William Lane Craig, “God eternally willed to enter into time and then He did and time was.” (or something like that). I offer this because it is the most nagging logical problem I have.
A more damning problem I recognize within myself is this:
If I allow reasoned argument to move me this direction and that and then trumpet the logical coherence of my positions, am I really following God at all or just the best human explanation for God I can find. I respond to this by saying that I unlike Drake and I would think the Catholic Church find wrong theology VERY unimportant. I study these things because they interest me, but if God does not say to me, “I know you not, whence you are: depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity “ it will have almost nothing to do with my tri-theism or modalism, or ....
Charity, TOm
Hi Tom,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for your continued interest and contributions. I know your last posts were directed primarily towards Jamie, but one of your assessments was also contained in an earlier post of yours to a more 'general' audience. You wrote:
==Folks like Plantinga and Barth back off the Catholic understanding of the councils to remove these logical contradictions...==
I am aware of Cornelius Platinga's criticisms of the Latin/Western understanding of the Trinity, but if the Barth you are referencing is the famous Karl Barth, my readings of his contributions on the doctrine of the Trinity sure seem to demonstrate that his view is almost identical with that of Augustine and Aquinas. Are you perhaps referring to a different Barth ? If so, who, if not, could you provide some quotations from his work/s that have led you to understand him differently than I.
Grace and peace,
David
Hi tOM.
ReplyDeleteYou write:
"...I unlike Drake and I would think the Catholic Church find wrong theology VERY unimportant. I study these things because they interest me, but if God does not say to me, “I know you not, whence you are: depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity “ it will have almost nothing to do with my tri-theism or modalism, or ...."
I completely agree. However I think you misunderstand the reason why the Catholic Church would find theology important. Since you know me a little, if you think about it, I am sure you will realize the truth of what I am about to say. I am not Catholic because it matches what I think makes the most sense theologically. I accept the mysteries of the faith because I am Catholic.
Since you adopt my view that theology "will have almost nothing to do" with why a soul would be separated from God, it would seem difficult to think that theology could be a good reason for separating oneself from the Bride of Christ and encouraging others to do so through words or behavior.
Would God remove the priesthood from the earth because of a mistake in theology? Especially when the mistake seems to actually increase God's glory and power? After all what father is upset to learn that his little one has mistakenly thought that dad could do almost anything? It seems to me then, that your position leaves very little room to claim that theological error can be a signpost of apostasy. Re-read the last sentence. I am going a step beyond denying the possibility that theology CAUSES APOSTASY. If it is so unimportant as we seem to agree, then it is NOT EVEN A SIGN OF APOSTASY.
I would suggest that it is the "obedience of faith", that is in question rather than figuring out theology. If precise Ecclesiology, Christology, Soteriology or any other subset of Theology isn't the ticket to an apostasy, it seems like the only other option is bad behavior. I am not taking any chances on that. God is very forgiving of His covenant people in the Scriptures without removing the ordinary channels of grace. I can belabor that point with strikingly vivid examples that most non-Catholics totally ignore.
So anyway, that is why I have chosen to be Catholic and not LDS, which I could be if I didn't tremble at the thought of the colossal mistake of implying (even if I was so nice that I wouldn't say it) that the spotless and blood-washed Bride of Jesus Christ was unholy because of some unhappy political event for which the Church was doubtfully responsible. Non-Catholics see us placing a premium placed on theology. I see us placing a premium placed on loving that which Jesus loves.
My regards tOM. I appreciate your candor regarding human reasoning. That is how to misunderstand the Catholic faith. Because Catholics offer reasons does not mean that it can always explain the mysteries of faith to everyone's satisfaction. If you could expose what appears to be an inconsistency to which there was no reply, by God's grace my faith will stand firmly mute. I don't believe because I understand. Theology is only important because it shows we trust God enough before a scoffing world to believe what we can't explain.
Faith before reason,
Rory
I wrote:
ReplyDelete"Non-Catholics see us placing a premium placed on theology. I see us placing a premium placed on loving that which Jesus loves."
That was two clunky sentences. Sorry. I kind of think Tom would get it, but this statement could be misunderstood by others.
It isn't failure to figure everything out that could be problematic. NOBODY figures everything out. But a problem could seem to arise if in the name of being unable to agree with an article of faith (figure everything out), one should be so confident in their lack of understanding as to be certain of the liberty to separate oneself from that which the Son actually loves supremely, His Church, so intimately united to Himself as to be described analogically as His Bride.
Today is the Feast of the Immaculate Conception and the Introit used was Is. 61:10. It reminds of how God magnifies His covenant people: "I will greatly rejoice in the Lord, and my soul shall be joyful in my God: for he hath clothed me with the garments of salvation, and with the robe of justice He hath covered me, AS A BRIDE adorned with jewels.."
I can not be a universalist, or even close. I believe in a well-populated Hell. It seems to me to be revealed that many souls who think to be pleasing to God will be eternally separated from Him. I fear to be a modern sentimentalist although it is tempting when virtually the whole "Christian" world seems to deny that the way to salvation is strait, "and few there be that find it." Alas, even the Successor of Peter today seems drawn to this "loving" lie of Satan.
If I weren't Catholic it would be easier to say that everybody, or almost everybody is saved. Theology really wouldn't matter much. Church affiliation wouldn't be very important. But it is revealed that the good God has adorned as a bride with jewels His covenant people, His True Church, His Son's Bride. If one will be so bold as to despise (in actions if not word) the Bride of Christ, what can I expect? Salvation? Hardly.
I expect what is revealed, that at that awful day there will be those who say to the Lord that they worked for him, loved Him, only to hear that He never knew them. How can we love our Lord and despise what He has adorned as a Bride?
Anyway, for what it is worth, I was trying to say that God cannot be pleased with us if we fail to love that upon which He has heaped every treasure. It isn't that non-Catholics fail to accept theological formulae, that is the damnation of heretics and schismatics. It is that without due reflection, a soul should think it is safe to pronounce by word or deed, that what God loves best is deformed, unholy, or untrue.
I hope this makes me thinking more clear, even if it would be unpopular.
Rory
If I might jump in ...
ReplyDeleteThe essence of my argument is that what the divine persons have in common cannot be identical to what the divine persons do not have in common. What the divine persons have in common is the divine essence. Therefore, what the divine persons do not have in common cannot be the divine essence.
What differentiates the really distinct divine persons cannot be the divine essence, precisely because they all share it in common, but rather must be something that they do not share in common, which necessarily cannot be the divine essence.
Call what the divine persons do not share in common, X. X is not the divine essence. The divine essence is Being itself. Therefore, X is not Being itself. Whatever is not Being itself is a creature, and thus X is a creature. Therefore, what differentiates the divine persons from one another is a creature.
Certainly, this is impossible.
And thanks to David for posting my comments from before to facilitate discussion of this important topic.
ReplyDeleteAnd just for clarification, I make no claim to originality in my argument. I'm sure it has been made numerous times by independent thinkers over the past several centuries. :)
Jamie:
ReplyDeleteJust to comment on some of the points that you raised earlier.
The first is that it implies a time-based event. This would suggest that there was "a time when the Son was not," and such a suggestion is heretical. It would also imply that the Son is a created creature (thus my bolding of dguller's wording). Since the Godhead is eternal and all persons of the Trinity existed prior to the existence of time itself, there was never a time in which the relations between the persons of the Godhead were not manifest -- there was no dependence on creation.
First, when I talk about “prior to creation”, I am talking about causally priority and not temporal priority.
Second, I agree that the conclusion that the principle of distinction between the divine persons is a creature does contradict core tenets of Trinitarian theology. However, that just means that you have to show that my argument has either false premises and/or an error in formal reasoning. If you cannot, then there is a serious problem here.
This suspicion is further strengthened when you consider that one of the "quotes," by relation of origin, is such a short fragment and so completely void of setting that it could have meant almost anything in the original context!
Just to be clear, it really doesn’t matter for my argument whether the principle of distinction is the different origins, the different processions, the different relations, or whatever. You can just say that whatever distinguishes the divine persons from one another is X, and therefore, if my argument is correct, it necessarily follows that X is a creature. The absurdity still follows.
In conclusion, I would have to say that Aquinas does not make the argument which dguller asserts for him. We can know this, because Aquinas specifically says he does not make this argument. But going beyond simply avoiding the logical trap, it seems that St Thomas anticipated and answered this specific objection several hundred years in advance.
I don’t think that Aquinas did address my argument, other than by completely bypassing it, or completely muddling the issue with incoherent propositions, such as that the divine essence is really identical to the divine relations, and only distinguishable in our minds, but not in reality, and yet wanting to still claim that the divine essence is what the divine persons share in common, and thus cannot be the principle of distinction between them.
Anyway, you agree that if A and B are really distinct, then what A and B have in common cannot be identical to what A and B do not have in common. In this case, if the divine persons are really distinct, then what the divine persons have in common cannot be identical to what the divine persons do not have in common. Aquinas clearly states that what the divine persons have in common is the divine essence, and thus what the divine persons do not have in common cannot be identical to the divine essence. There must be something that differentiates the divine persons from one another, and it cannot be the divine essence, but rather must be something else, which you can call X. It does not matter what X is, as long as X is not the divine essence. However, the divine essence is Being itself, and thus X cannot be Being itself, which means that X is a creature. And thus it necessarily follows that causally prior to creation, the divine persons were indistinguishable from one another, meaning that they were not really distinct causally prior to creation, which is absurd.
Any thoughts?
Hi dguller,
ReplyDeleteSo good to see you back; I had hoped that you might check back in. With that said, it may be a bit late, for Jamie on 12/01/13 wrote:
==PS Work is supposed to be picking up for me with an intense, months-long special project. I do not know how much time I will have to participate in com-boxes. Since I don't normally do as much research and double checking in e-mail exchanges, I may be able to keep up with you via that mode. (Of
beneficial. -- Jamie==
If Jamie is unable to return to the discussion, I will try to get Dave Armstrong to drop in. He is a Catholic apologist who has written a book on Aquinas, and has participated here in the past.
Grace and peace,
David
All,
ReplyDeleteI hope to continue dialog with both TOm and dguller. Please give me a little time.
TOm, Just a quick note to say that I understand your Plebe year story. I'm USAFA '84.
-- Jamie
Hi David,
ReplyDeleteI get very busy at work lately and have not had much time browsing news on various blogs.
This post is so very amazing. I like dguller's argument, and I personally think his conclusion to be reasonable and valid, that is to say there is a contradiction in the said trinity theory.
The only possible conclusion that I can find to justify the theory and to counter dguller would be to say since the essence is infinite and beyond human understanding, what the three persons have in common is the divine essence, and the distinction lies also in the mystery of the divine essence, since it is infinite and beyond all human understanding, why not it can also be the X that distinguishes the three persons.
Thanks,
Mark
Mark:
ReplyDeleteThe only possible conclusion that I can find to justify the theory and to counter dguller would be to say since the essence is infinite and beyond human understanding, what the three persons have in common is the divine essence, and the distinction lies also in the mystery of the divine essence, since it is infinite and beyond all human understanding, why not it can also be the X that distinguishes the three persons.
I don’t think that will work, because it would lead to a logical contradiction. What the divine persons share in common cannot be identical to what the divine persons do not share in common. If the divine persons share the divine essence in common, then the divine essence cannot simultaneously be what they do not share in common, which is precisely what X must be. To say that because of “the mystery of the divine essence”, the divine essence “can also be the X that distinguishes the three persons” would mean that the divine essence is identical to X, which is precisely what is logically impossible.
dguller,
ReplyDeleteI agree with your conclusion, it is a logical fallacy.
But the last line of defense seems to be reconciling the human logical fallacy to the sublime mystery of the divine essence which surpass all human understanding, that is to say, X is the divine essence, or rather a "special attribute" of the divine essence called "person".
I have seen quite a few of able writers with otherwise very sound mind and great learning, lost themselves in a joy of ecstasy, totally transcendent, meditating on this great mystery of the Trinity.
Thanks,
Mark
Mark:
ReplyDeleteBut the last line of defense seems to be reconciling the human logical fallacy to the sublime mystery of the divine essence which surpass all human understanding, that is to say, X is the divine essence, or rather a "special attribute" of the divine essence called "person".
First, I agree that the divine essence is beyond human comprehension, but the bottom line is that God cannot be logically contradictory, and if the principle of distinction was identical to the principle of commonality, then God would be logically contradictory. It would be the logical equivalent of saying that X is identical to not-X.
Second, to admit a “special attribute” to the divine essence, which is differentially expressed in the different divine persons, would admit composition and potency into the divine essence, which is pure actuality and simple. There is no differential expression of the divine essence. It is fully actualized without any possibility of potentiality whatsoever, including a “special attribute”.
I don’t see any possible solution in which divine simplicity and the doctrine of the Trinity is preserved. Something must be abandoned and rejected. The only question is what.
And I'm sure someone could drive themselves dizzy with confusion trying to contemplate a square circle, but that is only because one is trying to comprehend something that is logically impossible, which results in mental gridlock and collapse. That is not a sign that there is something superbly profound behind the concept, but rather that the concept itself is empty.
Hi dguller and Mark,
ReplyDeleteLike Mark, when speaking of the Divine essence, I think one needs to admit to some 'mystery'. I also think the same must be said concerning the 3 persons of the Godhead. However, while some 'mystery' shall always exist/remain for us finite creatures, I do not believe that we are totally in the dark on these issues. In this THREAD, I listed the following "5 propositions":
I. There is but one God, the Father.
II. There are in the Godhead three (not mere names or modes) truly distinct persons (hypostases)—the Father, the Son or Word of God and the Holy Ghost.
III. These three Persons are 'one' in ousia, essence ('one' used here in a generic sense)—i.e. the three Persons are ὁμοούσιος (homoousios), not μονοούσιος (monoousios).
IV. There is but one beginning/cause (μοναρχία, monarchia), one font/fountain or principle of Divinity (πηγὴ θεότητος), God the Father, Who alone is aὐτόθεος, God of and from Himself; the Son and Holy Spirit deriving their Divinity (ousia, essence) and personhood from Him; the Son by generation, and the Holy Spirit by procession.
V. Because the Son and Holy Spirit derive both their Divinity (ousia, essence) and personhood (hypostasis), from God the Father, this derivation is not limited only to the person of the Father, or the Divinity of the Father; but rather, from both the person and Divinity of the Father.
I would be interested in what you guys think about the above—i.e. do you agree with them; would you delete some of them; would you add to the list.
Grace and peace,
David
Just to follow up on Mark's comment a little.
ReplyDeleteAll logical arguments are grounded in our understanding of the created order. In other words, the truthmaking of any sentence/statement/argument is not found in the sentence/statement/argument itself, but rather in our de re understanding of the terms that make up those sentences/statements/arguments. Without a de re understanding of the terms, any argument is vacuous. With that said, does anyone here know (de re, not de dicto) what it means to be eternally begotten? For Aquinas this is a principle of Faith. Also, what is Aquinas' goal? Is he trying to show the internal logical consistency of the Trinity, or is he trying to show how the doctrine itself is consistent with revelation?...Just some thoughts.
Apparently I posted at the same time as others. Disregard any redundancies.
ReplyDeleteDavid,
ReplyDeleteRegarding your 5 propositions, IMHO, this is the most conservative summary of faith if one would to honor two things 1) the Bible as the revelation of God and the sole rule of belief and conduct; 2) a living tradition of faith among the community and followers of Jesus that is shown in the writings of prior to the Council of Nicea.
If we were to abandon #2 and replace it with a living mother catholic church and the infallible teaching, then the conclusion would be the prevailing Triune God or the Divine essence as the one God, and persons as attributes or mode. This is logical following the authority of the mother church, but I find it to be contrary to the Bible, early tradition and human reason.
If we were to only honor the Bible as our guide and completely ignore all traditions of any community or followers, it seems to me that it would lead to a human Jesus of Socinianism.
Let me know what you think,
Thanks,
Mark
David,
ReplyDeleteI thought you might find this paper interesting...
http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~brower/Papers/Abelard%20on%20Trinity.pdf
Hi Mark,
ReplyDeleteA very interesting reply. I agree totally with your first two paragraphs, but concerning the third, I would argue that the pre-existence and divinity of Jesus Christ would make Socinianism suspect.
Grace and peace,
David
Hello Steve,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for the link Brower's treatment. Just moments ago, I downloaded the pdf to my hard-drive, and quickly glanced through it. It looks very interesting. Plan to print it off tomorrow, and read it in depth.
Grace and peace,
David
While continuing to insist with faith that the mystery of the Blessed Trinity cannot be explained, I trust also that Catholic mysteries cannot be accurately demonstrated to be illogical.
ReplyDeleteBecause of the second of my stated principles, in the interest of furthering the discussion, I have been reading and re-reading the thread this evening in conjunction with a work on the Summa which seems to embrace the teachings of the Catholic Church and the arguments of St. Thomas.
The author of this work himself seems to see the problem that has been raised by TOm and dguller:
"To have distinction we must have difference; and since there is no difference whatever on the side of nature-the three Persons having the numerically same divine nature--the sole possibility of difference lies in the processions of one person from another."
---from volume 1, p. 153 of the book mentioned below. (Sheed and Ward, 1941)
Walter Farrell was a Dominican priest writing in the middle of the last century. His five volume work, A Companion to the Summa, which attempts to shine light on the teachings of the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas.
My question for TOm, Dave, dguller, or others who still question whether Aquinas committed a logical fallacy in his explanation, is whether you think that Fr. Farrell's succinct summary pointing to the "sole possibility of difference" is compatible with what St. Thomas teaches in the Summa.
I must admit I am not well qualified to be critical, but it seems to me like Fr. Farrell ably defends the statement he makes above and locates "the difference" without compromising the divine nature. But before examining his claims, it seems important to see if you agree that he has correctly perceived the problem. If there is any interest, after we have appraised his comment about "the sole possibility of difference," I could be willing to share some of his arguments and observations.
Thanks for your consideration of my question regarding this commentary on St. Thomas.
Rory
Here's a simpler version of my argument:
ReplyDelete(1) C is a principle of unity between A and B iff A and B share C in common iff C is present in A and C is present in B
(2) C is a principle of distinction between A and B iff A and B do not share C in common iff C is present in A and C is absent in B
(3) A principle of unity between A and B cannot be identical to a principle of distinction between A and B
(4) The divine persons share being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) in common
(5) Therefore, being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) is a principle of unity between the divine persons (by (1), (4))
(6) Therefore, being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) cannot be identical to a principle of distinction between the divine persons (by (3), (5))
(7) If A is not identical to being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself), then A is a creature
(8) Therefore, a principle of distinction between the divine persons is a creature (by (6), (7))
You clearly want to reject (8), because it violates core theological truths, and so you must reject one or more of the premises. Which will you reject? You cannot reject (1) or (2), because those are just definitions of what a principle of unity and a principle of distinction are. You cannot reject (3), because that would result in a logical contradiction, i.e. what A and B have in common is identical to what A and B do not have in common. You cannot reject (4), because the divine persons share being God in common. And you cannot reject (7), because it is true that if something is not God, then it is a creature.
I really don't know what a Thomist Trinitarian would do, other than appeal to mystical and negative theology, which would itself undermine the determinate nature of the doctrine of the Trinity.
Hi dguller,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for the streamlined version; hopefully it will renew some interest in this thread.
Now, I don't think I have ever asked you what your own theological position is—could you share it with us ???
Grace and peace,
David
David:
ReplyDeleteMy theological position is complicated. I'm actually an atheist who has sympathies with classical theism, particularly the Aristotelian-Thomist variety.