This last Tuesday, Drake
Shelton, on his blog "UNCREATED LIGHT", posted a thread under the
title, "Triunism and Sabellianism; Is There a Difference?" (LINK). Though I have sincerely appreciated a number of
Drake's threads on 'Nicene Monarchism' and 'Triadology' (his output is very
impressive), this recent thread is not among them, due to a few 'difficulties'
that I have with some key aspects of the post. In the rest of this thread, I
will be delving into some of those 'difficulties'; Drake opens his thread with
the following:
It is the desperate and
hopeless cause of the Triunists to distinguish their view from Sabellianism.
There is a reason for this: it cannot be done. I have cataloged here a list of
popular historic Triunist Theologians, their accounts of Sabellianism and their
desperate and meaningless attempts to distinguish the Triune view from it.
The first
"Triunist" theologian he examines is Thomas Aquinas, beginning with
the following quote from his Summa Theologica [Drake is using the Christian
Classics Ethereal Library online edition (no date and no translator provided);
I will be using the Christian Classics 1981 reprint of the Fathers of the English Dominican Province 1911 translation - link to
online edition]:
“On the contrary, Boethius
says (De Trin.) that in God “the substance contains the unity; and relation
multiplies the trinity.” Therefore, if the relations were not really
distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only
an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.”
Drake comments on the
above quote with the following:
The problem with Aquinas’
view is that his theology makes persons relations. This is ad hoc
nonsense. I am a brother, I am a son, I am a cousin, but that does not make me
multiple persons.
IMO, the identification of
the 'persons' as 'relations' by Aquinas (he is following Augustine and Boethius
here) is not problematic if one has a clear understanding of what Aquinas
meant by 'relation'. In the first article of Question 28, Aquinas in his
answer states that, "relations exit in God [i.e. the Divine
essence/nature] really", and that:
"...when something
proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and
the source of procession, agree in the same order; and they have real relations
to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the
same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4), these relations, according to
divine processions, are necessarily real relations." (P1.Q.28.A1)
In the next Question (29),
Aquinas goes on to defend Boethius's famous definition of person: "a
person is an individual substance of rational nature". Aquinas writes:
I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by
itself ; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called this, because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own ; for they are called hypostases, or first substances.
Further
still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions ; and which are not only made to act, like others ; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances ; and this name is person. (P1.Q.29.A1)
One of the most important
'relational' distinctions between the three persons of the Trinity is that,
"the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead" (P1.Q.39.A5), the
"fontal principle of the entire divinity" (fontale principium
totius divinitatis - Aquinas, Commentum in Lib. 1 Sententiarum, D.34.Q.2)
Now,
I sincerely doubt that a Sabellian would be able to honestly embrace a number
of the above affirmations by Aquinas, especially that the three persons of the
Godhead are "individual substances" that have "real
relations" with each other. Maybe I have misunderstood Aquinas and/or
Drake; if so, I would greatly appreciate some correction.
Grace
and peace,
David,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your thoughtful critique, I have not read the above section of Aquinas, so I cannot comment on that.
I have read something very similar to this "person as relations" in my close reading of Bavinck, I agree with Farrell's conclusion that their notion of "peron as relations" is a notion of dialectical opposition (this point I believe is what Drake is contending).
I will try to bring up some Bavinck's quote later on this matter.
Thanks!
Mark
Here is a pretty good summary of Q29 from the first part of the summa.
ReplyDeletehttp://readingthesumma.blogspot.com/2010/11/question-29-divine-persons.html
I don't see where he distinguishes it.
ReplyDeleteIf you notice, in this article he never states that this language applies to the divine persons.
Moreover, he states later,
"I answer that, As above explained (Q[13], AA[1],2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves"
>>>Did you catch that? When he says that persons are substances of a rational nature that does not mean that he is saying that when this definition is used of the divine persons that it denotes anything real.
He continues,
"for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created."
>>>Did you catch that? I would not make that big of a mistake David. I have read Aquinas for many years. I understand how Monadism works like the back of my hand.
More:
"In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied"
(And by essence he makes this very clear later that he is referring to numeric being-DS)
...
Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence."
>>>You see. When he is using substances of the divine persons he does not mean what I mean by the word nature, being or substance.
More:
"Reply to Objection 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/aquinas/summa.FP_Q39_A2.html
Hi Mark,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for taking the time to respond; you wrote:
==I have read something very similar to this "person as relations" in my close reading of Bavinck, I agree with Farrell's conclusion that their notion of "peron as relations" is a notion of dialectical opposition (this point I believe is what Drake is contending).
I will try to bring up some Bavinck's quote later on this matter.==
Looking forward it Mark. (I have the English translation of Bavinck's 4 volume, Reformed Dogmatics; if I have some spare time later today, I will check the section on the Trinity).
Grace and peace,
David
Hello Steve,
ReplyDeleteThank you so much for the link—what an impressive blog/site—I hope to set aside some time each day and read through the exhaustive material.
Since it seems that you have some interest in Aquinas, I would like to share a link with you that I think you will greatly appreciate:
The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas
Grace and peace,
David
Hi Drake,
ReplyDeleteSincerely appreciate your taking the time to respond (I know you have a very busy schedule).
I fear that I am not fully understanding everything you posted, so bear with me as I ask for some clarifications. You wrote:
==I don't see where he distinguishes it.==
Me: What is "it"?
==If you notice, in this article he never states that this language applies to the divine persons.==
Me: Which "article"?
==Moreover, he states later,
"I answer that, As above explained (Q[13], AA[1],2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves"==
Me: Doesn't 1.Q13 pertain to, ""Whether God can be named by us?", and the following implications? Further, what do you mean by "he states later"?
==>>>Did you catch that? I would not make that big of a mistake David. I have read Aquinas for many years. I understand how Monadism works like the back of my hand.==
My initial understanding of "Monadism" came via Reformed theologians, and I just assumed that Aquinas was in full agreement with them (something they were very quick to point out). However, I don't remember (I could be wrong on this) that the Reformed theologians placed as much emphasis on Boethius as did Aquinas; and I don't remember them placing much emphasis on the fontal dynamics of the Father—these two aspects seem to reflect an Eastern/Greek influence that is pretty much absent from most Reformed theologians.
==>>>You see. When he is using substances of the divine persons he does not mean what I mean by the word nature, being or substance. ==
Me: Agreed, but, his use of hypostasis goes beyond mere modality; note the following from 1.Q29.A2 (which addresses the 'question' whether "person" is the same as hypostasis, subsistence and essence):
"I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v. ), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks ousia, which we may call essence. In another sense substance means a subject or suppositum, which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention ; and thus it is called the suppositum. It is also called by three names signifying a reality—that is, a thing of nature, subsistence, and hypostasis, according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called subsistence ; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called hypostasis; or substance. What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name person signifies in the genus of rational substances."
Looking forward to your response...
Grace and peace,
David
David, thanks for the link. I had a different book on the Trinity by Fr. Emery in my wishlist...now I have two :)
ReplyDeleteDavid,
ReplyDeleteI came across this....
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXADpdG6Uqc
This is a movie made by Restoration Fellowship, a Socinnian group of Christians, they interviewed several people in this movie, in 21"20 mark, the Restoration Fellowship interviewed a pastor in CA about the Trinity, he explained it using the "persons as relation" theory. I believe this is precisely what Bavinck's point is, so Aquinas (per Drake's presentation).
Thanks,
Mark
David,
ReplyDeleteHere are some Bavinck's writing on "person as relations" from my reading note from his very famous Reformed Dogmatic.
First of all, Bavinck affirms the distinction of person lies not in substance but in mutual relations. He said,"Accordingly, the distinction between being and person and between the persons among themselves cannot lie in any substance but only in their mutual relations." (Lib 2, p. 303)
By relation does he mean a real ontological relation derived through eternal generation? Or by relation he has in mind different modes or roles or functions of one being itself? Answer, the difference is modal. Bavinck wrote:"The difference really exists, namely, in the mode of existence. The persons are modes of existence within the being; hence, the person differ among themselves as one mode of existence differs from another, or - as the illustration has it - as the open palm differs from the closed fist. " (Lib 2, p. 304)
Just as his illustration, a palm is a hand open, while a fist is that same hand closed. So Father is the same divine being as a Father, and Son is that same divine being as a Son, and more importantly, he adds a dialectic to his notion of "person as relations", he wrote:"So as the divine being is not substantially different from being Father, Son, and Spirit but only relationally. One and the same being is, and is called, "Father" when it is understood in his relation to the same being in the person of the Son. The persons differ individually only in that one is Father, the other Son, and the third Spirit. " (Lib 2, p. 306)
Is he saying the three persons are just three roles or modes of the same being? Yes, he is, Bavinck wrote:" The Father is God as Father; the Son is God as Son; the Holy Spirit is God as Holy Spirit. " (Lib 2, p.306)
Is our learned Dr. Bavinck really that confused so that a person is no longer a subject but an abstract mode of one thing in dialectical opposition to another mode of the same thing? Yes, he is. He wrote:" The first person is, and is called, the Father because he stands in a unique relation to the Son and the Spirit. " And again, "Augustine has abandoned all trace of the idea that the Father is the real, the original God. He bases himself on the essence of God, which is present equally in all three persons" And again, "The Father can only be called Father because it is as person, not as God, that he is the Father of the Son. " (Lib 2, p.287)
Thus is Bavnick's understanding of person as the mode of one being in relation to another mode of that same one being.
Thanks,
Mark
Is our learned Dr. Bavinck really
Pardon my ignorance, but what does Bavnick have to do with Aquinas? It seems Bavnick has a different understanding than Aquinas with respect to subsistent relation in that which is ipsum esse subsistens.
ReplyDeleteHello again Mark,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for the quotes from Bavinck; but before on I comment on them, a word or two about Sir Anthony Buzzard. I met Anthony at one of the Northwest Bible Conferences back in the mid-90s. I remember him touting a recently published book by Karl-Josef Kuschel titled, Born Before All Time? - The Dispute over Christ's Origin, a book which argues against our Lord's pre-existence, which, of course, is also denied by Anthony. I also remember signing up for his monthly newsletter, "Focus on the Kingdom" (which I still receive). And finally, at another NBC, I participated in a roundtable debate on the issue of Christ's pre-existence which included two of Anthony's top students (there names are eluding me at present). Anyway, Anthony is a very bright gent, and has made some significant impact via his writings, speaking, organization (Restoration Fellowship), and school (Atlanta Bible College); however, with that said, I believe that is theology of God is seriously flawed on a number of points...
Now, to the Bavinck quotes. Last night, I began re-reading Bavinck's treatment on the Trinity in volume 2 of his Reformed Dogmatics (pages 256 - 334), getting to page 310 before falling asleep. That seemed providential, for the quotes you provided in your post are from that section. You asked the question:
"Is our learned Dr. Bavinck really that confused so that a person is no longer a subject but an abstract mode of one thing in dialectical opposition to another mode of the same thing?"
Your answer was: "Yes, he is."
I am certainly no expert on Bavinck, but with you, I sure come away from this section of his on the Trinity with a strong sense that he is, indeed, "confused". On page 302 he states:
"In the dogma of the Trinity the word "person" simply means that the three persons in the divine being are not "modes" but have a distinct existence of their own."
But then, on page 304, as you pointed out, he writes:
"The difference really exists, namely, in the mode of existence. The persons are modes of existence within the being; hence, the person differ among themselves as one mode of existence differs from another, or - as the illustration has it - as the open palm differs from the closed fist. "
If Bavnick is not "confused" here, I sure am !!!
Grace and peace,
David
Hello again Steve,
ReplyDeleteEarlier today, you posted:
==Pardon my ignorance, but what does Bavnick have to do with Aquinas?==
Me: Mark comes from a Reformed background which 'traditionally' maintains that the notable Reformed theologians understanding of the Trinity is virtually identical to that of Aquinas.
==It seems Bavnick has a different understanding than Aquinas with respect to subsistent relation in that which is ipsum esse subsistens.==
Me: I am coming to that conclusion too. IMO, Calvin (and a number of his followers) have deviated from Aquinas, adopting an understanding of the term "person" that is much more 'modal' than substantial/subsistent. (Hope to type up a separate post on this soon, the Lord willing.)
Grace and peace,
David
David,
ReplyDeleteGood discussion. I think that you're right in trying to understand what Aquinas means by "relation," and I think context plays a huge part. I'd like to focus on the objection you quoted from the original blog. Certainly anyone reading this can say something similar to, "I am a father, a son, a friend, etc," and note that these are each properly called relations. So it is only logical to wonder if Aquinas says that persons are relations, then are we actually multiple persons?
I would say that St Thomas is using "relation" slightly differently than "relation" is meant when saying, "I am a ..." First, when looking at the Godhead, we note that "Father" is used as a proper name for the First Person of the Trinity. In Aquinas speak, we can say that "Father" is the name of that Relation. However, in the Godhead, the Father can only say, "I am a father" to the Son. He does not say that to, nor about, the Spirit. If He did, then by necessity, the Spirit would have to say, "I am a son to the Father," making the Second Person of the Trinity something other than the "only begotten." Rather, with respect to the Spirit, the Father says, "I am the Source of Procession," or "I am the First Principle of the Spirit" (to paraphrase the CCC). This means that within the Godhead, using the language of the objection noted above, the Father has two relations: fatherhood and sourcehood. Yet St Thomas does not conclude that the Father is two persons based on these two relations. When talking about persons, "relation" has a different meaning.
In the end, Aquinas uses "relation" to refer to persons; in the Godhead, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. But note that the links you have provided (including the book in .pdf) and the links from Steve indicate that a personal relation must also have action or activity. This action or activity can be a connection to another person. This connection can be expressed as, "I am a father, son, friend, etc." It is a relation or relation TO, and in more modern language, we call it a relationship. Thus, we could say, "A relation has relations with other relation(s)," where the center "relation" is a connection relation or a relationship, and the outer "relations" are persons. This can be very confusing and care must be taken to correctly discern context.
For a person to be real, he must be a relation that has real relationships to other persons. It is the relationships which provide the action or activity that allow us to distinguish between persons or personal relations. Take the statement, "The sons of my parents are brothers. I am a son of my parents. Therefore, I am a brother." Assuming both my parents and I exist, we can be called "real" persons or relations. I say I am a son and they say they are parents. The relationship distinguishes between them and me. However, the parent/son relationship cannot distinguish between me and my brother. It is that brother relationship that provides that means to distinguish. However, if I am an only child, then there is no relationship to distinguish me from my "brother." I may claim a brother, but he is not a real person.
I don't have to say he doesn't exist in order to say that this "brother" is not a person. From Aquinas, I can say that real persons are relations who must have the activity of relationship and my so-called brother does not have the activity of relationship. Thus, he is not a real person.
When St Thomas says the error of Sabellius was in making the persons of the Trinity "not real," he was talking along those lines. I think Aquinas would say that even under Sabellius, God is a Person. He is a relation with the relationship of Creator to any given human person. But with Sabellius, there is no real relationship between Father, Son, and Spirit. So Sabellius makes the Trinity unreal.
Hi Jamie,
ReplyDeleteThanks much for dropping by and sharing some of your thoughtful insights that are contained in the above post. I find in more than just a bit interesting that much of the content of your post concerning "relations" and the Trinity are quite close to those of Dr. Gilles Emery, as found in a book of his I am currently reading: The Trinity.
Dr. Emery is a professor of dogmatic theology at the University of Fribourg, and is the author of the following book that I linked to above (and which you mentioned):
The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas
I plan to do a separate post on Dr. Emery's The Trinity as soon as I finish it (the Lord willing); it is amazing the depth and breadth that Dr. Emery has been able to provide in a mere 219 pages !!!
Grace and peace,
David
David,
ReplyDeleteHave you read this one?
http://thomistica.net/news/2007/5/10/gilles-emery-ops-latest-book.html
I have yet to purchase any of Fr. Emery's books, and am trying to figure out how to get the most bang for my buck.
Hi Steve,
ReplyDeleteI do not own, nor have read, the book you linked to; it looks like a collection of essays, and I may pick it up in the future.
As for the two other books by Dr. Emery that I mentioned, I would say that his The Trinity would be the best choice if one were to purchase only one of the two. I am almost finished with it now, and I'm very impressed with it.
Grace and peace,
David
Ok, thanks. Looking forward to your next post.
ReplyDeleteOK, you convinced me. Just ordered "The Trinity" by Fr Emery from Amazon.
ReplyDeleteHi Jamie,
ReplyDeleteCould you let me know when you have received the book and start reading it--I would like to create a new thread to discuss/review it.
Grace and peace,
David